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ABSTRACT 
Successful implementation of new technologies is necessary for survival in today's 
increasingly competitive banking environment. The banking sector is now the UK's 
largest investor in new technology. As a result of de-regulation and new technological 
opportunities, the dominant market position of the traditional banks is under threat from 
new market entrants. Such organisations are harnessing the latest technology to 
develop their services, and are not constrained by the costs of running national branch 
networks and integrating a diverse historical legacy of incompatible computer systems. 
This thesis addresses the question of why the massive investment by UK retail banks in 
information technology is not being translated into significant productivity gains. The 
issue is referred to in the literature as the IT productivity paradox. It will be argued that 
the importance of the banks to the economy as a whole, and the position of the industry 
as the UK's largest investor in new technology, make it a particularly suitable arena in 
which to study this phenomenon. 
Six empirical case studies of recent new technology projects are analysed by the 
development of grounded theory. The findings indicate that dysfunctional organisational 
structures and cultures, together with poor management of expertise, combine to 
sabotage change and constrain the potential of new technology projects. Most 
significantly, a lack of organisational learning is contributing to the IT productivity 
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paradox. Even successful projects had limited impact because the lessons learned were 
not disseminated throughout the organisation. The study concludes that the full potential 
offered by information technology will continue to elude the banks until their apparently 
complacent attitude towards organisational change isaddressed. 
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CHAPTER 1 -INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter begins by describing the thesis of the research, and then 
goes on to provide a brief overview of the major issues which will be covered in more 
detail later on. This includes a review of the historical and contemporary background 
of the banking industry, to explain why it was chosen as the subject of this study. 
These issues are expanded upon further in Chapter 3. An outline of the theoretical 
framework from which the thesis was derived is then described. A number of possible 
explanations of the IT productivity paradox have been put forward by earlier writers, 
and these theories are detailed in Chapter 2. Finally, the reasons why the particular 
research method pursued was chosen as the most appropriate for this study are 
explained. Full details of the methodological arguments are described in Chapter 4. 
THE THESIS 
This research investigates why the massive investment by UK retail banks in 
information technology (IT) is not being translated into significant productivity gains, 
given that successful implementation of new technologies is necessary for survival in 
the increasingly competitive environment that the banks inhabit. The literature 
provides examples from research in many industdes of this so-called 'IT productivity 
paradox'. It will be argued that the importance of the banks to the economy as a 
whole, and the position of the industry as the UK's leading investor in new 
technologies, make it a particularly suitable arena in which to study this 
phenomenon. The pivotal position occupied by the banks in society also means that 
lessons leamed from the cases studied may have relevance in a wider context than 
is usually provided by concentration upon one specific industry. 
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The research undertaken will show that various aspects of organisational structure, 
culture and management style (such as a tendency to adhere to traditional processes 
and values) can combine to sabotage change, thereby constraining the potential of 
new technologies in the major UK banks. The specific nature of the factors inhibiting 
new IT project success in the banks studied, and the relationship between each of 
these factors, was not apparent at the beginning of the programme, but became 
clearer as the research progressed. Analysis of the empirical material collected 
suggests that a lack of organisational learning is contributing to the maintenance of 
the IT productivity paradox. Until this issue is resolved, it is contended in this study 
that even IT project successes will have a limited impact upon the activities of the 
organisation as a whole. This is because structural and managerial constraints 
ensure there is little chance of the lessons learned from successful projects being 
adopted in other parts of the organisation. As a result, specific successes are rarely 
replicated elsewhere. 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The financial services industry is an important area for study as it plays a major role 
in the changing fortunes of the UK economy. It is also the largest investor in new 
technology within a society that is rapidly becoming dominated by service industries. 
The banks regard technological investment as the key to generating competitive 
advantage and maintaining their threatened domination of the market for financial 
services. According to a 1996 survey by Computer Weekly and Kew Associates 
quoted in the Times, the UK banking and finance sector as a whole was expected to 
spend E5.28 billion on information technology in that year alone. The figure 
represents an increase of 13 percent over total spending in 1995. Figure 1 
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summarises the overall current and forecast expenditure on information technology 
by European banks. More recently, an information technology survey by the Financial 
Times (1st July 1998) estimated that total expenditure on IT systems by European 
banks was likely to exceed $21 billion in 1999 alone. 
Progressive deregulation in the financial services industry, and the availability of new 
technological opportunities, has meant that many traditional barriers to market entry 
have now been removed after the banks have enjoyed years of operating as an 
informal cartel. It has also resulted in greatly increased levels of competition in the 
industry. For example, Microsoft could use its domination of world-wide computer 
networks to introduce new forms of money transmission, and telephone operations 
such as First Direct, unlike the major market players, are not tied by the costs of 
maintaining outdated (but still essential) computer systems and extensive branch 
networks. Tesco and Sainsbury are among the major retailers now offering banking 
services. Both have an extensive customer base and strong brand image. They also 
offer their customers higher rates of interest than any traditional bank or building 
society. 
In response to these ongoing changes, the banking industry is undergoing significant 
structural adjustment. Recent merger and acquisition activity includes Lloyds of TSB 
and Cheltenham & Gloucester building society, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation of Midland, and the merger of Halifax and Leeds building societies, to 
name but a few. Many building societies are also opting to lose their 'mutual' status, 
effectively turning themselves into banks and thereby allowing the provision of a full 
range of financial services. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the broad issue of technological change. The aim 
is to provide a theoretical framework within which the empirical study of new 
technology projects in the banks can be located. Additional literature which is 
specifically related to the issues raised in the empirical work is described in later 
chapters where relevant. Because of the inter-disciplinary nature of the study, it is not 
possible to review in full previous work in all of the related fields, and indication is 
given in the text where brief summaries of existing literature only are provided for the 
sake of clarity. For example, the issue of a 'banking culture' is frequently raised in 
the case study banks, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore in detail the 
many facets of corporate culture. 
Chapter 3 reviews the history of the financial services industry in the UK, and 
describes how IT has evolved into an integral part of the banking business. It then 
compares innovative developments by the established banks with the activities of 
industry newcomers, and speculates upon the potential impact that successful 
developers of new technological innovations may have on the traditional make up of 
the industry. 
Chapter 4 describes the method which was followed in conducting the research, and 
also the principles of grounded theoretical analysis that were applied to the data 
collected from the case study banks. 
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Chapter 5 introduces these banks and their particular new technology projects which 
formed the empirical research material. The dominant categories to emerge from the 
analysis form the subjects of the remaining chapters, namely: 
Chapter 6 Organisational Structure for IT 
Chapter 7 Knowledge Management 
Chapter 8 Leadership 
Chapter 9 Organisational Culture 
Chapter 10 describes the results of a further analysis of these chapters which 
highlights a lack of organisational learning in the banking industry. This finding was 
the common theme to emerge from the analysis process. The concluding chapter 
considers whether the specific research questions detailed at the end of Chapter 3 
have been fully addressed, and identifies areas where further research is necessary. 
Finally, the implications of the findings are considered in the context of future 
success prospects for both the traditional banks and industry newcomers. 
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT THEORETICAL DEBATES 
Research by Freeman (1988) into the causes of Japanese success in recent years, 
accorded a primary role in the pursuit of economic growth to technological 
innovation, in both products and processes, which facilitated cost reductions and 
quality improvements. He showed how these changes were themselves based upon 
a combination of deeply rooted social and organisational characteristics. He also 
noted the increasing importance of service industries to the UK economy because of 
their massive investment in information technology to develop and enhance their 
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businesses. Freeman's work therefore seems to imply a major role for the banking 
industry in the process of technological change. 
Barras (1990) described the financial sector as 'the vanguard of the service 
revolution' and claimed that the diffusion of new technology from the banks to the 
rest of the service sector would eventually reap benefits for the whole world 
economy. Other writers have considered the implications of developments in 
information technology to be so pervasive that they will eventually facilitate a new 
wave of economic growth at a macro level, with attendant rewards for its protagonists 
(Bolter, 1989, Freeman and Perez, 1988, Zuboff, 1988. ) These authors all 
maintained that established business practices were likely to be transformed during 
this process, and traditional structures and mechanisms rendered obsolete. 
In practice, there appears to be little evidence so far that the banks are living up to 
their supposed role as leaders of a 'technological revolution'. A paper by Flannery 
(1996) reflects back on the forecasts he made in a 1973 book when the 'impact' of 
technology on banking business was being discussed in a similar language to today's 
talk of 'revolution' and 'transformation': 
"In reviewing past predictions about the impact of technology upon financial 
services provision, / discovered that history has not been kind to many of our 
forecasts. I urge you to consider this fact when evaluating todays technology- 
induced 'transformations of the financial landscape. "' (Page965) 
In 1973 Flannery had predicted the imminent demise of paper cheques, and the 
circuitous bank clearing network, in favour of an electronic system. While there have 
undoubtedly been important developments in electronic payment systems since his 
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original work was published, they have evolved alongside the paper based methods 
rather than replace them. For example, the credit card industry has grown 
dramatically since 1973 but settlement is still dependant on a voucher-based 
authorisation system. The cheque cleadng system in the UK is now largely 
automated, but still operates to traditional timescales and mechanisms whereby 
paper is physically exchanged between branches. Caution is clearly necessary 
because parallels can be traced here with current extravagant predictions of the likely 
impact of 'home' or'internet' banking upon the demand for more traditional systems. 
Despite the scale of their IT investments, and the level of knowledge built up over 
some 30 years of computerisation, Gates (1995) has dismissed banks as 'dinosaurs' 
in their use of IT. Technology companies have made handsome profits by 
encouraging banks to spend more and more money on technological innovation, but 
the benefits are often elusive. The computerisation of banks has been referred to in 
the Financial Times as 'the biggest bank robbefy of all time' (Naim, 1996). A recent 
survey by Morton, of IT consultancy Braxxon Technology (1996) found that 71 
percent of the banks questioned had no idea whether their new technology systems 
delivered value for money, and 50 percent had no measures in place to assess the 
effectiveness of their investment. 
While IT applications have undoubtedly increased processing capacity by automating 
tasks previously accomplished by hand, it will be shown in this thesis that the 
opportunity to utilise technology to instigate more fundamental change has not been 
maximised. New systems introduced in the banks often make little impact upon 
productivity and stimulate little change to established routines. This phenomenon has 
become known as the 'IT productivity paradox'. Hackett (1994) addressed the 
specific issue of low return upon the massive technological investment in service 
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industries. He claimed that 80% of all technology investments are now made by the 
service sector, but his work showed how productivity (defined as the value of outputs 
measured against the value of labour and capital inputs) in the banking and 
insurance industries has been in decline since 1977. It can, of course be argued that 
the banks have focused upon quality improvements rather than cost reductions, 
although evidence for this is hard to find. 
Research by Fincham et al (1994) found that banks had concentrated their IT 
strategies upon the automation of existing processes to reduce costs, and also in 
copying the trends set by their major competitors, rather than focus upon innovation 
and business transformation. As a result, the traditional structures, functions and 
priorities within the banking industry still remained largely unchanged. Chapter 5 will 
describe how attempts by the banks to establish a European-wide payment system 
have so far been unsuccessful, with international money transmission remaining an 
area of banking which still relies upon procedures and timescales established in the 
Victodan era. 
McLoughlin and Clark (1994) identified three major contributory factors to the IT 
productivity paradox. Firstly, they noted a tendency for new technologies to merely 
replicate existing procedures, rather than make use of the opportunity to update and 
integrate work processes. (This finding is supported by the work of Zuboff (1988). 
She distinguished between two possible uses of new technology; on the one hand 
merely to 'automate' tasks that were previously accomplished manually, and on the 
other to 'informate'. This meant using technology more imaginatively to add value to 
business transactions. ) Secondly, McLoughlin and Clark found that the relationship 
between employee and machine resources was often badly managed. Thirdly, there 
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tended to be a poor fit at the organisational level between technology strategy and 
the overall objectives of the companies studied. 
To summarise the arguments made so far, it is clear that despite the growing 
importance of service industries in the UK, and the opportunities presented to both 
traditional and new market entrants by technological advances, the banks have had 
limited success to date with the implementation of innovative projects. Historical 
evidence shows that exaggerated claims of the 'impact' of technology have been 
made in the past, and the passage of time has revealed a more prosaic outcome. In 
contrast to the predicted 'revolution' in business structure and practice precipitated by 
IT, in many respects little appears to have changed. This is despite the dominant 
market position enjoyed by the banks and the vast sums of money they have devoted 
to technological investment over an extended period of time. Such reticence also 
offers significant opportunity for new market entrants to challenge the traditional 
banking structure in the UK. This study will seek to establish the reasons for what 
can at best be described as a disappointing track record with new technology in the 
banks. 
The reasons put forward by earlier writers for the disappointing findings outlined 
above are expanded upon in Chapter 2, but can be summarised here as follows: 
0A lack of accountability, whereby money wasted is written off and lessons are 
not leamt from failed projects 
0A focus upon the automation of existing procedures, which is symptomatic of 
a reluctance to change established business practices 
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0 Poor human resource management, with 'technology' issues taking 
precedence over'people' issues 
0 Misalignment of technology and business strategy 
0 Patching of obsolete technologies to meet changing demands 
Examples can also be found of research that is more optimistic about the 
opportunities offered by IT. Freeman (1988) suggested that technological 
developments were pervasive enough to precipitate a new 'tech no-econom ic 
paradigm', once enough time was allowed for the necessary (and major) social 
changes to catch up with technological developments. Zuboff (1988) described how 
IT had the potential to 'informate' business processes. By this she meant that 
significant qualitative improvements could be made, provided the systems were 
designed intelligently and with the input and cooperation of all the employees 
involved. Benefits would therefore accrue to the business over the longer term, but 
their intangible nature would make them difficult to measure in a quantifyable way. 
So on a more positive note, the productivity paradox could also be explained as 
follows: 
0 Insufficient time has yet been allowed for organisational changes to be 
implemented, thereby matching rapid technological developments 
0 Organisations are using IT to facilitate the introduction of entirely new 
business practices, or to focus upon service quality improvements - features 
which are difficult to quantify in terms of productivity. 
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THE RESEARCH METHOD 
In view of the importance of the banking industry to the UK economy as a whole, the 
apparent paradox between technological opportunity and business reality in the UK 
retail banks warrants further investigation and analysis which will be undertaken in 
this study of 6 major new technology projects. The various explanations for the IT 
productivity paradox that have been introduced here will be assessed in the context 
of experience of new technology implementation in the case study banks. The aim of 
the empirical research is thus to establish the extent to which grandiose claims for 
the 'impact of IT' in the banking industry are actually borne out in practice. The study 
will focus upon material obtained from a range of new technology projects recently 
implemented in both the traditional UK retail banks and by industry newcomers. In 
cases where projects can be categorised as failures, the reasons for the observed 
shortcomings will be explored. Equally, the factors underpinning the management of 
more successful projects will form a useful area of comparison and contrast. 
The results of the empidcal study will be analysed in conjunction with the findings of 
earlier researchers in the area of technological change management in banking. 
Particular aftention will be paid to the relationship between organisational technology 
policies and the nature and extent of change that is introduced. Previous work in the 
banks (for example by Scarbrough and Lannon, 1994; Pennings and Harianto, 1992; 
Morris and Westbrook, 1996) has concentrated upon individual cases and specific 
results obtained rather than reviewing the range of possible solutions and analysing 
why in some cases one particular strategy was favoured over others - which is the 
approach taken in this thesis. 
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It is anticipated that the research process will identify other specific organisational 
and management issues that impact upon the change process in either a positive or 
negative manner. The recommendation of particular management strategies which 
enable the full potential of information technology projects to be unlocked, could be of 
practical value as a guide to aid the running of future projects in the financial services 
sector. In addition, the comparison between the technology management strategies 
of industry incumbents and new market entrants will inform the debate over the 
extent to which banks are likely to maintain their dominant market positions into the 
21 st Century. 
CONCLUSION 
By investigating the reasons why IT investments in the banks have failed to meet 
expectations, this study will address the issue of whether UK retail banks are 
equipped to sustain and build upon their traditional roles at a time of significant 
environmental change. This chapter has described a range of possible explanations 
for the IT productivity paradox which have been proposed by earlier writers. It will be 
argued in this thesis that despite massive investment in information technology over 
a long period of time, the major reason why banks are not obtaining maximum value 
from new projects is because of a lack of learning from past mistakes. 
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CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 
THE PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews relevant literature on the subject of technological change and 
the IT productivity paradox, firstly at the macro and secondly at the micro level. The 
aim is to provide a conceptual and theoretical framework that will inform subsequent 
analysis of the actual influence of technology in specific organisations within the 
financial services industry sector. The chapter begins by considering the importance 
of innovation and technological change throughout the economy in the context of 
continued economic growth and prosperity. This somewhat utopian scenario is then 
compared with the reality of technological change in practice. The relative economic 
decline of the UK on the world stage in recent years is noted, and evidence put 
forward to show how productivity has actually declined despite the widespread 
adoption of information technology throughout the economy. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to investigate possible links between national economic decline and the 
effective utilisation. of IT within organisations, but this discussion introduces the issue 
at the heart of the thesis - the apparent paradox of diminishing returns in the banking 
industry despite massive technological investment at the organisational level. Whilst 
cognisant of the dangers of generalising from specific case studies, it is contended 
here, (and developed further in Chapter 4) that detailed examination of individual 
projects can provide valuable insights into a problem which appears to be endemic at 
the macro level. 
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To inform the subsequent debate about the nature and extent of technological 
change espoused by the banks, the chapter goes on to examine the various 
definitions of 'technology' that have been put forward by writers in this field. A 
number of theories are then discussed which have been developed from these ideas 
as to the influence of technology in organisations, each one purporting to 
characterise and explain technological change. The analysis includes a review of 
published literature on 'technological determinism', which assigns a positive and 
prescriptive role to the actual technology itself in the search for economic growth. 
The merits of alternative viewpoints which claim that the nature of a new technology 
is shaped to varying degrees by prevailing organisational attitudes and practices are 
then considered. This review concludes with a discussion of technological change 
and how the process can be managed. The chapter ends by explaining the position 
that will be taken in this thesis towards the definition and influence of technology and 
productivity, and why this particular viewpoint and the chosen methodology were 
considered to be most appropriate in the context of the study of the IT productivity 
paradox. 
THE NEED FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE 
ECONOMY 
Technological change is regarded as a process that is fundamental to the continued 
prosperity and development of a modern economy, enabling competitive positions to 
be maintained and enhanced. The simplistic Victorian view of technology attributed 
the causes of economic growth directly to new technological developments, without 
analysis of the nature of the change process and the inter-relationships between the 
variables involved. Technology was therefore seen as exogenous to the economic 
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system. The enduring work of Kondratiev and Schumpeter showed that the process 
was in fact more complicated than this. Kondratiev (1935) described how innovations 
seemed to be concentrated upon the upturn section of continual economic cycles of 
boom and slump, with each cycle taking about 50 years to be completed. The so- 
called 'First Kondratiev' was associated with the industrial revolution and growth of 
the textiles, iron and coal industries. The next cycle saw the rise of the railways in the 
mid 19th century, followed by the combustion engine and electricity at the turn of the 
current century. Since these ideas were originally published it is possible to add the 
growth of the large corporation after the second world war as a 'Fourth Kondratiev', 
and current developments in the field of information technology may be regarded as 
the start of another cycle. 
Each wave has a pervasive impact throughout the economy because of the rise of 
associated industries and need for entirely new forms of expertise and working 
practices. Initially this generates optimism, demand, investment and employment 
until the new system is integrated into the economy. Opportunities exist for new firms 
to service the needs of organisations that do not have the necessary expertise to 
develop the new technology themselves. Increasing competitive pressures then force 
more and more players from the market, unemployment increases, investment and 
demand fall and economic downturn begins. Schumpeter (1942) developed the work 
of Kondratiev by emphasising the central role played by technological innovation in 
the growth of capitalist societies. He wrote of 'gales of creative destruction' in which 
innovative products and processes swept aside obsolete industries and set up 
entirely new contexts in a disruptive, but ultimately beneficial fashion. Schumpeter 
referred to these changes as 'long waves of economic activity. His work has been 
influential in the development of more recent theories of technological change at both 
the macro and micro level. 
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For example, Freeman and Perez (1988) viewed the diffusion of information 
technology through the economy as the latest example of this phenomenon (the 5th 
Kondratiev wave) and claimed it was indicative of the emergence of a new 'techno- 
economic paradigm. 'They believed that a sufficient concentration of IT innovations at 
a micro level would have a pervasive impact upon the operation of markets as a 
whole, and the activities of organisations within these markets, stimulating economic 
growth and competitive advantage. Within this scenario, a new paradigm could 
emerge by a process of selection from a number of feasible innovations. However, 
the authors qualified their claims with the assertion that change would take many 
decades to filter through the economy 'as a result of a process of leaming, 
adaptation, incremental innovation and institutional change. They warned that during 
the transition period, the existing social framework, (which had evolved to suit very 
different circumstances) would come under severe strain, as social change is even 
slower to achieve than technological change. The authors also noted that the new 
economic system which eventually resulted might require deliberate technology 
policies, and considerable investment, to create the necessary new infrastructure. 
The new system would both appear and operate very differently from earlier 
'paradigms'. 
At a more micro-level, Nelson and Winter (1982) also drew upon the work of 
Schumpeter. They took issue with traditional economic theory which assumes 
conditions of knowledge and environmental constraints that are rarely experienced in 
practice. They used an analogy with evolutionary biology to explain their influential 
theory of the nature of technological change, whereby the uncertainty generated by 
threats from competitors and unstable environments forces organisations to change 
and develop in order to survive. The authors claimed that those firms that managed 
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the process successfully would enhance their market position and the remainder 
would go out of business altogether. The interaction of various strategies and 
techniques that are used to pursue this goal are far more complex and wide-ranging 
than the 'profit-maximising' scenario of firm activity envisaged by orthodox economic 
theory. 
Nelson and Winter emphasised the role of technology and technological change in 
the context of survival of the firm. They described how organisations within a given 
industry moved along 'a natural technological trajectory' which was influenced by 
historical activities and defined the conditions under which the firm operated. A 
competitive edge could be generated by an organisation which was able to move 
these parameters into new directions by utilising the knowledge and expertise of its 
employees, the reputation and flexibility of its business, or other innovative means. 
According to the authors, this activity resulted in incremental, or 'evolutionary' 
changes because the costs and attendant risks involved in radical change away from 
the existing trajectory were deemed to be too high. The theory could also help to 
explain why businesses tend to react conservatively in the face of technological 
developments that call for entirely new concepts of work organisation and practices. 
It has been empirically tested in the banking industry by Pennings and Harianto 
(1992), who examined the introduction of video banking. They found that the skills 
needed to manage existing business operations tended to inform the direction of 
prospective changes, with the focus upon improvement of deficient or inadequate 
methodologies rather than business transformation. In their words: 
"New solutions are similar to or in the neighbourhood of current solutions. On 
the voyage to new territories we are attracted to what looks familiar to or 
consistent with what we already know. " (p. 30) 
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This idea is closely related to Basalla's (1988) view of innovation as the 
recombination of existing knowledge. It will be developed in subsequent chapters and 
tested empirically in the context of technological change in the banking industry. 
To summarise the argument presented so far, the implications of developments in 
information technology have been considered to be so pervasive that they could 
eventually facilitate a new wave of economic growth at a macro level, with attendant 
rewards for its protagonists. In the process, claim supporters, traditional and 
established business mechanisms are likely to be rendered obsolete. For example, 
Forester (1985) described how developments in technology have acquired a 
'revolutionary' tag, thereby representing the most significant change since the early 
days of the Industrial Revolution. This has led to the ambitious idea of the potential 
applications of technology 'unleashing a tidal wave of technological innovation' and 
hence economic growth. Barras (1990) introduced a 'reverse product life cyc/e'model 
of the innovation process in the financial services industry, and extended it to the 
macro level with the ambitious claim that advances in information technology would 
eventually stimulate the diffusion of this process throughout the economy. Porter and 
Miller (1985) suggested that the impact of technological change could alter the 
structure of an industry, and in so doing introduce new rules of competition. Many 
other writers can be mentioned who have put forward similar claims for the 
'revolutionary' impact of technology. Nellis (1994) considered that the impact of 
technology on profitability, structure and activities would be a key driving force behind 
the transformation of the financial services industry if it was to meet the challenges of 
the 1990s. 
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A number of significant developments could be cited in support of the argument that 
technology is 'transforming' financial services, notably Direct Line's innovative 
telephone based insurance service, and the relentless growth of call centres inspired 
by First Direct's telephone banking operation. Graham (1997) presented evidence 
which suggests that these services are evolving alongsid traditional banking 
business rather than replacing it, because bank customers are maintaining their 
existing accounts whilst opening additional accounts with telephone providers: 
"New direct channels simply add another layer of costs, while older and more 
expensive ones have to be kept open. Although the leading high street banks 
have closed neady a quarter of their branches over the past ten years, the 
branch is still not dead. " (p. 3) 
Brierley (1997) supported this finding with his analysis of recent research into brand 
awareness in the financial services industry. He concluded that while awareness of 
innovative banking products was high, actual consumer take up was significantly 
lower, and even then it tended to supplement a customer's existing arrangements 
rather than replace them. Dunne (1998) showed how First Direct has taken 8 years 
to record a small profit. This has been achieved during a period of very limited 
competition because other banks only belatedly recognised the potential of telephone 
banking. In comparison, she calculated that the 'Big Four' clearing banks together 
made E46.5 million per da in 1997, and that these profits had invariably come from 
'bread and butter' business such as loans and mortgages: 
"How have they done it? In their most basic form, banks make money 
because they lend to customers at one rate but pay a significantly lower rate 
to those customers who only want to deposit money with them. " (p. 17) 
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So is information technology really transforming industry structures and business 
practices in the way that has been claimed? The next section of this chapter will 
contrast the somewhat utopian scenario of inter-linked technological innovation and 
economic growth described above with the apparent economic decline of the UK in 
the post-war period. 
THE PARADOX OF RELATIVE UK ECONOMIC DECLINE IN THE 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: THE ROLE OF BANKS AND FINANCE 
The relative decline of the UK as a world power has been neatly summarised by the 
title of a book by Hutton (1995) - 'The State We're In'. The book begins by charting 
historical events that have contributed to the commonly perceived status of the UK - 
and which still prevail in the country to this day - as the leader of the industrial 
revolution, empire builder, workshop of the world, and winner of two world wars. 
Despite political rhetoric, the reality is far more prosaic and Hutton illustrates how the 
facts of economic decline have been well documented by many writers. According to 
a 1995 survey by the World Economic Forum, the UK now ranks towards the lower 
end of international prosperity league tables, just two places above Chile. In a similar 
survey by the OECD, Britain was placed 18th out of 24 countries. Paradoxically, this 
relative decline in recent times presents quite a contrast to the boom years of the 
1950s and 60s, which pre-dated the widespread application of information 
technology. 
Hutton also noted that in Victorian times the commercial banks increasingly focused 
their business upon trade activities with the expanding empire, rather than upon 
domestic industrial investment. Hutton identified the structure of the UK financial 
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system and its reluctance to support industry as the chief reason for the comparative 
failure of Britain to exploit technological developments such as chemicals, electricity 
and combustion engines in the late 19th Century. He cited examples of Brush and 
Crompton, large engineering firms that were unable to raise finance from the banks 
which would have allowed them to exploit the expanding electrical market, and also 
Mond and Brunner (later ICI), which was obliged to look to Belgium for funding. 
The only exception to these policies occurred in the 1930s when deepening 
economic and political crises forced government intervention to encourage the banks 
to offer concrete support to domestic industry. Bank funding was reluctant, and 
lasting relationships with industry were not established, but the immediate results 
were impressive. Hutton validated his notion of the important links between the 
finance industry, industrial productivity and technological innovation by describing 
how output in the machine tool, chemical and aerospace industries also increased 
substantially cluring wartime, and how many innovations essential to the war effort 
were made, for example jet engines, radar and nuclear fission. After the war, the 
international power of the City was gradually restored, controls over the banks 
reduced, and the continuity of purpose which had briefly stimulated industrial 
momentum was again lost. 
Other recent research has attempted to quantify the extent of economic decline, as 
well as provide explanations. Freeman (1989) measured the level and trend of UK 
expenditure on research and development during the 1980s in comparison with other 
OECD countries. The figures were taken to be indicative of the extent of innovation 
and technical change in each of the economies studied. To compensate for any 
weakness in the perceived correlation between financial expenditure and the extent 
of change espoused, he excluded military research and covered a period of many 
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years to adjust for cyclical fluctuations. The results of this research showed that the 
growth rate of UK industrial research was the lowest in Europe (with the exception of 
Switzerland) since 1967, and that its'R and D intensity' had steadily declined relative 
to competitors with a similar industrial structure. Freeman blamed industrial decline 
upon the withdrawal of state intervention and funding, lack of co-operation between 
universities and industry, a short term outlook by industry leaders with a focus upon 
profitability rather than investment for the future, and poor quality education and 
training. He summarised his research as follows: 
"It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this represents a serious 
weakening of the long-term competitiveness of the UK economy" (p. 206) 
These findings are supported by the work of many other writers. Beuret (1987) 
quoted the reduction in the UK's share of world trade from 39% in 1900 to 8% today 
as evidence for relative economic decline. He also observed the willingness of the 
UK government to allow foreign industrial investment in direct competition with British 
firms (Nissan), to sell off British car manufacturers to foreign firms (Leyland, Rover) 
and to purchase Boeing's airborne radar system rather than GEC's. Hayes and 
Abernathy (1980) in an influential article criticised the 'devotion to short-term returns' 
by which they believed managers had 'effectively foresworn long-term technological 
superiority as a competitive weapon. ' Analysis of British industrial performance 
by 
Porter (1990) noted a loss of market share in most of the country's sophisticated 
industries: 
"... large net losses in machinery and in industries serving other industries 
(transport, office equipment, telecommunications, and power distribution) 
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signal an inability to upgrade, a shrinkage of clusters and a narrowing of 
competitive industries in the economy. " 
From this evidence it can be seen that, relative to its competitors, economic 
performance in the UK has been in decline for a significant period. It is tempting to 
extrapolate from this macro perspective to the m icro- perspective and conclude that 
IT project failures in the banks may be symptomatic of a 'British disease. ' Certainly 
parallels may be traced between the 'hands off' policies adopted by the banks as a 
whole towards industrial funding as described above, and their own internal practices 
which demonstrate an apparently similar reluctance to embrace the potential of IT at 
the micro level. For example, later chapters will show that many banks still retain rigid 
demarcations between IT and business areas, which tends to constrain the 
opportunities presented by new technology. However, a comparative analysis on an 
international basis is necessary to even begin to test this hypothesis, which is beyond 
the scope of the thesis. Therefore to draw such a conclusion would be speculative at 
best. 
The next section of this chapter moves the discussion from the macro to the micro by 
focusing upon an area that can be more readily tested. It details the various 
explanations that have been put forward by earlier writers for the existence of an IT 
productivity paradox at the organisational level. 
THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX 
So why are information technology investments failing to deliver value for 
organisations? Vast resources are being spent on new technology, often with 
disappointing results (see for example Roach 1991, Berndt and Malone 1995). The 
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scenario is well surnmarised by Coombs (1992) in his study of the impact of new 
technologies on organisational behaviour: 
"Sometimes it seems that the technological potential increases, the claimed 
business advantages multiply, and the boxes get cheaper and cheaper: but 
the budget and the headcount still rise, the benefits seem elusive, and the 
strategic direction of the IT investment and development programmes 
becomes ever more of an organisational battleground. " (p. 1) 
Hackett (1994) highlighted the growing power of the service sector with his claim that 
80% of all technology investments are now made by service industries. His work 
sought to ascertain why low returns were being made upon the massive 
technological investment in this industry sector. He showed how productivity (defined 
as the value of outputs measured against the value of labour and capital inputs) in 
the service sector as a whole had not improved, and had actually been in decline 
since 1977 in the banking and insurance industries. This surprising finding is 
supported by many writers in a variety of industries, notably Franke (1987), Freeman 
(1988), Smith (1989), Bowen (1989) and Forester (1995). 
The question of exactly how productivity changes are measured is notoriously difficult 
to address, and can therefore cast doubt on the accuracy of many studies. Boddy 
and Buchanan (1984) argued that conventional approaches to productivity 
measurement provide only a limited guide to the overall effectiveness of new 
technology: 
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"Measurable aspects of performance may be emphasised at the expense of 
other equally important but less measurable factors, such as the quality of the 
end product. " (page 234) 
The authors also noted how by focusing upon productivity improvements in one area, 
adverse impacts on the productivity of related areas could well pass unnoticed. This 
finding is supported by Senker (1985) who showed that traditional investment 
appraisal techniques were used by UK companies to justify their expenditure on new 
systems in terms of the labour savings that would result from such action to that 
particular area. Such a policy ignores the wider potential cost impacts of work re- 
organisation or the need for acquisition of new skills. Other writers have gone further 
by claiming that the figures upon which investment decisions are based may be at 
best inaccurate or even manipulated for political reasons in order to force through a 
favoured solution (see for example Wilkinson 1983). 
Wilson (1995) tackled the issue of productivity measurement by comparing the 
results of 20 studies by researchers from a variety of backgrounds, who had 
assessed the effects of IT investment on organisational performance in a number of 
different industries. The studies encompassed the use of a broad range of research 
methodologies, and deployed various analytical techniques against which 
productivity changes were measured. This work therefore overcomes a frequent 
complaint that reliance upon one particular mode of productivity measurement 
threatens the validity of the findings (Berndt and Malone 1995). Wilson provided 
convincing evidence of the extent of the problem; her analysis showed that the 
majority of the studies (13 out of 20) had found no evidence of productivity gain as a 
result of the introduction of new technologies. 
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Quantitative studies of the information technology productivity. paradox such as the 
ones described above have limited value in assessing why such a phenomenon 
should be observed when new technology is introduced. The next two sections 
attempt to draw out the reasons that earlier writers have identified for the poor results 
obtained. The findings can be categorised under six headings: 
1. Lack of accountability 
A report on IT in the banking industry by The Economist (1992) discovered few 
successful new technology implementations. Most banks expressed disappointment 
with their new systems, despite the high levels of investment. At the time of the 
study, 90% of bank payments still involved the use of paper -a figure that was 
predicted to fall only to 70-80% by the year 2000. Given the importance of the 
banking industry to the economy as a whole, and the extent of the investments they 
have made in new technology in an attempt to generate competitive advantage, it is 
not unreasonable to presume that the banks themselves would be concerned about 
the lack of value they have obtained. On the contrary, as described in Chapter 1, 
previous research has shown that few UK banks attempt to measure the 
effectiveness of their IT projects, and many have no idea whether their new systems 
deliver good value in terms of the money spent. 
2. Focus upon automation within existing structures 
I 
Research by Fincham et al (1994) in the banking industry found that banks had 
concentrated their IT strategies upon the automation of existing processes to reduce 
costs, and also in copying the trends set by their major competitors, rather than focus 
upon innovation and business transformation. As a result, the traditional structures, 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 31 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox. - the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
functions and priorities within the banking industry still remained largely unchanged. 
The authors concluded that technological change in banking was 'evolutionary' rather 
than 'revolutionary' in nature. For example, home banking using a computer link has 
been hailed as the delivery mechanism of the future since the early 1980s, but the 
banks have been slow to develop its potential. To date, home banking remains very 
much a niche market in the UK, affecting only 0.3% of retail customers (Graham 
1997). In fairness to the banks, he noted how progress has also been restricted by 
external concerns such as security issues, and by a lack of computing skills still 
prevalent amongst older segments of the banks' customer base. As a further 
example, Chapter 5 will describe how attempts by the banks to establish a European- 
wide payment system have so far been unsuccessful. Despite technological 
developments, international money transmission is an area of banking which still 
relies upon procedures and timescales established in the Victorian era. 
Hackett (1994) blamed declining productivity upon increased automation expenses 
due to a lack of integration between new technology and business operations. By 
focusing merely upon the automation of existing (but often outdated) procedures, 
organisations were missing opportunities for business redesign and the associated 
productivity improvements when IT is integrated with business strategy: 
"Many opefational units were never planned. Instead they evolved to fit the 
apparent needs of the business they support. Work tends to be executed in 
the same fashion as it was a decade ago, while the competitive environment 
has become much more complex.,, (p. 24) 
Hackett goes on to explain that the tendency to replicate existing processes when 
introducing new systems reflects a general antipathy towards change and a 
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preference for the security of familiar and established routines. Similar findings were 
reported by Pennings and Harianto (1992), whose work was described earlier in this 
chapter. 
3. Misalignment of technology and business strategy 
Coombs (1992) blamed the tendency for organisations to focus upon rational, linear 
planning systems (for an example see Chandler 1962) when implementing new 
projects, thereby ignoring the inevitable political processes within companies, which 
he claimed would sabotage the most careful plans. He noted that these project 
planning models become increasingly limiting as IT projects become ever more 
strategic in scope, and must reconcile a number of different vested interests. To 
address the problem, he recommended the revision of organisational structures to 
allow closer working relationships between technical and business areas. McLoughlin 
and Clark (1994) also noted that the relationship between employee and machine 
resources was often badly managed, and additionally they observed a poor'fif at the 
organisational level between technology strategy and the overall objectives of the 
companies studied. 
4. 'Patching' of obsolescent technology 
A survey by Morton (1996) reported that banks tended to patch together inefficient 
systems to maintain existing business practices, and hence avoid the uncertainty 
associated with the learning curve of new system introduction. The author concluded: 
"In the long term this will be a ball and chain, limiting the ability of the banks 
to run their business and constraining development of new services. " 
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Fincham et al (1994) also supported this finding in their study of the Scottish retail 
banking industry. 
"The sector is handicapped by ageing and inflexible information systems. 
Often data is inefficiently structured for applications not anticipated when the 
databases were first designed, and their piecemeal uptake means that 
organisationally the data is seldom well integrated. " (p. 156) 
The common theme running through the research described above is either explicit 
or implicit criticism of the way in which new technology projects are managed, 
leading to disappointing results and squandered opportunities. This suggests that a 
purely economic viewpoint focusing upon the measurement of productivity changes 
sheds little light on the reasons why poor results are obtained. It will be argued in 
Chapter 4 that the qualitative methodology adopted in this thesis allows the 
management issues surrounding new technology implementation to be investigated 
in depth. By focusing upon detailed contemporary micro-level cases, study of the 
productivity paradox can be taken a step further than is permitted by a quantitative 
approach. 
The various possible explanations described above for the IT productivity paradox 
can be summarised as follows: 
0A lack of accountability, manifesting in a reluctance to assess project 
effectiveness and take action to address past mistakes 
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0A tendency to use the introduction of new technology to automate established 
organisational procedures, rather than to act as a catalyst for changing 
outdated routines 
A lack of consideration for the social and expertise issues arising from the 
implementation of new technology projects, reflected by an inability to 
integrate technology and business strategy so that the new systems 
introduced actually support organisational objectives rather than compromise 
them 
0A tendency to patch together obsolete technologies to meet increasing 
demand so that resources are exhausted by 'firefighting' rather than directed 
at the development of more appropriate solutions 
The next section of this chapter reviews literature that reflects a more optimistic 
viewpoint about the reasons for the existence of the IT productivity paradox. 
1. Length of time necessary for change to occur 
Earlier in this chapter, Freeman and Perez's theory of IT, as indicative of the 
emergence of a new 'tech no-econ om ic paradigm', was introduced to illustrate the 
importance of technological change to the continued prosperity of the economy. 
Freeman (1988) applied this idea at the organisational level by suggesting that 
insufficient time has yet been allowed for a new era based upon information and 
communication technology to emerge. He claimed that enhanced productivity can 
only result once companies have instigated the necessary social change to match 
new technological capacity. In other words, Freeman's explanation of the productivity 
Li . sa Ham . s, Brunel University page 35 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox.. the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
paradox centres on the difficulty experienced by organisations in changing the ways 
in which they do business to get the full benefit from new technologies. More time 
needs to be allowed in order to achieve "a good match between the technology and 
the institutional framework. " (p. 19) 
Freeman's theory is supported by Franke (1987), who noted that the transformations 
wrought by the Industrial Revolution were spread over some 200 years, and would 
not have appeared so radical at a specific instance during this period. It is only the 
comparative viewpoint offered by hindsight that makes the changes so apparent. On 
the same basis, he claimed that it would be the 21s' Century before the necessary 
organisational changes could be implemented and fed through into increased 
productivity, resulting in business transformation on a similar scale to that 
experienced in the Industrial Revolution. Similarly, David (1990) compared the 
growth of information technology to the evolution of electricity, which was also 
allocated a 'revolutionary' label when first made available. It took several decades for 
people to learn how to make the most of the new technology and overcome their 
preference for traditional and familiar alternatives. The same argument has been 
used persuasively in Simon's (1987) study of the development of the steam engine. 
The common theme running through these studies is the need for an extended 
learning curve whenever a radical change to existing practices is required. 
2. IT as a catalyst for transformation of business processes 
Some writers have explained the existence of the IT productivity paradox in terms of 
the use of IT to facilitate a proliferation of new products and services rather than 
improve the productivity of more traditional business. Such a transformation in the 
activities of the companies concerned would necessitate considerable investment 
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and swallow up resources over a long period, thereby having a negative impact upon 
usual measures of productivity. In addition to the capacity of IT to automate certain 
tasks in pursuit of cost-cutting objectives, Zuboff (1988) noted its potential to 
'informate' (or in other words generate synergy by intelligent application) so that the 
outcomes transcended expectations in terms of creating new business applications 
by connecting formally disparate activities. For this somewhat idealistic scenario to 
be generated, Zuboff emphasised the importance of bringing together human 
knowledge at all levels of the organisation to create new systems that are 'greater 
than the sum of the parts. ' She described how the information provided by a new IT 
system has to be understood and managed so that value can be created from it. This 
thesis is supported by Berndt and Malone (1995) who contended that attention 
should be focused on radical new ways of organising work rather than upon 
measurement of incremental changes in traditional business practices: 
"It is often the case in human affairs that focusing on simple quantitative 
measures can distract people from achieving the ultimate values these 
measures are intended to represent. " (p. 181) 
This section has described the more optimistic explanations of the IT productivity 
paradox which can be summarised as follows: 
More time is needed for the significant organisational changes to be 
implemented which are necessary to exploit the full potential of new 
techno ogies 
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0 IT is being used to facilitate the introduction of entirely new products and 
services, which are so radically different from their antecedents as to make 
productivity improvements difficult to measure 
Later chapters of this study will address the IT productivity paradox issue within the 
context of the UK retail banking industry, by considering which of the various 
explanations described above resonate with the examples of the case study banks. 
The framework of analysis described in Chapters 6-9 has been derived from 
grounded theoretical analysis of the technological change projects studied in these 
banks. Full methodological details are discussed in Chapter 4. Before testing the 
issue of the value of new technology projects empirically, it is first necessary to 
conceptualise the problem by considering in more detail a range of theoretical 
positions that have been taken in respect of the nature of technology, the dangers 
of technological lock-in and the technological change process. 
WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY? 
The failure of writers to agree on what actually constitutes 'technology' has led to 
considerable dispute over the nature and influence of technology in practice. As the 
choice of definition made will impact upon how the actual influence of technology in 
organisations is studied, this section provides some brief examples illustrating the 
myriad of positions that have been taken by different authors. For example, early 
work by Child (1984) referred to technology merely as 'apparatus' within an 
organisational setting. This viewpoint is very narrow and does not acknowledge the 
influence of social factors within the organisation upon the nature of new system 
development. Reeves, Turner and Woodward (1970) went a step further and also 
included the related work practices in their definition of technology as: 
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"... the collection of plant, machines, tools and recipes available at a given 
time for the execution of the production task and the rationale underiying their 
utifisation. " (p. 4) 
Winners (1977) definition encompassed three different levels, the equipment itself, 
the knowledge necessary to operate it, and the organisational structure required in 
which to situate and control it. This broad viewpoint implied that he considered the 
final form of a technology to be dependant upon the influence of organisational 
factors throughout the development and implementation process, but the number of 
variables involved makes the definition rather too cumbersome to be of practical use. 
Misa (1994) was even more sweeping in his own definition: 
a technology is far more than a piece of hardware. Propedy understood, 
'technology' is a short hand term for the elaborate sociotechnical networks 
that span society. " (p. 14 1) 
Clark et al. (1988) claimed that popular definitions of technology were inadequate 
because of a tendency to ignore the various levels at which technology can be 
defined, and also the importance of the technical capacity of the equipment itself. 
They attempted to synthesise a more succinct definition of technology which was 
based upon the concept of an 'engineedng system', and developed dudng an in- 
depth empirical study of the telecommunications industry. The approach 
acknowledged an 'independent' influence of technology to some extent, but at the 
same time an important role in the eventual nature of technology developed was 
maintained for the particular organisational conditions that prevailed throughout the 
change process. The authors' contention that a new technology embodies a 
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combination of technical features and organisational factors was observed in the 
empirical examples studied, and hence will be investigated and developed 
throughout this study. Consequently, the next section of this chapter considers the 
technical aspects of technological change and then goes on to discuss the 
organisational influences. 
'TECHNOLOGICAL LOCK-IN' 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978) devised a model of innovation based on the 
changing emphasis of technological development as a major new product innovation 
becomes established in the marketplace. They showed how the focus of 
development shifts over time, firstly to process innovation and finally to minor product 
improvements. They noted that as the technology matures and advantage can be 
taken of economies of scale to improve efficiency, the system as a whole becomes 
less flexible and increasingly centred upon the 'dominant design' rather than further 
innovative activity. Also, by this stage the level of investment in financial and human 
skills is likely to be considerable. In such circumstances, the degree of cultural 
adaptation needed to contemplate radical organisational change is greatly increased. 
Their model is supported by Rothwell and Zegveld (1985) who described how the 
British chemical industry in Victorian times became a classic victim of this so-called 
'technological lock-in'. Innovative methods of alkali production were adopted by newly 
industrialised nations that soon became more cost-effective than the method 
traditionally used in Britain. British firms were reluctant to abandon their own process 
in which considerable sums of money had been invested, and instead responded by 
making incremental changes to improve efficiency and entering into price-fixing 
agreements. Another theory which is closely related to the Abernathy and Utterback 
product/process model is the notion of 'increasing retums' (Arthur 1994). He 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 40 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox: the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
explained how a successful product could become even more successful once a 
critical mass of people were committed to buying it. Technological standards also 
tend to become 'locked in' by such positive feedback. A good example of this would 
be the ubiquitous Microsoft operating system that compels users to run Microsoft's 
Windows software, so that increasing hardware sales lead in turn to increasing 
demand for software. The positive feedback created means that competitor products 
cannot become established even if they are cheaper and of better quality. Parallels 
can clearly be traced here with the current position in the banking industry, a theme 
that will be developed throughout this thesis. For example, the traditional payment 
systems have become so entrenched over time that industry newcomers face a 
difficult task in trying to establish radical alternatives. 
In contrast to the product/process model, Barras (1990) proposed a model of 
innovation that began with incremental process improvements and ended with radical 
changes. He used examples from the financial services industry to devise a model 
that was likened to the usual marketing concept of product life cycle, but in reverse. 
He concentrated upon the interaction of technical possibilities, market demand and 
organisational structure - features which he claimed formed the crucial drivers of 
technological change. In the Barras model, early innovations in the banks are 
incremental in nature, with the major objective being increased efficiency. This is 
achieved by cost control and staff reductions, as a result of investment in new 
technology by established firms delivering mature services in saturated markets. 
(Examples of the historical development of information technology within the banks 
are described in Chapter 5. ) The second stage of the model involves more radical 
process innovations that improve quality and effectiveness. Barras used the 
examples of SWIFT and ATM development to illustrate the extent of stanclardisation 
possible, as such products converge towards a dominant design and economies of 
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scale. He also described the danger of 'technological lock-in' at this stage, where the 
scale of the investment, and the extent of associated expertise generated, make it 
difficult for the banks to consider viable alternatives. In the third stage of his model, 
the emphasis is moved to differentiation as entirely new products are generated and 
the organisational structure transformed. Barras used the example of 'home banking' 
to support his claim that as the momentum of this wave of innovative activity grew, 
banks would lead the whole economy towards a new phase of growth and 
development. He predicted that at this more radical stage the costs of market entry 
would fall and the competitive threat increase from smaller, entrepreneurial firms - 
which are not compromised by structural rigidities based upon earlier investment and 
the associated entrenched knowledge base. 
Some writers have criticised the Barras model as overly simplistic and deterministic, 
because it places little emphasis on the impact of cultural factors on successful 
technological innovations and the need for active management of expertise within the 
organisation. Scarbrough and Lannon (1994) noted that specialised functions 
developed to manage existing technology often acted as baniers to the development 
of more radical alternatives, but they questioned the value of a definitive model which 
attempts to homogenise the disparity of circumstances in which specific 
organisations operate. Their research at Bank of Scotland identified 'historical 
precedent' as the major determining factor of organisational approaches to 
innovation. The successful implementation of the projects they studied was 
specifically dependent upon the interaction of cultural, structural and political issues 
within the organisation. These considerations rendered each example of 
technological change organisationally unique and context-dependent - therefore not 
amenable to standardisation and the application of a model. In particular, the third 
stage of organisational transformation would appear to be difficult to engineer in 
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these circumstances. Barras gives little indication of timescale for the different stages 
of his model; indeed, some years on from original publication, this thesis will 
demonstrate that the competitive threat has certainly increased but there is as yet 
little evidence of transformation in banking structures. 
Despite these criticisms, there are some developments in the banking industry which 
bear a strong resemblance to certain features highlighted in the Barras model of 
innovation. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Briefly, Vamham (1994) 
described how the European Community Commission has encouraged commercial 
banks, so far without success, to improve and standardise their payment services 
across Europe with the ultimate objective of implementing a single European 
currency. Instead, the banks' attention remains focused upon preservation of 
traditional business in their respective domestic markets. Specific efforts to improve 
payment systems concentrate upon refinement of existing systems that are 
dependent on international 'correspondent' relationships between banks. The 
practice has changed little in principle since its inception in the Victorian era. This 
evidence would place European Payment System developments squarely in the 
initial incremental stage of the Barras model. The banks have invested considerable 
sums in the SWIFT network, the inter-bank electronic delivery mechanism for 
payment instructions. It also represents a massive investment in terms of specific 
organisational structures and knowledge bases, which does not encourage the 
exploration of possible alternatives that are derived from outside this particular 
paradigm. This common inhibitor to innovation forms another example of 
technological lock-in, but Barras does not consider how the banks are expected to 
overcome this problem and move onto the next stage of organisational 
transformation. The ways in which the banks are managing technological change in 
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order to address the problems of technological lock-in will be addressed in the 
empidcal study. 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
The notion that technology has a form and momentum of its own which instigates 
organisational and environmental change has been widely expressed. This viewpoint 
has become known as 'technological determinism' and the origin of the idea has 
been largely attributed to Woodward (1970 and 1980). In the same tradition, Levitt 
(1983) claimed that technological advances in themselves provided a driving force 
towards globalisation of markets for standardised products on a vast scale, 
regardless of social or economic conditions. Such accounts are essentially 
determinist in nature, and can be criticised for ignoring both the social aspects of 
technology and its application within organisations (see for example, Wilkinson 1983 
and MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985). The theory disregards the impact of 
managerial choice in respect of technological decisions (Child 1972) and assumes no 
conflicts of interest exist between managers and employees, or indeed between 
individuals within either of these groups. It also appears over-optimistic in its 
assessment of both the extent and immediate proximity of the economic benefits 
created by technological developments. For example, although it was mentioned 
earlier that the financial services industry has been a massive investor in new 
technology over the past 30 years, there is as yet little sign of Levitt's prediction of 
increasing homogeneity in the products and services offered across organisational 
and national boundaries. 
Despite the ambitious claims of the determinist viewpoint, a review of the technology 
literature soon identifies a recurring theme that organisations can only benefit fully 
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from the potential of a new system if work practices, organisational structure and 
company culture are flexible enough to adapt. Galbraith (1974) established at an 
early stage that if an organisation is to benefit from technology, it must be structured 
in such a way as to allow effective information processing, and be flexible enough to 
respond to changes in the environment. Research by Kaplinsky (1984) and Kling 
(1991) in a variety of industries, found little evidence of substantial social change as 
a result of technological advances. They both characterised the change process as 
'slow and incremental', constrained by political activity and resistance within the 
organisation. In the introduction to the new edition, March and Simon (1994) 
reflected back over 35 years since initial publication of their theory of 'bounded 
rationality' as a constraint on organisational change, and concluded that it was still 
valid today. This was despite the growth of information technology over the period, 
and the vastly increased resources available to the modem organisation, which 
sought to reduce the restrictions on rationality imposed by the cognitive limitations of 
people within organisations. The authors acknowledged the power of IT to transform 
mathematical functions, but claimed that: 
"... the work of managers at higher levels has not been much changed despite 
frequent proclamations of an infonnation technology revolution. " (p. 10 ) 
In other words, they believed that IT cannot overcome organisational constraints in a 
deterministic manner, and is itself shaped and bounded by its developers and users. 
Watson (1980) provides a useful summary of these arguments: 
"Technology is only a means, it is a piece of machinery or equipment with an 
associated technique which is used for carrying out certain tasks. 
Developments in technology may have massive implications for individuals 
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and for society at large. Those implications only arise when people choose to 
adopt them and apply them to achieving human ends. Technology is no force 
in its own right. To talk of 'the iron hand of technology'... is to avoid the 
important and necessary question of who is applying technology and to what 
ends. " (p. 77) 
In MacKenzie and Wajcman's (1985) study of the social influences upon technology, 
the authors claimed that a new technology is created in the context of existing 
systems, and only appears radical with the benefit of a historical perspective which 
filters out less successful alternatives. They criticised the idea that a technology can 
be 'invented' as a single inspiration in isolation of the influence of existing practices 
by noting that histodcal analysis allows the benefit of hindsight to trace a particular 
invention back to a single inspirational source. In reality, competing projects may 
have overlapped and been developed concurrently, but only the story of the 'winner' 
survived the passage of time. In support of this claim, the writers cited Ogburn and 
Thomas (1922), who argued that technological developments were an inevitable 
result of the synergy created as innovators merged technological capability and 
contemporary artefacts within new contexts. They concluded that the major 
constituent of new technology was the existing process, often applied in new 
situations and modified in an incremental fashion over time by many developers 
working independently. A number of writers have supported this theory, notably 
Gilfillan (1935) in his study of the development of the ship, and Hughes' (1979) 
analysis of the development of electricity. By regarding both technological capability 
and human influence as central to the innovation process, this viewpoint discredits 
more deterministic accounts of the impact of technology which were reviewed above. 
A current example, described in more detail in Chapter 5, is the growth of the 
telephone banking market led by First Direct. The basic banking products that are 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 46 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox. - the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
offered remain the same, but the delivery mechanism still appears radical to some 
market segments. 
Sociologists of technology such as Grint and Woolgar (1997) have taken the 
argument even further. They accorded no independent design or role to technology 
in the organisational change process at all, claiming that both its characteristics and 
use were entirely 'socially constructed'. While this may be regarded as a rather 
extreme and impractical position to take, the evidence presented above from a 
diverse range of sources suggests that the influence of specific organisational factors 
appears to render each example of technological innovation unique, thereby 
discounting any significant 'independent impact' of the technology itself. McLoughlin 
and Clark (1994) pointed out that this does not imply that technology has no 
influence upon the nature of organisational change, but that it is only one of many 
interacting and complex factors. They concluded that effective introduction of new 
technology required challenge to conventional prerogatives and commitment from all 
levels of the organisation, and even then the results tended to be evolutionary and 
emergent. This means that it is difficult in practice to apply definitive models of 
innovation such as the 'reverse product life cycle' suggested by Barras (1990) and 
described in the previous section. Similarly, rational and linear models (for example 
strategy development, implementation, evaluation) favoured in traditional 
organisational change texts such as Chandler (1962) or Ansoff (1984) appear very 
limited in terms of their ability to explain the dynamics of change. In addition, Lewin 
(1951) saw change as an event that could be sequentially managed by 'unfreezing' 
existing attitudes, executing a change programme, and then 'refreezing' behaviours 
around the desired outcome. The next section addresses the complexity of change 
management and the limitations of such models by focusing upon change as a 
process to be managed rather than an event. 
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THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
A concern with the way that the introduction of new technology is mediated by social 
factors within organisations as described above focuses attention upon the process 
of technological change. Boddy and Buchanan (1986) criticised the notion that 
change can occur overnight rather like a 'big bang, and instead argued that: 
"The introduction of a new machine usually involves a long period of planning 
and preparation before its arrival; modifying it and improving it once installed; 
and training staff to use and maintain it. The effective introduction of even 
comparative minor technical changes is thus protracted and fragmented, 
and involves a lot of formal and informal negotiation. " (p. 9) 
Some writers have attempted to categorise a series of intermediary stages in the 
technological change process. For example, Clark et al (1988) identified initiation, 
decision to adopt, system selection, implementation and routine operation as the 
critical steps. Dawson (1993) showed that while these stages are helpful in analytical 
terms, the process is often anything but linear in practice. Organisations may revert 
to an earlier stage of the process if problems are experienced, or indeed may 
experience two stages simultaneously. In a later work (McLoughlin and Clark 1994), 
the authors agreed with this finding, but contended that it was still possible to use 
such a model to distinguish 'critical junctures' of the change process at which 
managerial choices could be negotiated, thus having critical influence upon particular 
outcomes. 
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Buchanan and Boddy (1992) showed that even incremental change projects, once 
underway, may take on strategic significance as circumstances and priorities within 
the organisation develop over time. The potential of individuals to influence the 
direction of the technological change process does not, of course, end once actual 
implementation is completed. The considerable capacity for post-adoption shaping of 
a technology has been detailed by Fleck (1993), who noted that in addition to the 
expected incremental improvements over time, further distinct innovations may be 
precipitated once the technology is actually in use. 
The complexity of change illustrated by the work described above emphasises the 
limitations of the linear models of change that were discussed in the previous section. 
Pettigrew et al (1992) sought to develop a more robust model that could capture the 
dynamics of the change process. They concluded: 
"Finally, the central assumption about causation in this kind of holistic 
analysis is that causation of change is neither linear or singular - the search 
for a simple and singular grand theory of change is unlikely to bear fruit. For 
the analyst interested in the theory and practice of changing, the task is to 
identify the variety and mixture of causes of change and to explore through 
time some of the conditions and contexts under which these mixtures occur. 
269) 
Dawson (1996) applied these ideas more specifically to technological change and 
distinguished three key 'determinants' of change, namely substance, context and 
politics. He noted how the importance of these factors to the change process lay not 
in the distinctions between them but in their continual interplay over time through the 
actions of 'change agents'. Such individuals are able to secure both the capacity and 
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legitimacy for change by political action. (For a more detailed study of the role of 
change agents, see Buchanan and Boddy 1992). 
While these process models of change seem to enhance understanding of 
organisational change, Buchanan and Boddy (1992) pointed out that complex and 
abstract models have limited use for practising managers. They sought to address 
this issue by identifying the specific expertise necessary to be an effective change 
agent in practice. The critical skills they noted were technical skills, project 
management skills, and political and cultural skills. These areas were categorised by 
the authors as corresponding to the 'content', 'control' and 'process' agendas of 
change. Buchanan and Boddy found that the priority change agents attached to 
these skill areas varied depending on two things: how critical a change programme 
was to the key activities of the organisation, and also how radical the change was 
perceived to be in compadson with earlier practices. The more central and radical the 
change programme, the more vulnerable the change agent was to implementation 
problems that were political in nature rather than technical or project management 
related. In such circumstances, therefore, the authors recommended that change 
agents should focus their efforts upon the process agenda rather than upon content 
or control issues. This means addressing internal communications, team building, 
neutralising resistance, enrolling support and resources, while at the same time being 
cognisant of the culture and history of the organisation. The role of change agents is 
considered in more detail in Chapter 8 which examines the subject of leadership in 
the case study banks. 
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THE FOCUS OF THE THESIS 
This chapter has described a number of theoretical positions that have been taken on 
the nature of technology and technological change. For the purposes of this thesis 
the pragmatic assumption will be made that the development and implementation of 
new technologies is influenced by both technical capacity and specific organisational 
factors. Therefore the idea of Clark et al mentioned above that technology can be 
regarded as a combination of technical and social influences will be used and 
developed throughout. Clearly, the acceptance of any definition and role for 
technology which acknowledges organisational constraints on the development of 
new technology systems implies that the chance of success can be enhanced by 
appropriate and effective management, rather than by adherence to a particular 
model. The scope for human influence was also highlighted in the discussion of 
technological change as a process, whereby opportunities for intervention and 
negotiation by management to influence outcomes exist at a number of distinct 
stages over time. Again, this concept will be drawn upon throughout the study. 
Contemporary case studies provide the rich detail necessary to illuminate these 
issues. 
The notion of what exactly is meant by 'productivity' and how it can be measured has 
also been questioned in this chapter. Quantitative studies focusing upon 
measurement of productivity changes imply that new technologies have deterministic 
characteristics, in the sense that specific inputs and outputs can be identified and 
compared. Although useful in as far as it goes, this method provides only a limited 
guide to the overall effectiveness of a new technology. It ignores more qualitative 
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changes such as, for example, improvements in service quality, as well as the related 
benefits that may accrue in other parts of the organ'sation. It seems that a more 
holistic overview of technological change is required, encompassing the wider 
organisational issues and management implications, to provide a realistic picture of 
technological innovation. This myriiad of social influences is difficult to 'measure' in 
the conventional sense of productivity improvements, but the issues can be 
illuminated by qualitative study of detailed cases that . interpret productivity in a 
broader sense than is conventionally found. 
Hence the focus of this study is upon analysis of empirical data from examples of 
technological change management in the financial services industry, with the 
objective of identifying particular organisational features which either inhibit or 
facilitate IT project success. It is hoped that the analysis of these micro-level cases 
can inform the wider theoretical debate about the reasons for the existence of the IT 
productivity paradox, and that practical lessons can be drawn upon by managers to 
guide the successful introduction of future new technology projects. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered the wider issues that impact upon the study of 
technological change in the financial services sector, and justified the analysis of 
detailed case studies as the most appropriate method to address the chosen 
research question. The major points raised can be summarised as follows: 
0 At the macro level, technological change is necessary for the competitive 
position of any inclustrial nation to be maintained over the longer term. Despite 
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recent technological developments, the economic status of the UK has 
continued to decline in global terms, suggesting that dysfunctional 
management of technological change may be taking place 
0. As major investors and developers of information technology, service 
industries such as banking should be playing increasingly important roles in 
the process of technological change, but there is as yet little evidence of 
productivity gain despite the levels of investment made 
At the micro level this could mean that opportunities exist for organisations to 
utilise the potential of information technology more fully and hence secure 
competitive advantages 
0 In practice this potential appears to be inhibited by lack of accountability, a 
focus upon automation of existing practices, ineffective management of new 
technology projects and 'patching' of obsolete technologies 
0 The prominence of social and political issues (as opposed to technical 
constraints) throughout the implementation of new IT projects highlights the 
critical need for effective management of the technological change process 
0 In such circumstances, a focus upon quantitative measures of productivity 
changes has limited explanatory power in comparison with a detailed study of 
contemporary case studies that illuminate the social and political processes 
involved in technological change management 
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In summary, the thesis to be investigated is that the difficulty of translating 
technological opportunity into increased productivity is related not so much to 
technical failings, as to the way in which implementation is conceptualised and 
managed within adopting organisations. It is hoped that the study will lead to an 
advance in knowledge- of how implementation may be better conceptualised, 
understood and managed. 
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CHAPTER 3- THE UK BANKING INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter illustrates the diverse range of innovative activity that is taking place in 
the industry. It begins with an historical review of the development of the UK financial 
services industry, with the aim of placing the theoretical issues raised in the previous 
chapter in the context of the specific industry to be studied. This material is largely 
taken from the author's own knowledge which was accumulated during a ten year 
period of full-time employment in a UK retail bank. The next section of the chapter 
summarises the current structure of the industry, before reviewing recent inroads by 
industry newcomers - namely technology companies and retailers - into this hitherto 
sacrosanct territory. These companies appear to be utilising technological 
opportunities to devise innovative products and radical delivery channels. They 
include Microsoft, which is investigating innovative payment systems that can be 
used in conjunction with the Internet, and retailers such as Sainsbury or Tesco, which 
aim to position themselves in direct competition with the high street banks. The 
activities of these new competitors are still at a very early stage, but each of the 
companies mentioned has the advantage of a massive customer base and quality 
reputation upon which to draw in search of viable diversification strategies. 
Two other major new initiatives, namely telephone banking and electronic purses, are 
described in Chapter 5 which introduces the empirical case studies. This is because 
they form the subject matter of the First Direct and Mondex case studies respectively. 
The chapter concludes by considering the potential impact that successful 
developers of new technological innovations may have upon the structure and 
operations of the traditional UK banking industry. It remains to be seen if the banks 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 55 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox., the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
are capable of discarding established industry norms and changing their historical 
structures and functions in order to respond to the competitive challenge The 
prospects of the various players will be assessed through analysis of the empirical 
case studies in later chapters. 
HISTORICAL REVIEW 
As described in the previous chapter, Hutton (1995) blamed the structure of British 
finance for the comparative failure of Britain to exploit technological developments 
such as chemicals, electricity and combustion engines in the late 19th Century. The 
pivotal role occupied by banks in society means that their fortunes are inexorably 
linked with those of the country as a whole, and the cultural characteristics of the 
financial services industry today have themselves been defined and moulded by 
national economic and social policies over the past 150 years. Banking in the UK 
has evolved over the past 200 years into a highly specialist community, which is 
commonly described as 'discreet', 'conservative', 'stable', 'traditional', 'secretive, and 
'imposing'. This image has been deliberately cultivated by the banks as it is seen to 
befit custodians of the wealth of others. 
The standard organisational hierarchy of authority found within the banks was 
developed in the Victorian era, and it followed a military model of organisation. This 
ensured that strategies were developed from the knowledge and experience of the 
company leaders, then imposed throughout the organisation by means of the 
authority vested in successive layers of management, and finally translated into 
action by workers at the base of the hierarchy. Seniority tended to be measured in 
terms of length of service and the consequent level of accumulation of internal 
knowledge, and only this warranted the privilege of strategic thinking. In a wide 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 56 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox- the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
application of 'Taylorist' scientific management principles, workers were employed to 
perform routine tasks to an established pattern, and traits such as discretion and 
initiative were discouraged. A bureaucratic approach to office work and 
administration which stressed qualities of order, precision, hierarchy and authority 
was considered particularly important in the banking industry, as banks sought to 
present a sober and efficient image that reflected their role and status in the 
economy. As a result of the pervasive application of these working practices, 
creativity was stifled and risk avoidance came to be more highly valued than 
innovation. Some banks went so far as to create lengthy rulebooks. These weighty 
tomes detailed exact and standardised procedures to be followed in particular 
business circumstances. Unfortunately, even if every possible task could be 
accounted for, this policy made no allowance for adaptations to rapidly changing 
technological and market conditions. This scenario appears to exemplify the 
'mechanistic' (or bureaucratic) system of management made famous by Bums and 
Stalker (1961) which the authors deemed to be appropriate only for stable operating 
conditions. 
In Victorian times a number of small banks operated in a competitive market, but 
after World War 1a series of mergers and acquisitions resulted in the establishment 
of just 5 major players who between them accounted for 80% of total bank deposits. 
The banks held no industrial securities, all of this money was invested in the London 
discount market or stored as cash. The economies of scale and potential for co- 
operation generated by the mergers made it difficult for newcomers to enter the 
market, and the resulting oligopolistic structure became a source of stability, growth 
and profitability for the major players. The Bank of England was nationalised in 1946 
and charged with regulation of the banking industry to protect the integrity of the 
financial system in the UK, and hence maintain confidence and stability in the 
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economy as a whole. It became a 'lender of last resort' to individual banks in 
difficulties, and was also responsible for enforcing government policy in the financial 
markets. The special position that the Bank of England developed as an intermediary 
between the state and the commercial banks, and its insistence upon self regulation 
within an industry 'closed shop', have been blamed for many of the resthctive 
practices that continue to dominate the banking, industry to this day. Recent attempts 
to widen 'the club' to include building societies, for example, were resisted strongly by 
industry incumbents. In addition, a strong ethic of co-operation existed in the labour 
market as the banks co-ordinated pay and conditions, entry requirements, union 
recognition policies and formal 'no-poaching' agreements. 
The market for banking products increased during the 1950s as more and more 
people opened accounts to receive the automatic payment of salaries. This resulted 
in the rapid growth of the branch network to meet demand, and the introduction of 
innovative services such as personal loans and credit cards. The co-operative ethic 
between the major banks was threatened in 1971 by Competition and Credit Control, 
a document issued by the Bank of England, which abolished lending ceilings and the 
agreement between banks to offer uniform rates to borrowers and lenders. Market 
forces could therefore operate in the industry for the first time. Competition from 
building societies, which had begun to intensify in the 1970s, became particularly 
acute in 1986 when the Building Societies Act allowed their product portfolio to be 
extended to include cheque accounts, personal lending and foreign exchange 
services. In turn, the banks began to move into the lucrative mortgage market that 
had previously been the preserve of the building societies. They also diversified into 
estate agencies and travel services, often with expensive consequences. 
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INDUSTRY REGULATION 
The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented period of regulatory change. This can be 
interpreted both as a response to changing market conditions and also as a catalyst 
for further sweeping changes in the financial services industry. Fincham et al. (1994) 
noted how regulation of the financial services sector was an important part of 
government economic policy, because of the centrality of the industry to the 
performance of the economy as a whole. 
The 1984 Gower Report on Investor Protection formed the basis of the current 
industry structure. The motivation for regulatory changes in the financial sector partly 
came from the political perspective of a need for fair trading and consumer 
protection, following a number of spectacular collapses such as Johnson Matthey 
Bankers (1985), and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (1991). Another 
important factor was the increasing influence of new market entrants such as Marks 
and Spencer that were not subject to the same level of supervision as the 
established players. The other factor leading to reappraisal of the regulatory system 
was concern that the increasingly international nature of financial markets was not 
matched by standardisation of operating conditions in the countries involved. Piesse 
et al. (1995) noted that these seemingly worthy aims were to some degree 
compromised by the high cost of regulation, the threat to competition that restrictions 
impose, and the opportunities presented for illegal activity in the form of 
circumvention of regulation or distortion of market principles. The authors showed 
how these issues were addressed by focusing new legislation upon authorisation, 
supervision and compensation. Possession of a banking license was essential for 
financial business to be undertaken, and this could be revoked if reporting and 
disclosure requirements were not met. Generous compensation for private investors 
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was also made available in the event of fraud or misconduct. These conditions were 
laid down in the 1986 Financial Services Act and the1987 Banking Act. 
The objective of these legislative changes in the 1980s was to change the scope of 
regulation, by shifting regulatory responsibility from the state to the banks 
themselves. Many legal constraints upon the type of activities that could be espoused 
by the different market players were removed, and enforcement became increasingly 
dependent upon self-regulation. This was because the rate of change in the industry 
had become so great that flexibility was regarded as the key to effectiveness. A 
complex legal structure would have been too ponderous to respond to changing 
demands. Additionally, the involvement of practitioners in rule formulation and 
enforcement was intended to encourage compliance and the maintenance of high 
standards of conduct. The end result manifested into a climate of deregulation on the 
one hand, in which trading restrictions were lifted so that the banks became free to 
develop new services and exploit new market segments. On the other hand they 
became subject to more stringent reporting requirements under the supervision of the 
Bank of England. The consequences of operating in an increasingly dynamic 
environment of regulatory change, technological developments and threats from new 
market entrants are explored in the next section. 
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 
As deregulation allowed the banks to move into the mortgage market, the building 
societies in turn began to offer competitive deals on current accounts which included 
standing order and direct debit services. The banks, (led by Lloyds and soon copied 
by the other major players) responded by offering free banking to customers 
in credit 
and even paying credit interest in some cases. Howells and Hine 
(1993) noted that 
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providing special interest bearing accounts had cost the 'Big Four' clearing banks 
E0.5 billion by 1990. The banks sought to recover lost revenue by increasing charges 
on customer correspondence, thereby losing significant amounts of goodwill amongst 
their customer base; a disturbing Situation which still prevails to this day. In this 
climate, Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) were also initially seen as a way of 
controlling costs and improving productivity by automating tasks previously 
performed by cashiers. In practice, the high set up costs and considerable, (if 
intangible) marketing benefits associated with the provision of this service made 
productivity changes difficult to measure. Scarbrough and Lannon (1994) showed 
how Bank of Scotland lost significant market share by being slow to introduce ATMs 
in comparison with their competitors. However, once all the major banks offered 
automatic cash withdrawal services, ATMs ceased to offer competitive significance 
and more collaborative strategies were adopted. This enabled reciprocal 
arrangements to be put in place allowing customers of one bank to use another 
bank's ATM network. 
Other examples of more intentional inter-industry collaboration to automate payment 
services during the 1980s included the establishment of inter-bank clearing systems 
such as BACS and CHAPS, and an ambitious project called EFTPOS (Electronic 
Funds Transfer at Point Of Sale) which aimed to create a national electronic system 
linking retailers with the banking system. A detailed study of EFTPOS developments 
by Howells and Hine (1993) showed how the collaborative network of 
bankers and 
retailers broke down in the face of competitive pressures, distrust and 
lack of 
expertise between the parties involved. A common clearing system was never 
established and a number of competing 'debit card' schemes 
developed instead. 
These projects are mentioned here to illustrate the diverse range of 
innovative 
activity that has taken place in the banking industry 
in recent years. The EFTPOS 
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case will be examined in more detail in later chapters that study the problems the 
banks have experienced in managing large technological change projects. 
THE UK BANKING MARKET TODAY 
The Bank of England continues to dictate that only 'licensed and adequately 
supervised institutions' are allowed to participate in payment systems. Possession of 
a banking licence is therefore still a prerequisite for money transfer using the 
traditional networks. Attempts to break down the remaining barriers to market entry, 
and thereby extend membership of the 'club' are strongly resisted by traditional 
banking industry incumbents. This defensive and protective attitude by the banks 
towards their existing payment systems is prompted by the possible future impact of 
innovative payment mechanisms that are not dependent upon membership of 
CHAPS or other national clearing systems. A recent report (1995) by Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu International quoted in The Financial Times summarises the attitude of the 
banks and the problems with which they are faced: 
"... banks which hide within the supposed safety Of PrOtective barriers and 
monolithic structures face daunting challenges. " (p-9) 
The European Monetary Institute has demanded that issuing rights for digital cash 
are restdcted to licensed credit institutions, but this is likely to be unenforceable. 
Banking regulators prefer the smart card developments by the credit card companies 
to the electronic cash facilities such as Mondex, (see Chapter 5). This 
is because the 
centralised clearing system used in the credit card industry is established and 
secure. Each transaction is recorded and money cannot be transferred 
from 
individual to individual. Some banking services cannot be offered through electronic 
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media for legal reasons; for example, the Consumer Credit Act prohibits the 
establishment of online loan facilities. 
Structural changes in the industry continue to dominate the headlines. Recent 
acquisitions by Lloyds Bank include TSB and Cheltenham & Gloucester Building 
Society, and the Halifax and Leeds Building Societies have also merged their 
operations. The Halifax has now shed its mutual status and become a bank, allowing 
the provision of a full range of financial services. These significant structural 
adjustments in the industry reflect an increasing tendency for the major players to 
attempt to differentiate themselves from the competition, in a market where the 
services provided have come to be regarded merely as utilities. In these 
circumstances the banks view information technology as their major potential source 
of competitive advantage. A brief history of the banks' use of new technology is 
provided in Chapter 5, to introduce the empirical cases and place the specific 
projects studied into a broader industry context. 
The bank branches now operate with fewer staff, but the skills required are very 
different from those of their predecessors. It has been estimated by Denton in the 
Financial Times (1995) that the number of bank branches in the UK will be reduced 
by 9000 by the year 2000, at a cost of some 50,000 jobs. This is in addition to the 
59,000 jobs that have already been shed by the big four clearing banks since 1990, 
leaving approximately 270,000 staff in employment at the end of 
1995. Expected 
productivity improvements from reducing staff costs have not materialised 
because 
Denton showed that 20,000 jobs have at the same time 
been created in the 
developing telephone banking market. Additionally, the banks have recruited 
IT 
specialists at significant cost. The problem of IT skills shortages 
is becoming more 
acute as the banks grapple with preparations 
for both the Euro and the 'Year 2000' 
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problem. Staff with the necessary skills can name their price in these unprecedented 
market conditions. 
The first part of this chapter has illustrated the broader industry context by 
highlighting the rapidly changing environmental conditions in which the banks are 
operating. The historical review showed that the traditional banks can be regarded as 
'mechanistid structures in the terms of Burns and Stalker, which means a type of 
organisation best suited to stable operating conditions. The next section reviews 
recent inroads by newcomers to the financial services market. Such organisations 
tend to exemplify the features of Bum's and Stalker's 'organic' structures that appear 
to be more suited to effective operation within these turbulent environmental 
conditions. 
INDUSTRY NEWCOMERS 
INTERNETBANKING 
The Internet has an estimated 30 million users world-wide and 1 million in the UK. It 
is widely accepted to be growing at a rate of 10 percent a month, although the figures 
are impossible to verify. It is also expected to become an important medium for 
settling financial transactions world-wide once reliable security encryption 
mechanisms are in place. Hawkes (1995) writing in The Times, quoted a report by 
the analysts Killen and Associates which predicted that money transactions through 
the Internet would expand to E380 billion a year by 1999. Recent reports by Booz- 
Allen and Hamilton and Ernst and Young (1996) highlighted the threat posed 
by the 
Internet to the operations of the traditional banking oligopoly. Both companies expect 
Internet banking to become an important distribution channel within the next three 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 64 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox- the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
years. Ernst and Young's Report on Technology in Banking claimed that banks are 
struggling to exploit the benefits of virtual banking and stand to lose a substantial part 
of their business unless they adopt their processes and expand their product range. 
The data in this section is taken from the Financial Times IT in Banking Survey 
(1996) which reports that some 500 banks are now represented on the Internet, from 
a zero base in 1989. Most banks still use it purely for marketing purposes, and have 
invested in elaborate electronic versions of the ubiquitous 'glossy brochure' which 
has little serious content. The US market research firm Input estimates that only 3% 
of large banks actually do business on the Internet at present, but the company 
predicts that 90% will be using it for electronic commerce by the year 2000. Wells 
Fargo was one of the first US banks to offer a web site service to its customers in 
1995. Initially only account data could be checked, but customers can now send 
payments to any US destination, set up regular bill payments, transfer funds between 
accounts, and check whether cheques have been cleared. In May 1995 three 
Amedcan banks - Wachovia Corporation, Cardinal Bancshares and 
Huntingdon 
Bancshares - together launched a 'virtual bank' called 
Security First Network Bank, 
the world's first full banking service on the Internet. Customers are able to access 
their accounts and write electronic cheques through an arrangement with the 
electronics payment firm Checkfree. The most advanced UK bank site is Barclays, 
which has formed a 'virtual shopping mall' called BarclaySquare in conjunction with a 
group of retailers, and accepts credit card payments on-line. According to Taylor 
(1996) writing in the Financial Times, Barclays set this site up to learn more about the 
online business, and at the same time find out which of its customers were 
interested 
in electronic shopping. The intention was to establish the bank as an innovator 
in the 
field. Visa International is also about to pilot an Intranet project (a private and 
localised network based upon Internet technology) in the USA. This system will 
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connect all of Visa's 19,000 member banks throughout the world, which will benefit 
from using the shared on-line information to improve service quality. 
While press attention has focused upon the efforts made by banks around the world 
to jump on the Internet banking bandwagon and utilise the unique marketing 
opportunities that it provides, relatively little consideration has been given to the 
difficulties still associated with the Internet. For example, the uptake of Internet 
banking services is limited by the number of Internet users in the country concerned. 
In the UK, a recent survey by ICL financial services found that only 11 % of the UK 
population had access to the Internet, and less than 25% of these people claim to be 
regular users. Although the market is growing rapidly, the number of current users 
still represents only a fraction of total retail banking customers. In addition, the 
infrastructure of the Net is now so overloaded that service quality can be poor or non 
existent at busy times of the day. Internet service providers are losing money as they 
compete for new users, and so are reluctant to pay vast sums of money to the 
telephone companies to upgrade the access networks. The biggest problem facing 
the banks, and one that may yet destroy customer confidence and thwart all of the 
ideas mentioned in this chapter, is the threat posed by computer hackers. Incidents 
have occurred where even the proprietary systems of banks have been penetrated, 
so it would be comparatively easy for fraudsters to access them via such an open 
network as the Internet. Considerable sums are being invested in the security of 
electronic money transmission systems, but the danger of fraud by internal or 
external elements always remains a possibility. In these operating conditions, an 
organisation such as the successful telephone banking operator First Direct, which 
prides itself upon quality service, is still reluctant to introduce Internet banking. 
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TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
It is sometimes argued that computer-based banking services will remain a niche 
market because a large proportion of the UK population are not computer literate and 
prefer to deal with bank employees face to face. This appears to be a rather short 
sighted approach because a growing number of banking customers and staff have 
grown up with computing facilities and are comfortable with new technology. The 
world's leading computer companies are trying to get a foot in the door of the growing 
on-line banking market. In April 1995, Microsoft made an abortive attempt to 
purchase Intuit, an American software company whose star product, called Quicken, 
allows PC users to deal on-line with their banks. Microsoft's attempt to buy Intuit 
actually boosted the smaller firm because it made the banks take it more seriously. 
Intuit is the market leader in personal finance software with 75% of the US market, 
and in June 1996 it announced the creation of BankNOW, an on-line system which 
will link six million subscribers with participating financial institutions. Intuit's 
relationship with the banking industry is becoming increasingly complicated, as banks 
currently pay Intuit a licence fee to connect Quicken users to their bank accounts, but 
the Web-based banking services under development by the banks will be in direct 
competition with Quicken. Microsoft Money is a direct rival to Quicken, and Microsoft 
secured the co-operation of 58 banks in July 1996 to support on-line banking with its 
Microsoft Money 97 personal financial software. In September 1996 IBM announced 
a deal with 15 major US banks to develop an electronic banking network called the 
Integdon Financial Network. It will offer interactive banking to a combined customer 
base of 60 million households in the US and Canada, and IBM aims to prevent 
the 
possibility of Microsoft or Intuit coming to dominate the industry. 
By establishing 
links with technology suppliers, the banks Involved can control costs 
by providing a 
shared infrastructure and transaction standards, and at the same 
time maintain bank 
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branding of services which run the risk of being hijacked by industry newcomers. This 
brief review shows that In line with the relative market penetration of electronic 
banking in the US as compared with the UK, the American banks at present are 
being far more proactive in this field than are their British counterparts. Even in the 
US, electronic banking accounted for only 1 per cent of banking transactions in 1995 
(Graham 1996). 
RETAILERS 
Supermarkets are targeting financial services to find new sources of profit to offset 
the maturing UK grocery market. They are also well placed to exploit the banks' poor 
reputation for customer service that was noted in an earlier section of this chapter. 
The UK retailer Sainsbury announced a partnership with Bank of Scotland in 
November 1996 to offer deposit accounts and credit cards to its massive customer 
base. By late 1998 it is intended that a full range of banking services will be offered 
by a combination of telephone operations and in-store cash dispensers. As the 
provider of a new service, Sainsbury is free to select certain banking products that it 
perceives will add value, without needing to offer the loss-making services such as 
cheque accounts that retail banks are obliged to provide. By the same logic, it can 
target the banks' most profitable customers from its large pool of regular shoppers 
and ignore the remainder. Tesco has a similar arrangement with Royal Bank of 
Scotland, and by May 1998 the retailer had opened 1 million deposit accounts with 
total balances exceeding E2 billion, (Financial Times, 16th May 1998). The main 
attraction to customers is the generous rate of credit interest, (currently 6.5%) which 
is way in excess of the rates offered by the traditional banks. 
Sainsbury is now 
considering a move into the mortgage market and Tesco into pensions. 
The same 
article reports a prediction by analysts from Merrill Lynch that the two supermarkets 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 68 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox. - the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
will produce combined annual operating profits of E300 million just from financial 
services by 2003. 
THE FUTURE OF BANKING 
Gates (1995) has made no secret of his belief that the convergence of money, 
commerce and personal computers represents one of the great new markets of 
modem times. As early as 1985, Frazer noted the likely implications of technological 
innovations in financial services: 
"MIM 
Biectronic banking... has a significance that goes well beyond simply making 
payments more efficiently. It could become a major battleground between 
banks and new competitors anxious to invade their terTitory, with important 
implications for the shape of banking in the future. " (p. 5) 
Similar claims were made in a recent report by Price Waterhouse (1996) on the 
challenge of 'virtual banking': 
"A new generation of non-bank competitors poised to harness new fonns of 
technology could radically alter the structure of the traditional banking system 
as we know it. Today, opportunities are being exploited by software 
companies, consumer companies and even large and influential media 
owners. The threat to the traditional 'bricks and mortar' banking system is 
very real" (p. 3) 
Warner (1996) writing in the Independent, summarises the current market position as 
follows: 
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"For the time being the o/d dinosaurs of banking are making record, many 
would say excessive, profits. A new, smaller, faster moving reptile is waiting 
in the wings. Twenty years from now, they may have inherited the earth. " 
16) 
Despite these warnings, the banks are in a strong position because of the sheer size 
of their customer base and detailed product knowledge. Graham (1996) noted that 
although the banks have a huge volume of customers who may be reluctant to go to 
the trouble of changing their established banking arrangements, and still enjoy 
considerable regulatory protection, these advantages are hardly indicative of 
operating effectiveness. It remains to be seen whether the banks can be flexible and 
innovative enough to exploit their advantages and respond positively to the 
competitive threat from industry newcomers. At the very least, they need to increase 
their levels of IT expenditure still further while focusing upon obtaining the full value 
from their investment. This issue is explored in detail in Chapter 5. 
At this stage it is difficult to predict the likely extent of change in the structure of the 
industry, and also important to bear in mind the cautionary note described in the 
introductory chapter against the common tendency to exaggerate the potential of 
new technologies, (Flannery 1996). It is clear that the benefits to the consumer in 
terms of increased choice and efficiency are likely to be considerable. The debate 
about the future role of the banks will be informed in later chapters by analysis of 
empirical data, which will enable comparisons to be made between the strategies of 
banks and industry newcomers with respect to technological innovation. This thesis 
will examine these issues in the context of current activity in the banking industry, as 
a number of industry newcomers challenge established norms. As shown in the 
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previous sections of this chapter, some of these organisations are contemplating 
radical change and believe that precedent should not necessarily decide either the 
direction or define the actual providers of new business practices. 
In contrast, it will be argued in later chapters that an 'anti-innovation' culture still 
prevails within the traditional banks and encompasses the dealings that they have 
with both clients and their own staff. This attitude appears to have become so 
ingrained in the retail banking industry that attempts to introduce radical changes in 
working practices based upon new communication technologies have so far been 
both belated and half-hearted. This is noted by Dougherty and Hardy (1996) in their 
examination of the problem of sustaining product innovation in mature industries. 
They claimed that it was relatively easy for such a company to come up with a single 
innovative idea, but much more difficult to manage the creation and development of a 
number of new ideas over time: 
"Sustained product innovation is particulady difficult for organisations with 
long histodes of stable operations ... 
long-stable organisations are especially 
challenged by changes in technology and global competition: they must 
become more innovative if -they are to survive, but to do so they must 
fundamentally change how they orpanise. " (p. 1120) 
The banks still tend to regard this viewpoint as heretical, although 
there are some 
signs that attitudes are beginning to change. For example 
Graham (1996) writing in 
the Financial Times, quotes a Citibank executive by the name of Jim 
Bailey who used 
an analogy with the ice-makers that once brought 
ice to India: 
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"Not one of those companies survived to become refrigeration manufacturers. 
We cannot afford to be like the ice-makers. " (p. 11) 
Although one of the largest banks in the world, Citibank has a particular reputation for 
conservatism. It would make an interesting study of technological change if its 
leaders really are determined to transform the organisation in this manner. 
Mondex and the credit card companies are owned by the banks, so some means of 
control can be placed upon their activities. This is not the case with the technology 
companies that are working alongside banks as partners in the development of new 
payment systems, or the retailers keen to extend their product range into financial 
services. Despite denials, Microsoft is rumoured to be developing its own financial 
products. In addition, the telecommunications company AT&T is now the second 
largest provider of credit cards in the USA. It was mentioned earlier that the strategy 
adopted by many US banks has been to establish formal links with technology 
suppliers in a defensive attempt to retain bank branding on electronic payment 
products. 
CONCLUSION 
It is certain that future developments will continue to change the shape of the 
financial services industry. This chapter has highlighted some of the projects 
currently under consideration in the industry. The innovations described cover the full 
range from incremental to radical, many are inter-related and involve collaboration 
between diverse organisational partners. Possible relationships between the theory 
of how innovation and technological change are believed to occur and the practical 
reality were explored during the empirical study, and are developed in later chapters. 
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Particular rare needs to be taken, as noted in Chapter 2, to look beyond the 'hype' 
surrounding banking innovations, which, as history has shown, may absorb 
considerable resources over an extended period of time whilst remaining peripheral 
to more established banking services. 
The major issues that have been discussed in this chapter can be summarised as 
follows: 
0 The banking industry forms a valid and topical subject of study because of the 
wide range of competing innovations which now exist at various stages of 
development (by both established and new players in the market) and also 
because of the importance of the industry to the UK economy as a whole 
0 UK banking history shows that early technology strategies which automated 
existing processes tended to reinforce the culture of stability and control at the 
expense of innovation 
0 The availability of new technological opportunities means that 
banks are 
facing additional competitive pressures from more innovative industry 
newcomers 
A number of questions arise from these issues which are developed 
in the empirical 
study: 
0 Why has the level of investment in new technology not 
been translated into 
significant produCtiVitY gains within the banking industry? 
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0 Why does there appear to be little sign of new organisational systems and 
working practices within the banking industry as a result of a sustained period 
of investment in new technologies? 
0 At the macro level, can the future shape of the banking industry be predicted 
by study of recent technological innovations by established players and new 
market entrants? 
0 Does the organisational structure and culture within UK retail banks preclude 
contemplation of substantive change despite increasing competition and the 
availability of technological opportunities? 
At the organisational level, can practical guidelines for management be 
derived by comparing and contrasting the technology strategies espoused by 
the various players in the financial services market? 
Internet addresses of organisations mentioned in this chapter., 
hffp. -Ilwww. iti. net(barclaysquareI 
http: //Www. sfnb. com 
httP. Ilwww. lloydsbank. co. uk 
http: //Www. mondex. com 
ýA 
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CHAPTER 4- THE RESEARCH METHOD 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the research method that was used to address the quesbons 
raised at the end of the last chapter. It begins by describing the problems 
encountered in obtaining access to banking institutions for interview purposes. The 
chapter then considers the merits of using case studies in this way, and explains why 
the approach is particularly suited to financial services research. The chapter goes 
on to explain how primary data was collated by means of a series of semi-structured 
interviews with managers and participants in various new technology projects. The 
organisations studied included both traditional UK retail banks and industry 
newcomers, which enabled the major issues raised in the literature review to be 
tested and comparisons made across different project and organisational boundaries. 
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the changing role of the financial services industry within 
a UK economy that has been in decline on the world stage for more than a hundred 
years. This helped to inform and focus the empirical study within a broader context. 
For example, the organisational conservatism and paternalistic management styles 
that still appear to prevail in the industry can be understood against the historical 
background and development of the industry which was described earlier. The 
questions raised by the review therefore guided the issues that were discussed in the 
semi-structured interviews. 
The chapter goes on to describe how the case study material collected was analysed 
by the development of 'grounded theory'. This approach is a rigorous method of 
qualitative data analysis devised by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) which uses 
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comparative analysis of specific cases to synthesise new theories from case study 
data. By comparing and contrasting the research findings from a number of cases 
with the results of earlier studies in the banks, it was possible to evaluate the range 
of possible explanations for the IT productivity paradox. Each alternative theory was 
assessed in terms of the degree of individual project success or failure that ensued in 
the various cases. In contrast, and as stated in Chapter 1, earlier studies have 
tended to focus upon individual examples rather than attempt to evaluate a range of 
possible explanations for the IT productivity paradox on a comparative basis. It is 
hoped that this method will lead to a broader understanding of the complex issues 
involved than has been the case in the past. 
Appendices A-D at the end of the study support the material in this chapter by 
detailing a specimen letter requesting initial interviews (Appendix A) the names and 
titles of all the interviewees (Appendix B) a sample interview transcript (Appendix C) 
and an example of grounded theory categorisation (Appendix D). 
ACCESS 
It was anticipated that there would be problems of access to certain commercial 
banks for interviewing purposes. Previous research by the author within a 
commercial bank was hampered by both an ambivalent attitude towards academic 
research and an insistence on confidentiality. The topic is sensitive in that 
implementation of certain new technologies could render obsolete the entire structure 
and knowledge base upon which careers have been built and on which peoples' jobs 
remain dependent. The very people charged with development often have a vested 
interest in preservation of the status quo, so great care needed to be taken. Howard 
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and Sharp (1983) emphasised the importance of obtaining the backing of a reputable 
academic institution in these circumstances to facilitate access. 
The access problem at commercial banks was addressed by utilising personal 
contacts of the author to gain admittance in the first instance. As recommended by 
Jankowicz (1993) an assurance of confidentiality was provided in that names of 
individuals and their institutions would not be quoted, and that the data collected 
would be stored in a secure place and not used for any other purpose than that 
specified in advance. It may also be necessary to limit the circulation of the 
completed research if it is deemed to contain commercially sensitive data, although it 
is hoped that this strategy would only be deployed as a last resort. Buchanan et al. 
(1988) recommended cultivation of informal contacts at middle levels of the 
organisation to form a network of potential sources. In their experience access was 
facilitated by persistence and avoidance of 'unreasonable' demands upon company 
time and resources. 
THE USE OF CASE STUDIES 
A useful starting point is to define what is meant by the expression 'case study'. The 
following definition is taken from Yin (1984): 
"A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
01. nvestigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
0 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearty evident; and 
in which 
0 multiple sources of evidence are used. " 
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This approach enables conclusions to be drawn and recommendations made as to 
future strategies, based upon analysis of both historical and current issues within an 
organisation. This study draws upon empirical material obtained from established 
firms and new market entrants in the financial services industry. The material was 
derived from a review of written records, semi-structured interviews with relevant 
management, and observation of organisational settings and contexts. This approach 
allowed a longitudinal feature to be introduced to the research. It utilises the method 
adopted by Fincham et al (1994) who advocated the use of a sample of case studies 
in a 'comparative case' method of analysis. They divided case material between an 
initial set of brief descriptions to familiarise the reader with the firms, and later 
empirical data categorised by chapters across the themes of the research. The 
authors found that their approach enabled them to conduct their analysis at three 
different levels. They obtained a broad coverage of the financial sector, made 
comparisons between the strategies of individual institutions studied, and also 
focused upon the specific detail of new technology projects within the organisations. 
The method gave both depth and breadth to their study, and has also been used to 
good effect by Zuboff (1988). 
It was decided that the development of a series of case studies would be particularly 
appropriate for this research project because it does not set out to test an established 
theory. Instead, it aims to establish practical guidelines for the successful 
management of new technology projects in the financial services sector, by the 
systematic analysis of project development and implementation in various types of 
organisation. The issues are complex and require analysis at the levels of project 
management, organisational strategy and industry sector. As case study material can 
be gathered from any combination of secondary sources, 
individual or group 
Lisa Harrfs, Brunel University page 78 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox. - the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
interview, or action research, a number of perspectives can be obtained to inform the 
analysis. 
The stages involved in case study work have been usefully summarised by Bennett 
(1986) as follows: 
0 Determining the present situation 
0 Gathering information about the background to the present situation 
0 Gathering more specific data to test alternative hypotheses about the 
important factors in the present situation 
0 Presenting recommendations for action 
The advantage of using case studies in this way is that a comprehensive volume and 
variety of data can be collected and analysed in comparison with more quantitative 
research methods. However, the drawback usually cited of the case study method, 
which involves a relatively small sample size, is in establishing how closely the 
results can be regarded as representative of the general phenomena under 
investigation. Bonoma (1985) discussed the need for a trade-off between 'currency', 
(the extent to which results can be generalised) and 'data integrity', (the accuracy 
and reliability of results. ) He admitted that it was impossible for any one research 
method to have high levels of both currency and data integrity, but observed that 'in 
practice the obsession with data integrity meant that it was often acquired at the 
expense of useful theories. He claimed that the level of data validity could be 
improved by a process of trýiangulation, thereby enhancing the potential for 
generalisation from a case study. This required the findings from a single case to be 
corroborated by the use of more than one research method concurrently. He found 
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that such methods could lead to deeper understandings than more 'scientific' 
techniques if the research was properly conducted. 
Craig-Smith (1990) put forward a persuasive argument for the value of case studies 
to theory development. He noted that the obsession with applying scientific 
techniques to ma nagement meant emphasis was usually placed upon quantitative 
research, and the quest for a representative sample resulted in considerable breadth, 
but relatively little depth. The quantitative approach requires the researcher to stay a 
step away from the problem in order to be objective, but it is difficult to retain 
objectivity in a social setting without becoming too distant from the problems under 
investigation. He claimed that application of the scientific method to social problems 
assumed, perhaps wrongly, that complex issues could be categorised and simplified 
to make them amenable to statistical analysis. Instead, he advocated the use of a 
methodology that encompassed observation and description to achieve meaningful 
results. This approach would certainly encompass the use of case studies and was 
backed up by Weick (1989) who quoted the following passage from Lindblom (1987): 
"Theorists often write trivial theories because their process of theory 
construction is hemmed in by methodological strictures that favour validation 
rather than usefulness. " 
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the drawback of the qualitative approach 
lies in determining the extent to which the findings from a particular case study can 
be generalised to a wider population. Craig-Smith advocated the careful use of case 
studies as constituent parts of developing theory, based upon logical rather than 
statistical inference. He emphasised that logical inference does not imply that the 
case study in itself is representative of more general behaviour, but that the 
'depth of 
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analysis conducted is sufficiently plausible'to warrant correlations being made. In 
other words, while statistical analysis only allows a researcher to infer that 
characteristics of the sample may be expected in a wider population, conclusions 
drawn from an informed study based upon a thorough and logical analysis of 
observed relationships can be equally valid. In the former case, it is possible for 
evidence of a statistical correlation between two variables to imply the existence of a 
relationship that does not in fact exist. A more logical analysis would rule out 
anomalies of this kind. Mitchell (1983) provides a useful summary of the argument to 
conclude this section: 
"We infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider 
population not because the case is representative but because our logic is 
unassailable. " 
DATA COLLECTION 
Initially a pilot study was conducted among contacts of the researcher at commercial 
banks, as a 'fact-finding' mission, using open questioning techniques. The early 
interviews elicited additional information that necessitated a more detailed 
investigation at the formal interview stage. This took place over a twelve month 
period so it was possible to cross check key comments by using material from early 
interviews to inform the later questioning. Table A details the total number of 
interviews conducted, the role of each respondent within the organisation, and the 
nature of the specific new technology projects under investigation. The background 
to each of the case studies is described in the next chapter. An alternative data 
collection method of participant observation within the organisational setting was 
initially considered, but rejected because the researcher already has several years' 
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experience within a commercial bank that can be drawn upon in this regard. Hickson 
(1986) analysed the value of ethnographic studies to a researcher in comparison with 
the semi-structured interview technique, and concluded that the information obtained 
by interview was essentially the same as from participant observation, but 'less 
cluttered with detail'. 
THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
Watson (1994) noted the need for 'reflexivity' in interview situations, by which he 
meant considering the difficulty of remaining neutral and objective within a setting in 
which the presence of a researcher influences the answers given and attitudes 
displayed by respondents. As the research methodology was centred upon the 
development of grounded theory, (described in the next section) a structured 
interviewing technique in which the precise line of questioning is predetermined was 
not appropriate, as this method pre-supposes the existence of theories and 
relationships which can be tested by specific questioning. At the other end of the 
scale, a totally unstructured interview, in which no guidance at all is given to the 
respondent, is never possible because the very presence of the researcher and 
explanation of the project under investigation will influence the thinking and nature of 
the responses given by the interviewee. instead, specific primary data was collated 
by means of formal semi-structured interviews with the industry representatives. Most 
questions were open ended to allow the interviewees to express their own views 
fully. Piore (1979) noted the value of anecdotes offered by the respondent in 
response to such questions, which illustrated the key organisational or environmental 
influences upon events, and the relationships between these factors. 
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All of the interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed, so that a full record of 
the conversation was obtained. The practice of writing notes during or immediately 
after an interview was not followed as this tends to partially interpret the data, as only 
issues that were previously regarded as important will be selected and recorded. 
Transcriptions can always be returned to and reinterpreted as issues are developed 
over the period of the research. This method of data collection is well established in 
the literature, (Easterby-Smith 1991 and Jankowicz 1993) and has been tested by 
the researcher on a previous occasion, where it was found to be extremely effective 
in clarifying the often contrasting motives of individual actors. This interaction allowed 
the literature described in Chapters 2 and 3 to be built upon, and various hypotheses 
about the nature and extent of the contributory organisational factors to the 
technological implementation process to be tested. This process contributes to the 
development of grounded theory, which is described in the next section. 
GROUNDEDTHEORY 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Burgess (1982) defined the development of grounded 
theory as the use of 'comparative analysis'to cultivate theory from data. This method 
requires the research to be undertaken with no preconceptions of what the findings 
are likely to be, so that any insights are derived entirely from analysis of data 
collected. In practice this is difficult to achieve because it is natural for any 
researcher to draw upon past experience to help understand and explain a new 
situation. Any intention to retain neutrality and objectivity is undermined by the 
principle of 'schema theory' (Bartlett, 1932) which holds that it is impossible for the 
human mind to dismiss preconceptions which impact upon the interpretation of the 
case under consideration. 
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Consequently, for the development of grounded theory to be most effective, the 
qualitative data obtained should be systematically categorised into a coherent 
framework as particular themes emerge, (see Appendix D for an example). This 
necessitates the physical separation of sections of transcripts, which can then be 
categorised and filed under appropriate headings. Each section represents an 
emerging theme which gains credence the more often the same issue is distilled from 
different sources. Dominant concepts derived from a series of case studies form the 
basis of grounded theory. Denzin (1988) criticised the grounded theory approach by 
warning that the danger of placing too much emphasis upon the categorisation 
process could lead to "a corTesponding slighting of the actual recording of lived 
experience in interactional situations" (p. 432). Care needs to be taken to avoid this 
problem throughout the data analysis process. It is difficult to predict how many 
interviews are necessary, but the grounded theory approach suggests that after a 
number of interviews, a data pattern should emerge, and further data collected 
eventually becomes predictable. Glaser and Strauss referred to this point as 
'saturation', and it indicates that enough cases have by then been studied. 
THE PRACTICE OF DATA COLLECTION 
The most striking feature of the data collection process was the difference in the 
quality of data obtained from interviews where the respondent was known to the 
interviewer, and that which resulted from a direct appeal to the organisation. In the 
former case, people were often prepared to give more freely of their time, and 
provided detailed and honest accounts that would have been sanitised or even 
omitted for a stranger. For example, the case study of Bank A provided considerable 
detail which has been extensively utilised in different categories 
throughout the 
research project. In contrast, the interviews with First 
Direct yielded less useful data. 
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The bank prides itself on its customer service record and they were anxious to 
please, regarding the interviews as a public relations exercise. However, the 
information obtained was rather bland, and provided little added value over 
secondary data from press sources. On occasions however, prospective interviews 
which initially appeared uninspiring turned out to much more valuable than 
anticipated. In one case, (Bank B) a telephone call I made to one manager was 
returned by her boss, who had overheard the conversation and offered his 
assistance as well. It turned out that he had recently completed an MBA course and 
a research project of his own. After experiencing problems in arranging his own 
interviews he was keen to help others in a similar position. 
When approaching organisations in which I had no personal contacts to follow up, I 
first of all obtained an initial contact name and spoke to the manager concerned by 
telephone. The banks get many requests from researchers and tend to direct such 
enquiries to a Public Relations or Marketing area in the first instance. I found it was 
useful to emphasise my background and prior employment within the industry to 
establish a certain amount of credibility. Although often prepared to spend heavily to 
obtain advice from management consultancies, there are very few - if any - official 
links in place between the UK banks and the universities which can be drawn upon. 
In fact I would go so far as to say that the banks do not seem to see any way in 
academic research could add value to their business despite the turbulent 
environment in which they are operating. When speaking to the banks I emphasised 
the aims of the research, and how the final results may well be of practical interest to 
the banks themselves, but only in one case (Mondex) was this offer taken up. If a 
manager agreed to be interviewed it was usually justified as a public relations 
exercise, or on one memorable occasion, 'because you may be my boss one day. ' 
The telephone conversation was then followed up with a letter of confirmation, which 
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included a summary of the aims of the project and a list of the general subject areas 
to be covered. After one interview it was usually possible to speak to other people in 
the department, or obtain a contact name in a different part of the organisation which 
could be followed up later on. 
Table A shows that the interviewees consisted of marketing managers, industry 
consultants, project managers and general managers. The level of individual project 
detail discussed at each interview therefore varied considerably. It was not possible 
to interview very senior individuals, (at board level for example) and consequently the 
limitations of the sample in terms of overall 'representativeness' must be 
acknowledged. In general terms, the interviews can be grouped into two categories, 
those which focused upon the intricacies of organ isation-specific projects and those 
of much broader scope which examined trends in the industry and compared the IT 
strategies of various market players. 
In addition, 5 interviews have been conducted with banking industry consultants from 
Price Waterhouse and Ernst and Young. Discussions did not centre upon the detail 
of particular new technology projects but upon broader issues such as general trends 
in the industry and the prospects for new market entrants. The data obtained has 
been incorporated into the analysis and concluding chapters together with the above. 
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TABLE A: CASE STUDY DETAILS 
NAME OF NUMBER AND ROLE OF DESCRIPTION OF NEW 
BANK INTERVIEWEES TECHNOLOGY PROJECT 
STUDIED 
Bank A 1 general manager Integration of all banking services 
2 project managers within one IT network 
1 marketing manager 
1 business analyst 
Bank B 3 marketing managers Establishment of links between 
2 project managers European partner banks in 
1 general manager preparation for the creation of a 
6 clerical staff European Payment System 
Bank C 3 project managers Integration of worldwide branches 
within one IT network 
Bank D 1 general manager Development of electronic home 
2 marketing managers banking systems 
1 business analyst 
First Direct 2 marketing managers start up telephone banking operation 
5 telephone operators 
Mondex 2 marketing managers Development of electronic purse 
1 general manager product as cash replacement 
The objective of interviews falling into the first category was to explore the ideas 
developed from the literature review in the context of the interviewees' 
responsibilities for current IT projects at vanous stages of development. The general 
trend of the questioning can be summarised as follows: 
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0 What are the recent/current new technology projects under development in 
the organisation? 
0 Have problems been experienced in the course of project development and 
implementation? 
0 What were the nature of these problems? 
0 How were they overcome? 
0 Are any procedures in place to measure the effectiveness of IT projects after 
their implementation? 
0 Have changes been made in the management of IT projects as a result of any 
problems experienced in this case? 
What form should such changes take? 
The second set of interviews focused upon more general trends in the industry and 
the strategies of the major players and newcomers to the market with respect to new 
technology. The five interviewees were consultants with broad experience of the UK 
retail banking industry, and well Placed to provide an overview of current issues, as 
well as comment on specific findings from the individual case studies. 
THE PRACTICE OF DATA ANALYSIS 
As the interview process progressed the focus of the questions became more 
specific as the categories of grounded theory began to emerge. This did not mean 
that the interviews became increasingly more useful over time. In fact the process 
was more adhoc with some early interviews of greater value than later ones. Within 
this framework, however, it was noticeable that later interviews formed a check on 
the material covered at an earlier stage. It was also soon apparent that certain issues 
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recurred time and time again in projects undertaken by different banks, and even in 
successive projects within one organisation. In some cases the interviews with one 
bank were spread over a period of several months, so it was possible to return to 
issues that had been discussed earlier and examine the progress made over time, 
and also to reinterpret the material covered in the light of later findings from other 
case studies. The extent of overlap in the emerging categories of grounded theory 
from bank to bank itself became a significant finding as well as the actual content of 
the issues raised. 
When analysing the interview transcripts it was noticeable at an early stage that 
different areas of the same bank had their own distinct operating practices, and it 
would have been far too simplistic to allocate the activities of one individual bank to 
emerging grounded theory categories. For example, different parts of Bank D 
exhibited distinct organisational structures and cultures, which were manifested in 
very different attitudes towards innovation and change within the one organisation. 
The process of grounded theoretical analysis led directly to the organisation of 
material within chapter headings. The first - and eventually the largest - category to 
evolve from analysis of interview transcripts was the influence of structural and 
functional separation of IT and business areas within the banks on the 
implementation of new technology projects. The number of facets encompassed 
within this one heading became rather unwieldy and the data was eventually split into 
two chapters. The first dealt with the impact of structural divisions within the 
organisation on the success of new technology projects, and the second with the 
consequent implications for knowledge creation and transfer. The other categories to 
emerge from the analysis were the role of leadership and the impact of culture upon 
the success of new technology projects. Further analysis showed that absence of 
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organisational learning was a common theme to each of these chapters, and this 
issue is explored in Chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 5- THE CASE STUDIES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets the scene for discussion of the empirical case studies by describing 
how the banks have integrated information technology into their business over the 
past forty years, during a prolonged and unprecedented period of investment. The 
programme has resulted in automation of many traditional banking activities, with the 
focus now moving towards 'information management' as technological capacity has 
increased. This provides the necessary broad histodcal context for informed analysis 
of specific new technology projects within the retail financial service sector. The 
chapter goes on to detail the background and objectives of each of the 6 
technological change projects under consideration within the case study 
organisations, together with a description of the difficulties that were faced in 
practice. The main issues raised by these cases are summarised in the context of the 
overall objectives of the thesis. The data was obtained from interviews with bank 
management and industry consultants (as specified i-n Chapter 4), and also from 
secondary sources such as literature provided by the banks concerned. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO THE BANKS 
Developments in information technology have provided both opportunities and 
threats to the traditional providers of financial services. Hardware costs have 
reduced, and software and telecommunication capabilities have 
increased 
dramatically. A historical review by Barras (1990) noted the scale of information 
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technology investment by the financial services sector. He found that by 1975 the 
industry accounted for 50 percent of all UK computer mainframe installations, and 
between 1975 and 1981 the growth rate of total bank system investment approached 
20 percent per annum. Since this review the centrality of IT to the operation of the 
financial service industry has continued to increase, and a recent survey by Morton 
(1996) found that spending on technology by banks equated to between 20 and 25 
percent of total business costs. Curry (1995) emphasised how information technology 
has developed into a strategic issue for the banks because it is used to increase 
efficiency, link remote locations, streamline processes and improve customer service. 
Despite the growing importance of information technology and the large sums of 
money invested, her research found that technology departments in the banks are 
still regarded merely as support functions. This finding confirms the assertion made 
in Chapter 1 that the banking industry constitutes an important example of 
technological change to study because of its position as the leading investor in new 
technology. The size of its domination also means that findings from an industry 
study have a wider relevance in the context of technological change in the economy 
as a whole. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Mainframe computers were first introduced into banks in the early 1960s to handle 
statement production, cheque sorting, payroll and other basic accounting functions. 
The technological emphasis was initially upon the automation of existing tasks, 
thereby reducing the volume of paperwork and the numbers of staff necessary to 
process it. As a result, new system design tended to reflect the physical 
infrastructures that it replaced, and the nature of the underlying roles remained the 
same. Only later were strategies directed towards improving management 
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information systems and service quality as memory became cheaper and more 
extensive. For example, the interbank electronic clearing system (BACS) was 
introduced in 1971 to improve the productivity of money transmission in an 
environment where demand for banking transactions was increasing by 8 percent per 
annum. The Cleariing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) was established 
in 1984. It allowed payments to be exchanged electronically within one day, and 
automatically transferred the net surplus or shortfall of payments between the 
clearing banks at the end of each day. Cashpoint machines (ATMs) first appeared in 
1979, permitting 24 hour access to funds. After a slow start they can now be found 
in such diverse locations as motorway service stations and superstores, as well as in 
the high street. Initially available for cash withdrawals and balance enquiries, the 
range of services provided now includes statement ordering, bill payment, travel 
facilities, and arrangement of interview appointments. 
A recent Economist survey of technology in finance (1996) described how the focus 
of all these expensive systems was upon efficiency of processing rather than 
analysis of information. Transactions could be handled more quickly and with fewer 
errors, but as all the banks developed similar systems this ability conferred little 
competitive advantage. In fact, business such as cheque clearing is now regarded as 
a utility and increasingly outsourced to specialist firms. Information of value to the 
banks about the behaviour and needs of their customers was difficult to extract from 
these process-based systems. For example, data concerning a customer with a 
current account, mortgage and business account, dealing in stocks, shares and 
foreign exchange transactions would be duplicated in several different areas of the 
bank, and none of these areas would necessahly be aware of the existence of the 
others. The diverse range of systems which have evolved to handle this business 
were often technically incompatible. It was therefore impossible to assess whether a 
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particular customer relationship was profitable or could be extended to other 
products. The development of "middleware" technology in the late 1980s allowed 
disparate systems to be linked for the first time, facilitating the extraction and analysis 
of customer data, which could be used to evaluate relationships and improve 
business decision making. It is only recently that the banks have had the capacity to 
utilise their technology to its full potential, and it remains to be seen if the process 
can be effectively managed. The banks will need to make the most of the 
opportunities presented by this situation if they are to overcome the competitive 
threat from industry newcomers that was described in Chapter 3. 
BANK A- INTEGRATION OF ALL BANKING SERVICES WITHIN ONE 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK 
This project was a major change programme, initiated in 1992 in response to 
increasing competition in the financial services industry. The aim was to improve 
business performance and enable profitability levels to be increased by E200 million 
within five years. Although the project was centred around IT, it involved and 
impacted upon every part of the bank as all banking services were to be integrated 
within one IT network. It was intended that customers would be able to gain 
electronic access to all of their accounts throughout the country from any terminal, (to 
transfer funds, arrange a loan, pension or mortgage, for example) without the need 
for specialist knowledge and functions to be maintained in individual branches. The 
entire structure and image of the bank was to be altered, removing a traditional 
emphasis upon geographical splits and making the layout of branches more efficient 
and welcoming. More than E100 million was invested in the technology required to 
effect this transformation. 
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In the course of the change programme, problems began to surface as the bank tried 
to reconcile planned job losses with a severe skills shortage in the area of new 
technology development and management, and the often conflicting aims of business 
and technical personnel. It appeared that staff felt their skills were being devalued, or 
their jobs put under threat. There was little commitment to the change process and 
morale suffered. Technically, it was difficult to integrate the new client server 
technologies (written in SQL Windows) with the mainframe programmes written many 
years before in COBOL. The mainframe system was also account based and could 
not be easily changed into a customer-based system. This meant that data 
concerning customers with more than one account could not be linked together, and 
this caused administrative problems, duplication of work and low service quality. 
The role of some interviewees in this project was to manage a team within the 
Technology Division that was developing and implementing "middleware" - new, 
technology that enables disparate systems to be integrated. For example, the bank 
wanted to have a global view of the loan arrears management, and under the old 
system, customer data would be held in different areas of the bank depending on the 
particular products involved, and it was a technically difficult and time-consuming job 
to integrate the data and provide a single figure representing the total outstanding 
funds owed by an individual customer. Once the systems were upgraded and 
middleware installed, remote sites across the country could access and assimilate 
data held in core systems. This work formed part of the bank-wide systems 
integration objective of the project. The Technology Division expanded rapidly as the 
project progressed, with staff numbers increasing by over 300% between 1992 and 
1994. Many of these newcomers were temporary, employed by consultancies or by 
the bank as short term contractors, to meet what was perceived as a growing 
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knowledge gap between the skills of the original staff and the new technological 
requirements of the project. 
Significant difficulties were encountered from a managerial perspective in terms of 
group morale, as many individuals found their skills to be obsolete and their hitherto 
secure jobs under threat from the new entrants. These staff had been used to a 
stable and undemanding environment, looking after an established and well known 
computer system on behalf of user departments. They now had to acquire new skills 
as new technologies were introduced and deal with unforeseen problems in 
interfacing the new systems with the old mainframe, whilst coping with increasing 
demands and tight deadlines from user departments. In effect, the old working 
environment and culture was overturned in a short space of time. Uncertainty about 
the future encouraged rumour, speculation and confusion. In addition, there was no 
managerial infrastructure in place to co-ordinate each element of the project, which 
was under the control of different project teams, in line with overall company strategy. 
As a result, different sub-projects imposed their own procedures and standards. For 
example, within the same office some groups were working with Microsoft Access 
version 1 software, and others with version 2, which was fundamentally different in 
terms of its usage and capacity. As a result of these difficulties, the project began to 
exceed its budget and timescales. A decision was taken to compromise the original 
objectives of the programme in order to keep within the allocated schedules. 
Consequently the radical change programme was abandoned, in favour of a more 
incremental adjustment. Despite the level of investment made in the project, no 
attempt was made to analyse and address the reasons for the project failure. 
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BANK B- EUROPEAN PAYMENT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENTS 
The banking industry is regarded by the European Community Commission, (ECC) 
as central to the concept of a Single European Market, because of its control over 
domestic and international money transmission and also currency exchange. The 
ECC is therefore pressing for the creation of a pan-European payment system. This 
could be formed either by linking existing national electronic systems, or by 
establishing a single harmonised system, although the latter may imply the creation 
of a monopolistic public utility. The strategy derives from the ECCs stated policy 
objective of monetary union, and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty timetabled the 
introduction of a single currency by 1999. The opening up of Eastern Europe and 
potential increase in the membership of the European Union, (EU) provides 
considerable opportunity for the development of electronic payment systems in 
paper-based societies, as does the prospect of Monetary Union for innovation in 
cross-border payment mechanisms. The trend towards European integration is 
increasing the volume and value of cross-border transactions, and technological 
innovations are widening the scope of payment mechanisms, as described in 
Chapter 3. 
The creation of any new monopoly would appear to contradict standard EC 
competition policy, which advocates competitive solutions dictated by market forces. 
Sir Leon Brittan, (1990) in his role as Commissioner for Financial Institutions and 
Competition Policy, summarised the position as follows: 
"To achieve the gmat commercial benefits of a single currency In a 
single market, we must unlock our payment systems from their current 
national structures and set them firmly in a European context. " (p. 54) 
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The 'commercial benefits' referred to were quantified in the Cecchini Report (1988) 
which analysed the potential benefits of a single market to a wide range of industries. 
It concluded that savings of ECU 22 billion would be generated if a single market 
were to be established. 
A payment system is "a system of contractual arrangements and operating facilities 
for transferring value", (Levitt 1991). It involves communications media by which 
instructions are transmitted using standard codes, formats and procedures. In 
traditional payment methods, a clearing mechanism is used to establish mutual 
positions among the participating bankers and facilitate settlement of obligations by 
means of a netting system. Within each country an automated clearing house, (ACH) 
provides this facility and transfer of value is usually made across the accounts that 
each participant holds with the national central bank. Domestic clearing systems 
tend to be multilateral in nature, whereas international payments are traditionally 
settled on a bilateral basis between correspondent, (or agent) banks in the countries 
concerned. At present, national domestic systems vary considerably. Some countries 
have sophisticated automated clearing houses, others are basic. The degree of 
central bank involvement varies between countries, as does the level of revenue they 
obtain from operating payment systems. (This revenue exceeded $800 million for the 
Federal Reserve in 1991, a fact which does not encourage innovation and change. ) 
Membership criteria and access to clearing systems also differ across the European 
Community. For example, in the UK the "club" has only recently been widened to 
include some building societies, although their powers are severely restricted, (see 
Chapter 3). There are also practical differences across Europe as regards to the level 
of industry regulation, operating hours, the length of the clearing cycle, input 
standards and degree of automation. As a result of these national differences, 
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transfers across country boundaries tend to be more expensive and lengthy than 
those made within one country, and the possibility of linking each existing domestic 
clearing system into one European-wide payment service seems remote in the 
foreseeable future. 
This high degree of diversity displayed in payment systems across Europe appears 
to be rooted in deep-seated historical differences in social patterns and customs, as 
well as national legislative structures. It therefore seems highly unlikely that 
convergence will occur through spontaneous adoption of new technologies and 
common behaviour. A report by Peeters, (1994) for the Centre for European Policy 
Studies commented on the situation as follows: 
"The creation of an integrated European Payment System is likely to 
be an uphill struggle, requiring substantial systemic changes, a 
thorough examination and reconsideration of the distribution of tasks 
and responsibilities between the various players and authorities 
involved, and discretionary action by authorities and market actors. " 
(p. 11) 
Gerald Hawkins, General Manager of Payment Services at Lloyds Bank, was not 
exaggerating in this quote from an interview with The Times (1994): 
"Cross-border banking is an area and an industry that has been relatively 
untouched by progress made elsewhere in banking. " 
TraditionallY, international transfers are exchanged on an individual basis 
between 
correspondent banks in the countries of remitter and beneficiary respectively, 
using 
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the world-wide electronic inter bank communication system known as SWIFT. The 
monopolistic nature of this system means that charges are high, and only banks can 
be members. In many countries it is standard practice for banks to hold incoming 
payments for 24 hours, (and hence earn interest on the funds) despite the 
instantaneous nature of the SWIFT transfer system. Multinational banks are also able 
to transfer payments using their own world-wide network of branches. These services 
have come under considerable attack in recent years from consumer groups and the 
banks'business clients with increasing levels of business across Europe. Complaints 
centre on the slow delivery times, high charges and complexity of a process 
developed in the Victorian era for settlement of international trade transactions. Since 
that time, the transfer mechanisms have evolved but the banking procedures 
involved have changed very liftle. 
Bank B, which forms the subject of this case study, has not yet taken seriously the 
issue of payment system development in a European context. Although the threat of 
increased competition from within the banking industry and innovative newcomers is 
acknowledged, attention has been focused upon consolidation of traditional business 
in the domestic market. The combination of ECC pressure and media and customer 
attention forced initial consideration of a European Payment Project in 1991. The 
original target for project implementation was late 1993, but it was to be another 
three years before a pilot system was finally in place. The intention was to form 
alliances with the bank's main European correspondent banks and link computer 
systems to facilitate the exchange of payments. All non-urgent payments for a 
particular country would be concentrated upon the favoured partner bank and 
reduced fees offered to customers utilising the service. The basic payment 
mechanism using SWIFT was unchanged, although individual transactions destined 
for one country would be grouped together and sent as one transfer. The 
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correspondent bank would then split the payment into its constituent parts for 
transmission to the beneficiaries through the national ACH. The process enables 
charges to be reduced but delivery times may be significantly increased. Other UK 
banks followed a similar strategy, and examples of such alliances include National 
Westminster Bank, Commerzbank of Germany and Societe Generale of France, and 
also Lloyds Bank, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya of Spain and Credit Agricole of France. This 
innovation requires only incremental change to existing procedures and makes little 
use of on-going technological developments. It appears to be unadventurous in 
comparison with the activities of industry newcomers that are utilising new 
technology to devise innovative money transmission mechanisms. 
The project responsibilities of the interviewees included the integration of business 
and technical departments of the bank, with the aim of developing an electronic 
payment system that could interface with the systems of other European banks, 
providing a compatible international network for exchange of payments. The major 
problem to hamper their work was the direct conflict between the aims of the project 
and the maintenance of existing skill sets, career paths and indeed employment 
itself. All of these features would undoubtedly be threatened by the significant 
changes in working practices anticipated by any developments in this area. 
In 
addition, change directly conflicted with achievement of departmental performance 
targets, based upon commission taken from the volumes of traditional payments 
made, and upon which annual bonus payments were dependent. Internal 
incentives 
to develop innovative international payment systems were therefore non-existent. 
The issues identified by the interviewees that hampered their task can 
be 
summarised as follows: 
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0 Ongoing conflicts of interest between the IT department and the business 
areas 
0 Resistance to change by staff and management 
0 Cost controls prohibited consideration of radical changes 
0 Pressure to economise meant that adaptations to existing technology had to 
be sought rather than sanction new, more appropriate systems 
0 Senior management commitment was lacking in view of the adverse impact 
that a viable solution would have upon existing business levels 
9 There was no clear international business strategy communicated throughout 
the organisation 
0 Links with other European banks were hampered by incompatible systems, 
and differing organisational goals, procedures and charges 
0 The overall impression given was that the project was not intended to be 
completed, but that it existed merely to reassure the European Commission 
that change was underway 
As a result of these problems, progress was slow and by the end of 1997 a pilot 
system was operating between Bank B and just two of its European Partners. The 
agreement to exchange payments between the three banks extended only to small 
items valued at less than the sterling equivalent of F-3000, and no formal system links 
were in place. Instead, the standard SWIFT payment format was maintained, and 
over 70% of payments were transmitted individually, in the traditional manner. The 
remainder could be grouped together and transmitted by one message, generating 
cost savings for the remitting bank, but this advantage was offset when handling 
incoming bulk payments which had to be split manually into their constituent parts for 
processing. This was because the payment process was subject to the technical 
Lisa Harfis, Brunel University page 102 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox. - the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
shortcomings of the SWIFT system, as no agreement has yet been reached on the 
integration of proprietary bank systems. 
BANK C- INTEGRATION OF WORLD-WIDE BRANCHES WITHIN ONE 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK 
The business focus of the bank at the centre of this case study is the provision of 
travel facilities and charge cards. Once the market leader in this field, the bank has a 
world-wide presence and quality image, but this has recently come under increasing 
pressure from new competitors. The project concerned was called 'Genesis' - it 
began in 1987 and involved some 500 staff world-wide. It was supposed to combine 
all of the organisation's separate computer systems used in different countries for the 
various business functions into one global system. The rationale behind the project 
was that the state of the art functionality it offered would enable the company to 
regain its leading market position. Or in the words of one interviewee: 
"Did anyone ask the customers what they wanted? No, it was mer-ely an 
attempt to be different, to stand out from the crowd. They were trying to 
resurrect a historical image, recapture the glory days, but it was over 
ambitious. " (Project Manager) 
The company started to draw up the business requirements in 1987, and by 1991 
had concluded that the project would be too massive to handle. No one 
had 
anticipated the scale of all the local amendments that would be necessary to meet 
the requirements of each individual market, legal differences being one pertinent 
example. Consequently the prospective travel system and card system were 
thrown 
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out, and efforts were concentrated upon replacing just the system which controlled 
the links between the bank and the establishments that accepted the charge card. 
This compromise was quite different from the initial grandiose plan to replace all 
existing systems with one global network. The only improvement would be 
replacement of the current disparate systems in use across the world (that controlled 
this particular function) with one new system, but this would have little impact upon 
the business as a whole. 
In 1991 a team of business users were drawn from across Europe to see if the 
scaled down version of the new system would meet differing international business 
requirements, thereby allowing the work to be integrated properly. At this point the 
project was already 3 years behind schedule: 
0 The specific objectives of the project were never elucidated 
0 No coherent overall project plan and timetable existed 
0 Games of organisational politics were played at all levels of the organisation 
0 The project was sabotaged by participants who were afraid to admit 
failure 
and prepared to lie about progress 
The organisational structure allowed no individual sufficient power 
to integrate 
the systems development and business sections of the project 
a The international distribution of the 
business allowed no individual any 
judsdiction over the other countiries with interests in the project 
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0 Employees were encouraged to look after their own narrow departmental 
interests at the expense of the organisation as a whole 
0 There was friction between system developers and business users 
Departments were reluctant to accept responsibility or take decisions in case 
they were blamed for possible future project failure 
Despite the scale of the project, nobody at a high level seemed prepared to stop the 
arguments and politics to finally push the project through. Even a mere three months 
from implementation, (* see note below) different regions of the world were still 
arguing over whether they wanted it or not. The major costs of the project had been 
incurred at the development stage, and by now were considered to be historical 
rather than an incentive to complete. At this late stage, it was nearly decided to 
cancel the project and upgrade the system used in Australia and extend it to other 
regions. In the end the project was implemented, but scaled down so much that even 
within the limited area of the business that remained under consideration, all the 
features that would have impacted upon customer service were left out. The bare 
bones of the project were implemented as 'phase one' and all the 'nice to have' 
features were promised for future upgrades. This meant that from a customer 
viewpoint, project Genesis offered no improvement in terms of service quality than 
the system it replaced. It also cost more to run than its predecessor, and provided 
little added value to the operating staff. This was a somewhat different outcome from 
its initial conception as the physical manifestation of a grand strategy to regain the 
leading position that the bank had historically enjoyed in the market. Although the 
new system merely replaced the existing one in terms of functionality, it was hailed 
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as a success - and celebrated with champagne - because the actual changeover 
from the old to the new system was implemented without problems. People were 
relieved that it actually worked after all the delays and negative publicity. The 
attention of the operators was fully occupied with learning new routines and screen 
displays, so adverse comparisons with the original project specification required both 
the time to reflect and a very long memory. 
The major project management weaknesses are analysed in subsequent chapters, 
but for information purposes ran be summarised as follows: 
0 No attempt was made in advance to quantify the scale and costs of the project 
and therefore assess its feasibility. As a result, the project lost credibility and 
morale suffered when its features were regularly downgraded. 
0 There was no sense of accountability for the money spent on the project, 
(total expenditure was estimated at E300 million) despite the existence of 
vigorous controls on expenses and other forms of expenditure which were not 
related to IT. It appeared that excessive payments could be authorised if the 
management responsible had no concept of 'reasonable' costs for the 
expenditure concerned, and would approve the expense rather than admit 
their ignorance of technical matters. 
0 There was no coherent long term strategy. Shortly after the project was 
implemented in Italy it was decided to franchise out that part of the business. 
The new service provider had its own system and so the Genesis system was 
taken out of Italy three months after implementation. Similar action is 
expected in other markets in the near future. 
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0 There appeared to be no evidence of organisational learning, (this was a 
particularly important finding and is discussed at length in Chapter 10). 
Subsequent projects were instigated without the implementation of any 
organisational changes intended to help avoid the problems experienced with 
Genesis. Business managers with no project management experience had 
been brought in to run the project, and their accumulated knowledge was lost 
when they returned to their original role on completion of the project. 
0 No attempt was made to measure the effectiveness of the completed project 
in comparison with its original specification. In fact a review was considered 
but ruled out due to the anticipated cost of one million pounds. 
0 Creativity was stifled by a 'find the guilty' mentality if any aspect of the project 
went wrong. Although official policy welcomed innovative ideas from 
employees, in practice ideas were vetoed if any degree of risk was involved. 
The project leader himself did not have the personal authority to impose the 
system upon all the regions involved. He was a Senior Vice President who 
reported to the Head of IT world-wide, who in turn reported to the Chief 
Executive. This put him only at the same level, but in a different reporting line, 
from the leaders of the markets in which Genesis was to be implemented. 
0 The project leader had no experience of managing a large 
IT project, he relied 
upon the testimony of his staff who invariably set over-optimistic time scales 
or glossed over the extent of any difficulties that were experienced, to protect 
their own positions. 
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0 The separation of technical and business functions ensured that there was no 
capacity for either the IT division to impose the system on the businesses, or 
for the business divisions to enforce their particular requirements from the 
new system. Users were reluctant to admit to their lack of technical knowledge 
when checking that system specification matched their business 
requirements, which led to misunderstanding and errors. 
* It is interesting to note the emphasis in this project upon 'implementation' as 
referring only to 'installation' of the system. Writers such as Leonard-Barton (1995) 
have noted the problems inherent in maintaining such a narrow view of technological 
change. In particular, she found that consideration of knowledge creation and 
management were vital aspects of a successful overall implementation process that 
a focus on merely installing a new system obviously lacked. 
BANK D- DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRONIC HOME BANKING SYSTEMS 
Bank D successfully developed a home banking system for use by personal 
customers and small businesses. PC banking as a service offered by the UK cleadng 
banks is still very much in its infancy, so a brief overview of market trends is provided 
to introduce this section. 
For example, Barclays introduced a home PC service in 1996 that the bank billed as 
the latest innovative sensation for compute r-I iterate professonals without the time or 
inclination to queue up in a branch. Hewson (1996) writing in the Times, took a closer 
look at the package on offer by Barclays and found that it revealed little that was 
new. Considerable expense and effort was also needed on the part of the customer 
to utilise the service. It was necessary to have a computer capable of running 
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Windows 95, a modem, a copy of Microsoft Money 97, and also to pay for the 
telephone connection charge. In exchange, the customer was able to check 
balances, transfer money between accounts, pay bills and standing orders. All these 
services are currently available from telephone banking operations where someone 
else does the work. The Barclays system allowed customer account information to be 
transferred into the Microsoft Money personal finance package, but this proprietary 
communications package worked with no other bank, locking the customer into 
Barclays at the very time when other new technologies are increasing choice and 
breaking down such barriers. 
Bank D has established a global presence, with offices in over 90 countries world- 
wide. The sheer size provides a competitive advantage, as significant levels of 
resource can be devoted to new projects, and inefficiencies or mistakes can be "lost" 
within complex transfer pricing arrangements. The interviewees all commented on 
the attitude of complacency towards competitors that still prevails at senior levels of 
the bank. They described how the organisation remains hierarchical and 
bureaucratic, with a complex internal structure. Customers can be classified as 
'global relationships', 'emerging markets', or 'retail' and there is significant overlap 
and duplication between these categories. This can mean that a routine customer 
meeting may in theory be attended by as many as 12 bank management, each with 
an interest in that particular account, and responsible for a different part of the overall 
package. There is no pressure to instigate major change because the bank is still 
making millions while operating within its traditional functions. An exception occurred 
in 1991 when poor financial results forced consideration of ways to improve efficiency 
across the organisation. Consequently, information technology 
functions were 
centralised within one integral platform. The bank has capitalised upon 
this over the 
past five years by investing heavily in state of the art software applications 
to support 
its core strengths in trade finance, cash management and foreign exchange services. 
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One of the bank's London offices which is central to the case study appears to have 
succeeded in breaking away from the standard company mould. It is responsible for 
developing and marketing new electronic banking projects to personal customers and 
small businesses. The strategy is to provide a 'complete solution' to the business 
requirements of its clients - this process is also described by management as 
'seamless delivery' While concentrating upon traditional products, it seeks to 
customise them to meet individual customer needs. 'The products offered are of high 
quality and have a price to match. The business was described by one interviewee 
as, 'niche banking for a specific type of customer - it is not in any sense a mass 
market operation. ' Another described the target market and strategy as follows: 
"Our tafget market is suited professionals who are high eamers, and they are 
not going to be happy with a smile from a teller, they are looking for 
innovative products and unless we produce those innovative products they 
are not going to stay with us. You cannot rely on the inertia of the normal 
customer in this market.. they do not have much loyalty, they will go to 
whoever offers the newest technology so we have to be on our toes. " 
(Marketing Manager) 
The office has just gone through a downsizing and reengineering exercise, reducing 
from 380 to 210 people. The areas of operations, finance and marketing have been 
overhauled and a new team based structure created with just four levels, namely 
team member, team leader, director and managing director. This means that the 
lines of communication are now very short. The new structure is admired by other 
parts of the bank who regard the London office as the vanguard of new business 
practices, and aspire to similar achievement for their own areas. To this end, London 
office management are regularly invited to give presentations around the world to 
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other parts of the bank, explaining why changes were made and how they were 
implemented in practice. Despite this communication, attempts to repeat the 
experiment in other parts of the world have been less successful. 
All of the interviewees credited the transformation of the London office to the 
inspiration of one visionary leader. They commented on how the scope of the 
changes he introduced extended beyond a mere downsizing operation. By a 
combination of effective communication and increased accountability allocated to 
lower levels of the organisation, people began to accept responsibility for activities 
without adhering to the rigid lines of demarcation which had fragmented their 
operations prior to the change. The particular new technology project studied was 
staffed by people with no IT background and experience, but the major 
communications exercise allowed a successful relationship with the IT department to 
be developed. The product was an electronic home banking service that linked 
customers to their account data by means of their own PC. It was implemented in 
mid 1996 within the original budget and timescales, and has so far attracted a 
significant volume of new customers to the bank. The interviewees claimed that the 
timing of the new product launch in 1996 was crucial to its success, because it is only 
recently that a critical mass of customers have had access to the necessary 
technology which allows added value to be given to home banking. They believed 
that earlier home banking systems by other banks had been compromised by the 
effort required to access them and the unsophisticated nature of the services they 
offered, (as was the case with the Barclays service described above). 
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FIRST DIRECT - TELEPHONE BANKING 
A report on retail banking trends by Datamonitor (1.996) -forecasted that the number 
of regular telephone banking users would triple to 10 million by the end of the 
century. The report defined 'regular users' as those using a dedicated telephone 
service for more than 50% of non-cash withdrawal transactions. This figure 
represents one third of all bank customers in the UK. 
First Direct was conceived by a special project 'think tank' at Midland Bank from a 
clean sheet of paper. The 'Project Raincloud' team was put together during a lean 
period for Midland in the late 1980s and charged with revitalising the business. At the 
time, Midland was languishing behind the other clearing banks, which were 
expanding rapidly in the wake of Big Bang and making record profits in the midst of 
the 1980s economic boom. The result of the team's deliberations was a remote 
banking operation that was established in Leeds in 1989. According to a report in 
The Telegraph by Bates (1996) the other clearing banks were sceptical when First 
Direct was established, claiming that customers would always prefer to conduct 
business face to face rather than over the telephone. Now they are all trying to catch 
up by offering similar services. 
Bates noted that while the high street banks argued about the merits of opening an 
extra hour in the afternoon (from 3-30pm to 4.30pm), First Direct first opened for 
business at midnight and is open 24 hours a day, every day of the year. An average 
of 26000 telephone calls are received each day, 52% outside normal banking hours. 
By acknowledging and acting upon market research which highlighted customer 
dissatisfaction with the service levels offered by the high street banks, First 
Direct 
built up a loyal following by providing quality service at times which were convenient 
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to its customers. It is also a recent winner of the Sunday Times Outstanding Service 
Award. Approximately 13,000 new customers are signed up each month, and at one 
point the bank had to stop advertising as accounts could not be opened quickly 
enough to satisfy demand. A record was set in February 1996 when a total of 15000 
new accounts were opened in just one month. Some 2500 staff are employed on two 
operating sites in Leeds, and First Direct opened two new sites in Scotland in 1997 to 
cope with the demand. 
Some interviewees attributed the success of First Direct to changing patterns of work 
and social trends, in which young and busy people in particular are attracted by the 
convenience of banking by telephone at a time to suit themselves. Others cited the 
value of the strong support given by the Midland Chief Executive to the project, at a 
time when the other banks were ridiculing the idea of telephone banking. In addition, 
the advantage of being the market leader gives First Direct prestige in comparison 
with 'copy-cat' operations belatedly established by the other clearing banks. As a 
separate entity from its parent, the new bank was able to develop from scratch a 
single, centralised customer information system. The system allows any member of 
staff access to all information about the customer on the line, and to details of the 
products and services of the bank, without the need for transfer the caller to other 
departments. The single customer interface is in fact 5 or 6 systems joined together, 
and the availability of this data is fundamental to the provision of a quality service. IT 
support is provided by a systems department of 100 people. Although operated 
separately from Midland Bank, First Direct can still offer customers the use of the 
Midland branch network to withdraw money, but does not have to bear the expensive 
operating costs incurred by its parent company. Consequently First Direct benefits 
from the resources and infrastructure of the Midland branch network but is not tied to 
the old fashioned computer systems and traditional operations of a large bureaucratic 
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organisation. It operates in a unique position as both a competitor and a subsidiary to 
Midland and its parent HongKong Bank. 
The culture of First Direct is very open and the management structure flat. All staff, 
including the Chief Executive Peter Simpson, work in an open area in the same 
building and are on first name terms. They have devised their own grading structure 
that is entirely separate from the Midland system and based upon teamwork. Each 
team consists of 8-12 people under a team leader. One manager looks after several 
teams, and the only other management layer above this is director level. The teams 
are organised around shift times so any one customer could deal with any member of 
any team, depending upon the time of day that they call. Staff are selected on the 
basis of their communication skills rather than past banking experience, which in fact 
is sometimes seen as a disadvantage. Many staff are part time or older workers as 
24 hour service allows flexibility of working conditions. Each new recruit receives 7 
weeks of full time training before answering calls, and training is topped up every 6 
months depending on individual needs. Courses available include communication 
skills as well as specific product training. Calls are often monitored to check staff 
response in real situations and 'mystery shoppercalls are also commonly used to 
test helpfulness. Such is the strength of the service ethic in First Direct that these 
checks are regarded positively by staff rather than as a threat, as they would be in 
many traditional organisations. In keeping with the service culture, mistakes are not 
punished and staff are encouraged to try out new initiatives. 
First Direct is not committed solely to the telephone as a delivery mechanism and is 
currently (mid 1998) investigating the potential of PC banking and Internet links. It 
does not yet have an Internet presence, and is determined not to compromise Its 
quality image by rushing in to a new market before a first class product is developed. 
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Surveys have been undertaken of existing customers to establish the likely demand 
for computer-based banking services. By the very fact of being users of telephone 
banking, First Direct customers tend to be innovators and receptive to new ideas. 
Many have professional jobs, are 'tech nology-I iterate' and have money to spend. 
First Direct views this market as its likely source of future competitive advantage, as 
competitors crowd into telephone banking. It is also considering the viability of 
extending its customer base by offering business accounts. All of the interviewees 
were keen to point out that the bank is not complacent about its early success, and is 
determined to remain one step ahead of the competition by concentrating upon its 
reputation for innovation and service quality. 
MONDEX - ELECTRONIC PURSE REPLACEMENT FOR CASH 
Other innovative means of money transfer are now under development in the UK. For 
example, 'smart cards' (also known as 'electronic purses') look rather like credit 
cards but have a computer chip built in, which enables them to store more 
information than a simple magnetic-stripe card. They can be given multi-purpose 
functions incorporating cash withdrawal, payment at the point of sale, and direct debit 
to a customer's account. They are also difficult to forge. Physical characteristics of 
the holder, such as fingerprints, can be incorporated into the card using computer 
language. It has been estimated that the current (1998) size of the smart card market 
is 500 million, and this is expected to increase to 2 billion by the end of the century. 
Smart card technology was pioneered by the French, who have conducted feasibility 
studies on a large scale and found applications from transport systems to satellite 
television and public telephones. The introduction of chips into Carte 
Bancaire 
payment cards cut card fraud by 75% in the first three years of operation. 
A number 
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of organisations, both bank and non-bank, are experýirnenting with the latest cards, 
which can also be loaded and reloaded with units of value. 
As yet, no common standards exist for either the cards, the authorisation terminals or 
the machines which reload them with units. Internationally applicable standards for 
credit and debit card technology, known as EMV, are under development and 
agreement is promised for 1999. This is necessary for wider acceptance of any smart 
card initiative as retailers will not be prepared to install a number of terminals to 
accept different cards, but compromise may prove difficult. Visa International and 
MasterCard began to work together in 1995 to set a single world-wide identification 
number standard for smart cards, agree the exact location of the computer chips, and 
other vital details. Unfortunately, inter-company rivalries soon surfaced to sabotage 
this co-operative effort, and Visa broke away to set up its own standard in 
conjunction with Microsoft. Their smart card product was tested amid huge publicity 
at the Atlanta Olympics, where payment by Visa was the only accepted credit 
mechanism. Shortly afterwards, MasterCard, IBM and Netscape introduced their own 
version. Both companies may lose out from this apparently short sighted competitive 
strategy, as the absence of a single technical standard could well impact adversely 
upon the commercial viability of any innovative product based upon smart card 
technology. The chance of a compromise being reached seems unlikely given the 
historical enmity between some members of the respective groups, notably Microsoft 
and IBM. 
If the use of cards for small transactions in retail outlets becomes widespread, 
substantial savings in cash handling could be generated by financial institutions. 
According to a Financial Times survey (1994) there were approximately 300 million 
smart cards in circulation, and a total of 14 billion transactions made. UK 
banks 
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estimated that they spent E2 billion a year on cash distribution, and the equivalent 
cost to retailers has been estimated at E800 million. The banks also hope to be able 
to charge customers and retailers for the smart card technology, as the latest 
estimates of smart card manufacturing cost range from C5 to E20 per card. The initial 
consideration, however, will be to decide how to convince consumers and retailers of 
the viability of a world without cash, before attempting to extract payment for using its 
potential replacement. However, the acceptance of electronic cash requires a leap of 
faith by the consumer which is not unprecedented. Many financial transactions today 
are only represented by numbers on bank statements, and at some point in time it 
became acceptable to receive coins in exchange for goods, then paper cheques 
instead of coins, and even automatic bank transfers instead of cheques. 
In common with the First Direct case, the idea of Mondex was conceived by a special 
project team within National Westminster Bank in 1990. The team compared the 
technological features of smart cards with the needs of the financial services market, 
and came up with the concept of a radical electronic alternative to cash. The idea 
was immediately patented and the product developed secretly within the bank until 
1994 when a separate company was established. The Mondex card looks rather like 
a credit card but has a computer chip built in, enabling more information to be stored 
than on a simple magnetic-stripe. It can be given multi-purpose functions 
incorporating cash withdrawal, payment at the point of sale, transfer from cardholder 
to cardholder, and direct debit to a customer's account. Mondex can also 
handle up 
to five different currencies at any one time, so it forms a suitable mechanism 
for 
settling international payments as well as every day domestic transactions. 
It has a 
built in security 'chip' that generates a unique signature each time the card 
is used. 
Development started in 1990 and Mondex cash cards are currently on 
trial in 
Swindon with 13,000 people and 700 high street retailers. 
The trial participants can 
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load the Monclex card at a cash point or at home, by inserting it into a specially 
adapted telephone linked to their bank. There are similar telephones in shops and in 
street pay phone kiosks, and purchases made are automatically debited from the 
cards. Mondex differs from other new electronic purses in that value can also be 
transferred from cardholder to cardholder. The trial will show how comfortable 
consumers are using electronic wallets instead of Gash, and if successful, the product 
may be launched commercially as early as 1999. The Inland Revenue has already 
indicated that it intends to accept Mondex for payment of tax and National Insurance 
contributions. So far however, the trial results have been disappointing in terms of the 
level of customer interest and number of transactions made, even though the service 
is currently free and still a novelty to its users. 
The majority of the El 00 million development costs for Mondex have been incurred in 
the establishment of a lavish security system to combat the threat of fraud. Funding 
for the project was provided by Natwest, and its allocation was regarded as a far- 
sighted decision in the middle of the UK recession. Despite its ownership, the culture 
within Mondex is more akin to that of a small technology company than a large 
commercial bank. It operates independently and is therefore totally free of the 
infrastructure, operations, skills base and values which often appear to constrain the 
innovative activity of its parent companies. The organisational structure of Mondex 
UK bears no resemblance to its parent bank. All non-essential services are 
contracted out, including the human resource functions. Only 70 staff are employed, 
of which 60% work on product development. The duties of the remainder are split 
between marketing, legal and commercial security issues. The management 
structure is flat and employees were recruited entirely from outside Natwest. Many 
have backgrounds in industries other than financial services. There is no exchange of 
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staff between Mondex and Natwest, and no attempt has been made to impose 
banking style grading structures of work procedures on Mondex. 
The developers of Mondex have global aspirations for their product, and franchise 
rights have already been sold to Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation for 
use in several Asian countries. Talks are also underway with prospective partners in 
the US, Europe and Japan. In March 1995 Royal Bank of Scotland announced that it 
would participate in Mondex. In May 1995 Royal Bank of Canada and Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce, the two largest Canadian banks, announced that a pilot 
scheme would begin in 1996 to introduce Mondex to Canada. In July 1995 Wells 
Fargo Bank in San Francisco began the first Mondex pilot scheme in the USA. In 
June 1996 Mondex signed up the three largest banks in Australia to form a major 
new group called Mondex Australia. In July 1996 Mondex co-ordinated each of these 
initiatives by becoming an independent payments organisation called Mondex 
International Limited which is owned by 17 major organisations world-wide. Each 
participant has acquired franchise rights to exploit Mondex in their respective 
markets. The first Chairman of Mondex International is David Mills, responsible for 
developing the innovative First Direct telephone banking network. As well as major 
banking organisations, participants include AT&T and British Telecom. 
Discussions in 1993 between Mondex and MasterCard with regard to a possible joint 
venture broke down at an early stage because of fundamental disagreements over 
the essential functioning of the product. MasterCard favoured a central clearing and 
statement-based service, similar to the existing card system, whereas Mondex 
wanted to have an audit trail on the card itself. This would mean that details of the 
last 10 transactions were printed out by inserting the card into a special teller 
machine, and any queries be taken up directly with the supplier. It would also mean 
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that the transaction costs associated with a central clearing system were avoided. 
This difference of opinion between Mondex and MasterCard proved insurmountable, 
and they split up to pursue their own preferred options. The example also illustrates 
how MasterCard, by thinking within the boundaries of existing organisational 
infrastructure and functionality, actually constrained the possibilities for innovation in 
comparison with Mondex. As a new entity with no legacy systems and existing 
products to influence its judgement, Mondex came up with a new concept in payment 
systems which was totally independent of existing networks. Despite the advantage 
held by MasterCard in terms of expertise and market coverage, its preferred clearing 
mechanism could prove uncompetitive. As with existing credit card systems, retailers 
would be charged for using the clearing mechanism, and the Internet interface is not 
yet secure enough to support payment facilities. MasterCard tested its own version of 
an electronic purse in the marketplace with limited success, and late in 1996 the 
alliance between the two companies was resurrected with the news that MasterCard 
International was to acquire a 51% stake in Mondex International for 150 million 
dollars, (Financial Times, 8th November 1996. ) The remaining 49% remains in the 
hands of the 17 banks which formed the consortium in 1996. Mondex will become an 
independently-run subsidiary of MasterCard, retaining its existing management team. 
The agreement allows MasterCard to promote Mondex throughout the 23,000 
member institutions that carry its franchise, and it will earn royalties from the use of 
the pioneering technology developed by Mondex. MasterCard is now committed to 
using this technology in the 370 million cards that it currently has in circulation 
throughout the world. 
The credibility Of Mondex has received an enormous boost 
from the MasterCard 
endorsement. The access to established distribution channels, a 
leading brand name 
and global customer base should ensure that the necessary critical mass of customer 
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support can be built up. Each interviewee acknowledged that the major challenge 
they faced was to build an entire company around a new and untried product. The 
alliances made to date have succeeded in raising the profile of the Mondex concept 
world-wide but the most difficult hurdle - that of widespread public acceptance - 
remains to be faced when the project finally goes live. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced the 6 empirical cases, and placed the specific projects 
studied in the broader industry context by describing how the banks have come to 
rely upon information technologies over the past 40 years as their operating 
environment has become increasingly competitive. The remaining chapters deal with 
analysis of the issues raised in the cases to address the central question of this 
thesis - why the massive investment by UK banks in information technology is not 
being translated into significant productivity gains. 
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CHAPTER 6- ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the impact of organisational structures for information 
technology upon the success of the technology projects undertaken by the six case 
study banks. It begins by introducing relevant theories concerning the role played by 
organisational structure in the technological change process, before incorporating the 
main findings of the empirical study. This material was derived from grounded 
theoretical analysis of interview transcripts together with secondary data supplied by 
the case study organisations. The findings of earlier published research in the 
financial services industry are also included to support the conclusions that are 
drawn from the empirical study. The most dominant category to emerge from 
grounded theoretical analysis of interview transcripts was initially entitled 'structural 
and functional separation of IT and business areas. ' This file soon became 
unmanageable in size as the issue featured prominently in each of the case studies. 
Consequently the subject has been divided into consideration of structural issues at 
the organisational level and expertise issues at the individual level. The first category 
is dealt with in this chapter, and the second in Chapter 7. This chapter contributes to 
our understanding of the productivity paradox by concluding that the most successful 
change projects studied tended to be separated from mainstream organisational 
activities to avoid the restrictions imposed by traditional structures. 
While this policy 
paid dividends for the projects in question, such isolation did 
little to stimulate a 
climate of innovation throughout the organisation. 
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THEORIES OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The classic work of Burns and Stalker (1961) was drawn upon in Chapter 3 when 
descriibing the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of the banks that has become 
firmly established over time. It was suggested that this form of organisation was 
indicative of a 'mechanistid structure best suited to stable operating conditions. In 
contrast, Bums and Stalker labelled organisational structures that relied upon a 
looser network of control, knowledge and communication as 'organic', and more 
suited to less stable environments. Such features encouraged collaboration and 
commitment to problem solving throughout the organisation. In their words: 
"The organic form is appropriate to changing conditions, which give rise 
constantly to fresh problems and unforeseen requirements for action which 
cannot be broken down or distributed automatically arising from the functional 
roles defined within a hierarchic structure. " (p. 121) 
Scarbrough and Corbett (1992) drew upon this work when noting the 
appropriateness of organic organisational structures in the context of the 
technological innovation necessary within a changing environment. They showed 
how such structures supported innovation by allowing knowledge and information to 
transcend the constraints of the artificial functional boundaries and rigid hierarchies 
of responsibility that typify the mechanistic form. However, to suggest that an 
organisation needs merely to change from a 'mechanistic' to an 'organic! structure in 
order to demonstrate adaptability in the face of changing environmental conditions is 
a major undertaking in practice. Whipp and Clark (1986) studied an attempt by the 
car manufacturer Rover to transform its structure in response to increasing 
competition. The results were disastrous because both the resilience of the 
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established structure and the extent of change necessary were grossly 
underestimated: 
"The grasping of new opportunities means that the existing body of corporate 
knowledge has to be 'creatively destroyed' and constructively replaced. " 
213) 
Indeed, Bums and Stalker themselves doubted whether a mechanistic firm could 
transform itself into an organic one in response to changing environmental 
conditions. They noted how 'pathological' systems tended to develop when a 
mechanistic organisation tded to cope with innovation and change whilst retaining its 
traditional bureaucratic structure. These new systems resulted from destructive 
power struggles as individuals wrestled with unprecedented levels of uncertainty. 
The issue of changing from mechanistic to organic structures in response to 
increasing competition is particularly relevant to the case study banks, and will be 
returned to in the concluding chapter which discusses the need for organisational 
learning to occur if technological change opportunities are to be maximised. 
STRUCTURAL RIGIDITY WITHIN THE UK BANKING INDUSTRY 
It was noted in the introductory chapter that information technology does not yet 
appear to have 'transformed' business practice in the manner we have been 
promised in the media. For example, a comprehensive study of innovative projects 
and expertise in the financial services industry by Fincham et al (1994) found that the 
traditional structure, functions and priorities within the banking industry remained 
largely unaltered, despite the opportunities presented by technological 
developments. Their research programme concentrated upon a series of case 
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studies that examined the managerial problems experienced within organisations 
when handling new and diverging knowledge bases. The projects studied included 
branch automation systems, MIS, customer cash management systems, telebanking, 
customer care databases and credit card processing packages. The authors 
observed little sign of structural transformation, despite a decade of deregulation and 
intense competition. They noted how new skills in marketing have been gradually 
integrated without disrupting the traditional and prevailing knowledge base of the 
industry. For example, the need for a more 'customer-friendly' image was belatedly 
recognised, but the changes made tended to be cosmetic, (such as the introduction 
of new open plan branch layouts that were supposed to be more welcoming) and the 
underlying business principles remained unaltered. The same banks continue to 
dominate the UK industry, and some of these are now retreating from their rapid 
expansion into new markets during the 1980s. Instead they are now focusing intently 
on their core business, and relying upon takeovers or mergers to stimulate change: 
"Expansive growth and the speeding-up of product lifecycles had stimulated 
technological innovation and seemed to demand the multi-functional 
integration of roles in product development and delivery. Deregulation and 
market dynamism called existing institutional orientations and management 
models into question. But growth tended to be managed through 
diversification or organically rather than by restnicturing. " (p. 299) 
This conclusion is supported by more recent developments in the industry. For 
example, Lloyds Bank has sold many of its foreign branches and its merchant 
banking subsidiary in the past few years, and concentrated resources upon its 
traditional strengths in the domestic market by taking over TSB and Cheltenham and 
Gloucester Building Society. The resilience of organisational structure is also 
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illustrated by the continuity of the fundamental activities of Midland Bank in the UK, 
eight years after its acquisition by HongKong Bank, one of the largest banks in the 
worid. 
Many studies of technological change in the banking industry have noted how 
specific projects have been compromised by a tendency to adhere to increasingly old 
fashioned and inappropriate organisational structures, in the manner of the findings 
of Burns and Stalker that were described earlier in this chapter. Research by 
Howells and Hine (1994) into the development of EFTPOS technology found that the 
establishment of a national network of banks and retailers was sabotaged by the 
differing agendas of the various actors involved, each operating within rigid 
hierarchical structures. The major problems in this case concerned the rigid 
separation of technical and commercial functions within the banks, and the existence 
of many hierarchical layers of management which separated those individuals with 
the power to take strategic decisions from those working on the project itself. The 
end result was a series of bilateral arrangements between individual banks and 
retailers, rather than the creation of one national network, and the cost of the project 
was estimated to exceed E120 million. 
Research in the commercial banking sector by Child and Loveridge (1990) 
uncovered little evidence of structural change in banking organisations following the 
introduction of new technology, with clear historical hierarchies of status levels and 
technological legacies rigorously maintained. They found that the major influences 
upon banks' technology policies were the 'national banking habit'and the historical 
development of the institution under consideration within society. These factors had 
led to the establishment of deeply embedded skill sets, grading hierarchies, structural 
segmentations and power positions during the long period of stability in the industry. 
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The researchers concluded that the potential of new technology was compromised 
by adapting it to fit in with the prevailing organisational conditions and priorities. 
Scarbrough and Lannon (1988) also noted the response of many banks to the 
changing technological environment tended to be ineffective because of 
inappropriate organisation structures, and that the existence of specialised, 
segregated functions developed to manage existing technology often acted as 
barriers to change. As a result, even considerable investments in technology 
produced disappointing levels of return in strategic terms. Specifically, the authors 
descriibed how Bank of Scotland had lost significant market share as a result of a 
disastrous policy towards ATM introduction in the late 1970s. The bank then 
reviewed its technology policy and recognised the need to change its traditional 
organisational structure, thereby creating a more flexible environment that was better 
placed to respond to rapid technological developments. This process involved: 
. -overcoming the major 
barrier Of differing departmental interests and 
perceptions, where each department is unable to see the problem other than 
in its own narTowly defined terms. " (p. 253) 
The transformation was facilitated by the appointment of a young, dynamic General 
Manager who supported champions of innovation within the bank, and integrated 
technology policy into mainstream activities. This stimulated awareness of the long- 
term implications of new technology on banking operations. Within a climate of 
informality that encouraged personal initiative, barriers to organisational learning 
were overcome. HOBS (Home and Office Banking System) was launched in 1985, 
many years ahead of the competition. The authors described how Bank of Scotland 
came to be regarded as a market leader in its utilisation of new technology, as the 
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major restructuring exercise enabled a more viable approach to the management of 
innovation to be developed. 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR IT IN THE CASE STUDY BANKS 
Bank A has a separate IT division and, until recently, three senior IT managers 
controlled their own areas within the division. They initially reported to the Finance 
Director of the bank. During the project to integrate all banking services within one IT 
network which forms the subject of this case study, a new manager was recruited 
over the heads of existing IT management to act as liaison between IT and the 
Finance Director. One interviewee described the results of this decision as follows: 
"The Finance Director used to have a good involvement, he has an /T 
background and got things done through the three /T managers reporting to 
him. But then they brought in a new manager - as a sort of buffer. That's all 
she does, nothing goes up and nothing goes down... who knows why she's 
there? Nothing has been delivered since she arfived. " (Project Manager) 
This decision ran against current trends within the industry that aim to improve levels 
of efficiency by removing layers of management. The new IT manager had no IT 
background, but came with a reputation as 'an effective managee. Her appointment 
meant that five layers of management now came between the programming staff at 
the bottom of the hierarchy and the Finance Director at the top. At the same time, in 
other parts of the IT division, team leaders and project managers were made 
redundant, effectively removing two management layers in these areas. No 
consensus therefore existed on the best way to structure the division as a whole. 
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Until 1995, Bank B maintained a bank-wide area known as 'Group IT'. It employed 
3500 people whose sole function was to provide IT services to other areas of the 
bank. In addition, specialist IT sections had evolved within the operating areas to 
meet local needs, so there was considerable duplication of resources throughout the 
organisation. In recognition of this problem, Group IT has now been split up into 6 
different divisions, one for each operating arm of the bank. This means there is no 
longer a sing e IT Director for the bank as a whole, but 6 Heads of IT who report to 
the Director of their respective divisions. One interviewee commented on the 
situation as follows: 
"It is too eariy to say whether this structural change will be successfuL.. it 
should mean that the relevant part of IT is fully in tune with what its operating 
area wants. The downside is that / do not know what level of co-ordination 
there will be in IT across the bank - if for example the insurance arm and the 
retail arm use different systems and do not talk to each other ... maybe 
there 
will be some overarching layer of management to co-ordinate and ensure 
standards are applied throughout the bank - but I'm sure someone on high is 
paid to think about these things. " (Project Manager) 
Bank B has retained one bank-wide systems area that has a watching brief for the 
whole bank in terms of looking at new technologies that may be of future benefit to 
the organisation. If a particular idea is considered viable, then a business sponsor is 
sought for it from an area of the bank that would benefit from the technology. The 
activities of this small area (20 staff) are centrally funded, and their recent initiatives 
include 'kiosk' banking facilities, and the automated delivery of loans through 
cashpoint machines. The team is separated entirely from the operating divisions of 
the bank and its role as a 'think tank' for identifying industry trends is endorsed and 
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closely monitored by the Chief Executive. The original ideas for Mondex and First 
Direct came from similar project teams within high street banks, but Bank B is one of 
the most conservative institutions and therefore seems unlikely to consider 
developing anything as radical as a new form of bank. 
Bank C operates as a very hierarchical organisation, with many layers of 
management. The head of the world-wide office integration project which formed the 
subject of the case study was a Senior Vice President who reported to the Head of IT 
world-wide, who in turn reported to the Chief Executive of the bank. The project head 
occupied the same level of management as the leaders of the branches that the 
project was attempting to integrate, albeit in a different reporting line. This meant that 
he did not have the power to enforce project co-operation and commitment from all 
interested parties. He also lacked IT experience having been seconded from a 
business area to run the project in question. 
The interviewees working for Bank D described how the organisation as a whole 
remains hierarchical and bureaucratic, with a complex internal structure. They 
believed there was no pressure to instigate major change because the bank is still 
making millions while operating within its traditional functions. An exception occurred - 
in 1991 when poor financial results forced consideration of ways to improve efficiency 
across the organisation. Consequently, information technology functions were 
centralised within one integral platform, and the London office that forms the subject 
of the case study has just gone through its own downsizing and reengineering 
exercise. The areas of operations, finance and marketing have been overhauled and 
a new team based structure created. There are just four levels in total, namely team 
member, team leader, director and managing director. This means that the lines of 
communication are now very short. The Managing Director was previously the IT 
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Director and this has ensured that a focus is maintained on new technology 
developments. The new structure is admired by other parts of the bank, who regard 
the London office as the vanguard of new business practices in comparison with their 
own areas, which are still locked into bureaucratic hierarchies. 
The management structure of First Direct consists only of three layers. All staff, 
including telephone operators, systems, and the Chief Executive Peter Simpson, 
work in an open area in the same building and are on first name terms. The bank 
has devised its own grading structure based upon teamwork which is entirely 
separate from the Midland system. Each team consists of 8-12 people under a team 
leader, and one manager looks after several teams. Out of a total of some 2500 
employees, 100 IT staff support the single customer interface which is in fact six 
systems joined together. The availability of this data is fundamental to the provision 
of a quality service. In practice, when dealing with a customer on the telephone, the 
operator has immediate access to all relevant information about that customer, 
regardless of the subject of the enquiry. This means that customers do not have to 
be passed from department to department if they make use of a number of bank 
services. 
As an independently run subsidiary of Midland Bank, First Direct was able to develop 
the technology necessary to provide this service from scratch. This meant it was not 
reliant on adapting existing Midland 'legacy' systems to develop its new service. 
Chapter 3 described the problems associated with updating and linking the diverse 
computer systems that have evolved in the banks over many years. These systems 
are often put together in a piecemeal fashion and have to be maintained and 
operated to support day-to-day banking activities. Customer data in particular tends 
to be scattered between the computer systems of different functional areas that 
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cannot always communicate to utilise the data effectively. Consequently the banks 
often have no means of forming an overall Picture of profitability or activity by 
customer. As a separate entity from its parent bank, First Direct has been able to 
adopt a 'clean sheet' approach to system building and data management. Each 
interviewee identified First Direct's ability to customise its information technology to 
suit specific business needs as pivotal in establishing the new bank as a provider of 
quality service. In addition, First Direct offers customers the facilities of the Midland 
national branch network to withdraw cash or pay in cheques by linking the 
infrastructure of its proprietary computer system to that of its parent. 
Mondex was initially run as a secret project within Natwest until the company was 
formally established in 1994. The Mondex management team is totally 'ring fenced' 
from the normal business activities of Natwest in a similar manner to First Direct's 
separation from Midland. The organisational structure within Mondex UK bears no 
resemblance to its parent bank. All non-essential services are contracted out, 
including the human resource functions. Only 70 staff are employed, of which 40 
work on product development. The duties of the remainder are split between 
marketing, legal and commercial security issues. There are just four levels of 
management in total and all employees were recruited from outside Natwest. Many 
have backgrounds in industries other than financial services. There is no exchange of 
staff between Mondex and Natwest, and no attempt has been made to impose 
banking style grading structures or work procedures on Mondex. 
This section has highlighted the advantages which accrued to First Direct and 
Mondex in respect of their separation from the massive computer systems, 
established organisational hierarchies and pools of expertise which have evolved in 
their parent companies. One interviewee commented that some US banks have 
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taken this scenario further and are starting to operate 'parallel banks. ' These are 
effectively new outlets starting with a clean sheet - that is, new technology and new 
staff - for the benefit of customers who expect 'state-of-the-art' banking facilities. The 
banks concerned run both their traditional and their new operations along side each 
other, rather than attempt to convert legacy systems - which are still adequate for 
certain segments of their customer base - and retrain existing staff to operate 
effectively in an entirely different culture and business environment. As this strategy 
is still very new, it remains to be seen how successful (and indeed expensive) it will 
prove to be in practice. 
Although all the interviewees at First Direct and Mondex were keen to point out how 
independent they were from their parent companies, and how crucial this policy had 
proved to be in their success, there is a sense in which they can still be regarded as 
very dependent upon their founders. First Direct relies upon Midland Bank for access 
to the clearing system, and its customers use both the branch and ATM networks 
extensively. Mondex has grown by forging links with traditional financial institutions 
world-wide, which now own shares in the company. This strategy culminated in the 
takeover by Mastercard that now owns 51% of Mondex. Whilst both projects have 
benefited from independence on an operational basis, structurally they are still tied to 
their founders. As a further example, the innovative insurance company Direct Line 
obtained regulatory approval only because of its backing by Royal Bank of Scotland, 
and has benefited from the bank's financial support in the early days, as well as 
obtaining access to its large customer base. 
There appears to be little consensus among the case study banks with respect to the 
best location of the IT function within the organisation. Some of the banks had 
centralised their IT, others had done the opposite and split the role between different 
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parts of the bank. The most significant issue to arise from this analysis of IT 
structures is the apparent reluctance of the banks to change their existing 
organisational configurations. This conclusion supports the findings of earlier 
research in the industry by Child and Loveridge (1990), who summarised their work 
as follows: 
". .. leaming to secure the full potential of a new technology is a process that is 
shaped and bounded by forces of a social and political nature in the sense 
that the people who are involved have a concem to preserve or extend 
organisational relationships with which they are comfortable. They are likely 
to contest alternatives using the power and influence at their disposal. " 
359) 
In the cases where current systems are clearly inappropriate to support their new 
developments, the banks have gone to considerable expense to maintain existing 
structures, while at the same time setting up entirely new systems to facilitate their 
entry into new markets. This finding supports the work of Bums and Stalker that was 
described earlier - they believed that the very nature and characteristics of 
mechanistic organisations mitigated against contemplation of radical change. 
INTERACTION BETWEEN BUSINESS AND IT AREAS 
This section takes the issue of organisational structure to the individual project level 
by examining the working relationships between the systems and business areas of 
the case study banks, and it considers how the level of interaction influenced the 
success of the technology projects in which they were involved. 
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Child and Loveridge (1990) noted the impact on new technology projects of a lack of 
communication between decision makers and system operators: 
"The greatest single barrier to effective learning in this most vital of 
developments for our future lies in the organisational inhibitions that prevent 
the free interchange of views from afi who have something to offer " (p. 382) 
Their study found that system development groups considered to have 'expert' 
knowledge were separated both geographically and structurally from the prospective 
users of the technology. In addition, the system operators at low levels of the 
organisation were not consulted about technological change issues and had no input 
to decision-making. Their expertise was therefore not utilised or indeed valued by 
senior management. 
Similar results were obtained in a study of the financial services industry by Currie 
(1995). She noted the extent of the gulf between systems and business staff, which 
led to power struggles, rigid demarcations and the development of separate 
languages and working practices. In one of her cases, technical staff felt that the 
major criterion for project success was to align the business and system 
specifications, and then devote the best brains to system development. On the other 
hand, business managers preferred to concentrate upon delivery within budgets and 
time scales, thereby allowing quality adjustments to be made at a later 
date. The IT 
staff also believed project failure could usually be attributed to the 
lack of technical 
knowledge on the part of business managers, who in turn believed technical staff 
lacked the managerial skills to run a project. They were stereotyped as 
'techies' or 
'pointy-heads' and regarded as poor communicators. The author argued 
that new 
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technology projects would be more likely to succeed if these entrenched perceptions 
could be overcome. 
Similar problems were noted within the case study banks. As described earlier, the 
leader of the branch integration project at Bank C did not have the seniority to 
enforce its implementation. One of the interviewees described how this problem was 
exacerbated by rigid divisions between systems and business areas: 
"The /T people were completely separate from the business people, and 
never on the same wavelength. The person in overall charge of the project 
did not have the authority to make any system decisions, he had to go to his 
colleague on the systems side. When I was working on this project I had to go 
to the systems people and ask on bended knee if they would do certain 
things. If it was a legal requirement they had to do it, but if it was a business 
requirement/ had to justify it in blood. " (Business Manager) 
Tension between business and IT areas was also reported by an interviewee from 
Bank A: 
"The project had a business project sponsor that knew a lot about IT.. in fact 
the biggest problem was that he probably knew more than the IT manager. 
He would have made a good IT manager and he knew it. This caused such a 
poor working relationship that the IT department deliberately held up the 
project just to spite him. They favoured people who were not so bolshy and 
did not try to tell them how to do theirjobs. " (Business Analyst) 
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Another interviewee from Bank A endorsed this view and described how there was 
no attempt to integrate the needs of the business and the capabilities of the system 
during the project: 
"The first time that input from the users was obtained was after the project 
was delivered. There was a good integration between the programmers and 
the business managers, they worked in the same office, and socialised 
together The /T management did not get on with the main business sponsor, 
and they did not like their staff bypassing them in this way. They tried to 
prevent the programmers from talking to the business managers without 
going thr*ough the /T managers first. They had to justify their own role and 
were jealous of a rapport between their subordinates and 'the enemy, as it 
were. " (Project Manager) 
Both interviewees attributed the major reason for project failure at Bank A to lack of 
communication between business and user departments at a managerial level, and 
also to a lack of appreciation of changing roles and priorities in an increasingly 
competitive market. Historically, IT was used to dictating terms to the business for 
systems design and implementation, relying upon what a Marketing Manager termed 
'a certain technical mystique' to get their own way. As business users became more 
IT literate, they regarded the systems area as just another supplier, and became far 
more demanding. 
Keen (1991) surveyed a range of articles from the 1970s and 1980s which showed 
that the gulf between business and IT areas is nothing new, and indeed the issue has 
dominated management concerns for many years. He noted how the same 
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explanations are repeated again and again with little progress made over time in 
addressing the issues: 
"These old complaints are boting and their repetition does little to move the 
organisation ahead. Yes, the IS organization has far too often not delivered 
on its promises. Yes, technical people too often do not understand business. 
Yes, users too often do not know what they really want ... 
So what? Instead of 
dwelling on the old concems, why not accept their historical validity and work 
on opening the needed dialogues that will end them? " (p. 215) 
Again, this finding demonstrates a reluctance to learn from past mistakes as the 
same problems recur from project to project over an extended period of time. This 
issue will be returned to in Chapter 10 which discusses the need for organisational 
learning. 
Examples were found among the case study banks of efforts to address the gulf 
between business and IT areas. One of the Management Consultants interviewed 
described how he had noticed an increasing tendency for banks to reconcile divisions 
between their business and IT areas by undertaking a "business alignment 
programme. " This process involved analysis of the fit between the core businesses 
of the banks and the systems necessary to support this business. To get all the 
necessary staff working more closely together, people were physically removed from 
their roles within operating areas and given permanent roles as liaison officers in the 
IT area, while IT staff were transferred to fulfil similar roles in the relevant operating 
areas. The interviewee deschbed the aim of this strategy as follows: 
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"The aim is to co-ordinate the two areas so that IT can facilitate operational 
enhancements. It also means that common sources of ffiction between the 
two roles can be avoided. For example, a business area may be convinced of 
the merits of a new technology, and then expects the IT department to 
integrate it smoothly into existing systems with which it was not designed to 
interface. Generally what IT people hate is having to implement yet another 
database because the operations people say, 'this is the best product - just 
do it'. " (Industry Consultant) 
These issues are developed further in Chapter 7 under the sub-heading 'Hybrid 
Managers'. 
There was little evidence of formal strategies like this to integrate IT and business 
areas within the case study banks. Bank A attempted to resolve the gulf between 
systems and business areas by setting up a steering committee. This committee met 
once a month and reviewed actual progress against a timetable drawn up at the start 
of the project. It was run by senior management from the business and IT. Selected 
project participants were invited to present progress reports. Slippage from the 
original timetable meant that the chosen project representative was given a hard time 
at the meeting, but no action was taken to address the issues raised, or to amend 
time scales in the light of circumstances which had arisen during implementation. 
One interviewee described how care needed to be taken when reporting to the 
commiftee: 
"It is a grilling really - Why have you not delivered? 'And of course you cannot 
tell them the real reasons, they may be sat right there in front of you. It's 
easier to be upbeat about your progress, or to claim that certain issues are 
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"The aim is to co-ordinate the two areas so that IT can facilitate operational 
enhancements. It also means that common sources of friction between the 
two roles can be avoided. For example, a business area may be convinced of 
the merits of a new technology, and then expects the IT department to 
integrate it smoothly into existing systems with which it was not designed to 
interface. Generally what IT people hate is having to implement yet another 
database because the operations people say, 'this is the best product - just 
do it'. " (Industry Consultant) 
These issues are developed further in Chapter 7 under the sub-heading 'Hybrid 
Managers'. 
There was little evidence of formal strategies like this to integrate IT and business 
areas within the case study banks. Bank A attempted to resolve the gulf between 
systems and business areas by setting up a steering committee. This committee met 
once a month and reviewed actual progress against a timetable drawn up at the start 
of the project. It was run by senior management from the business and IT. Selected 
project participants were invited to present progress reports. Slippage from the 
original timetable meant that the chosen project representative was given a hard time 
at the meeting, but no action was taken to address the issues raised, or to amend 
time scales in the light of circumstances which had arisen during implementation. 
One interviewee described how care needed to be taken when reporting to the 
committee: 
"It is a grilling really - Why have you not deliver-ed? 'And of course you cannot 
tell them the real reasons, they may be sat right there in frunt of you. It's 
easier to be upbeat about your progress, or to claim that certain 
issues are 
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now resolved, or to blame another department. .. because next time it's 
someone else's turn to be hauled up there. " (Business Analyst) 
On a more positive note, an interviewee from Bank D described how the success of 
the electronic home banking project could be attributed to the close working 
relationship which was built up between the business and IT areas: 
"Banking staff with no systems experience were seconded to the project, and 
it was successfuL There was a date to meet and we did it. Everybody was 
involved and consulted from the start - IT were not allowed to dictate what 
was done. This vision of involving everyone came from the MD, (ex IT 
director) previously IT would have just gone ahead and ground level staff 
would not have been involved even in the testing. A/I business areas are now 
much more closely involved with /T than they ever were... so you do not have 
the IT ar-ea here and the business area there, we have collective 
responsibility for system development The lines of demarcation have become 
increasingly blurred and everybody owned that project. Any new technology 
that comes along, we can now go for it" (Business Analyst) 
In this case, all of the interviewees gave the credit for encouraging the business and 
IT areas to work together to the Managing Director. He had an IT background and 
could empathise with the problems of both sides, as well as having the power to 
enforce somewhat radical ideas. One interviewee confirmed the validity of the above 
project success criteria with this comment: 
"Success comes down to user involvement in design. You need key 
involvement from the best people in the depaftment, who are feally committed 
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to it because it will solve their problems. For once we had this, and the whole 
thing worked .. 
it was easy really. " (Project Manager) 
CONCLUSION 
One of the dominant themes to emerge from grounded theoretical analysis of the 
data was the influence of organisational structure upon the progression of IT projects. 
Consequently this chapter has focused upon the role of organisational structure for 
information technology within the case study banks. Data analysis therefore suggests 
that the issue of restrictive organisational structures may contribute to our 
understanding of the IT productivity paradox by building upon existing theories which 
were detailed in Chapter 2. 
In this chapter, the value of separating innovative projects from mainstream 
operational activities has been made clear, but at the same time the continued 
reliance of such projects upon the parent institution has also been noted. In the 
examples studied, it seems that the benefits of the organisational separation policy 
are restricted only to the particular project in question. This is because day-to-day 
activities within the bank are unaffected, and therefore no ongoing commitment to 
innovation is generated in the organisation as a whole. The resilience of traditional 
structures within the banks supports the contention of Bums and Stalker made many 
years ago, that mechanistic organisations have great difficulty transforming 
themselves into organic ones in response to competitive pressures. This study 
therefore builds upon the work of Bums and Stalker by focusing upon the trans ition 
period between mechanistic and organic structures that is not emphasised in their 
work. 
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A sub-category of grounded theoretical analysis of organisational structure 
concerned the level of interaction between business and IT departments in the 
context of project success or failure, which has also been examined in this chapter. 
While interviewees from both Bank A and Bank C cited poor communication between 
the two areas as a major contributor to project failure, the successful project run by 
Bank D was characterised by a close relationship between all project participants. 
The next chapter continues this theme by considering in more detail how the case 
study banks dealt with the issues surrounding business and technical expertise at the 
individual level. 
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CHAPTER 7- KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by discussing the issue of knowledge and reviewing relevant 
literature on the subject of knowledge management. It then analyses how the banks 
managed the changing knowledge requirements during implementation of the new 
technology projects that were studied. The difficulties of changing skills which have 
become entrenched within the organisation over time are considered, and the 
attitudes of both business and IT staff towards change are compared. Attempts made 
by the banks to manage the knowledge acquisition process in terms of recruitment 
and training policies, manipulation of internal grading structures, and the 
development of 'hybrid' managers are then reviewed. From analysis of both the 
literature and the empirical examples, the chapter concludes that project success can 
be facilitated by the adoption of deliberate policies to cultivate new skills and develop 
a more flexible and IT-literate workforce. These findings therefore contribute towards 
both our understanding of the productivity paradox and how the problem may be 
addressed in practical terms. 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
One of the first wdters to emphasise the importance of knowledge management was 
Peter Drucker who coined the phrase 'knowledge worker in the 1960s. Drucker 
(1993) built upon his early work by suggesting that an organisation needed to shed 
obsolete knowledge, and sustain existing knowledge, while simultaneously creating 
new knowledge on a continual basis if it was to remain viable. These ideas are 
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supported in a famous work from t, he Japanese perspective by Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995) who noted the need for organisations to 'acquire, create, accumulate and 
exploit the knowledge domain' if they were to succeed. The authors argued that 
innovative firms display characteristic mechanisms which enable them to manage 
knowledge effectively. The central feature is the ability to create synergy by 
combining 'tacit' and 'explicit' forms of knowledge. This means that both intuitive and 
analytical approaches to knowledge management are regarded as complimentary 
rather than contradictory, and can therefore feed off each other in a positive manner. 
The management of knowledge has been brought into sharper focus in recent years 
because of fears over the possible impact throughout the economy of what has 
become known as the 'year 2000 problem. In addition, there is the possibility of 
conversion to the Euro at roughly the same time. These imperatives have 
precipitated a massive demand for IT skills in many industry sectors, as companies 
(often belatedly) begin to grapple with the unknown. Skills once thought redundant 
are now back in fashion as ageing computer systems with programmes written many 
years ago in, for example, COBOL and BASIC languages now have to be made 
(millenium compliant'. Staff are being brought back from retirement and can often 
name their price if they possess the technical skills necessary to address these 
issues. 
Houlder (1997) noted how companies are beginning to recognise the importance of 
ongoing knowledge management to avoid this type of crisis, and she observed an 
increasing number of 'knowledge managers' within organisations who are taking on 
responsibility for managing knowledge. The aim of this focus upon knowledge is to 
create and disseminate the expertise of employees throughout an organisation in 
order to stimulate innovation and facilitate organisational change. To a significant 
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degree it has been prompted by the problems involved in integrating computer 
systems and streamlining information flows around an organisation. In practice, 
Houlder found that people are often reluctant to cooperate with initiatives which 
encourage them to share their knowledge, because of the perceived threat to their 
status as experts, which is based upon the possession of knowledge that others lack. 
This finding is supported by Scarbrough and Corbeft (1992) who noted that 
hierarchical organisational structures are not conducive to the sharing of knowledge. 
They quote examples of social divisions between 'management' and 'workers' which 
prevent meaningful communication, despite the high levels of detailed knowledge 
that can be acquired over time spent working on the shop floor. Management often 
saw initiatives by workers to improve their effectiveness as a threat to their own 
positions: 
'The emphasis on authority and control is antithetical to the generation of 
knowledge commitments. The latter can only emerge where groups and 
individuals can freely communicate, relate to and act upon the knowledge that 
they deve/op. '(p. 132) 
The difficulties of sharing knowledge throughout an organisation are compounded 
when new types of knowledge are required. As Fincham et al (1994) found in their 
study of financial services, the application of new technologies inevitably leads to 
changes in the content and distribution of knowledge. They highlighted the differing 
types of knowledge which, although very different from each other, are often grouped 
together in discussions of knowledge management. They distinguish 'formal' 
knowledge, which is usually available in written form such as a manual, 
from 
'informal' knowledge. The latter is specific to a particular job or working group and is 
acquired from colleagues over a period of time spent 'on the job'. The authors also 
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noted the importance of 'contingent' (or 'loca/) knowledge acquired from working 
within the broader organisational environment, and especially 'tacit' knowledge which 
is difficult to specify and can only be acquired by experience and following the 
example set by others. Finally, they specified 'cultural' knowledge that encompasses 
organisational rituals and values and is altogether broader in scope than a mere 
application of particular procedures. In the past, the authors showed that banks have 
concentrated upon formal forms of knowledge by relying upon rulebooks and routine, 
but the pressures of implementing new technology projects have necessitated a shift 
towards managing informal, tacit and contingent forms of knowledge. These issues 
will be considered in more detail in a later section of this chapter. 
Chapter 3 described the history of banking in the UK and showed how the passage 
of time has tended to entrench rather inflexible procedures and practices which 
emphasise the role of financial institutions as safe havens for depositors' funds. This 
policy has on the whole been very successful, but the focus on stability and continuity 
has not prepared the banks for coping with the very different operating conditions 
that prevail today. In particular, the perceived need to control banking activities in the 
interests of investor protection has resulted in a climate of dependency upon internal 
regulations and functional specialisms. Leonard - Barton (1995) noted how 
organisational routines tend to 'so/idify'over time around a consensus about 'the way 
things should be done'. She suggested that this mindset was difficult to change in 
practice, because increasing demands for integration of information across 
organisations meant that zealously guarded internal knowledge now has to be 
shared amongst individuals from differing functional backgrounds and codified in 
compatible computer systems. The contention that routines are essential merely 
because they have 'always been done that way'is no longer valid. Leonard - Barton 
memorably compared the development of these routines to training fleas: 
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"... the tendency is to discourage innovation and train people as fleas used to 
be for a circus. Enclosed in a glass tube, the fleas slammed into the invisible 
force above them every time they hopped. Thus trained, they 'leamed' to 
crawl, so that they could be docilely harnessed to tiny wagons and 
encouraged to crawl across minuscule tightropes. Employees can likewise be 
trained to adhere to the past, mindlessly. Thus trained, they may continue 
routines long since outdated. " (p. 37) 
To focus on risk-avoidance in the manner long practised by the banks, therefore, 
may have succeeded in reassuring customers that their investments were secure. 
The policy has, however, done little to equip the banks for successful implementation 
of a series of new technology projects in an environment where very different skills 
and priorities are required. This finding is supported by Fincham et al (1994) who 
observed the difficulty of changing dominant skill structures, which they described as 
'institutionally embedded over time. The most significant influence they identified 
upon the development of new technologies was the particular knowledge base and 
skills that already existed within the firm. Unavailability of expertise tended to 
constrain strategic choice, thereby limiting and conditioning the developmental 
possibilities along familiar lines. 
This finding was also observed in some of the case study banks, particularly within 
the IT departments themselves. In Bank A, the interviewees reported that there had 
been a more ready adoption of the new working practices they had introduced by the 
business users, than by the IT department which developed the new technology: 
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"/ think it is probably more painful for people in /T to change the way they do 
things. Business people see it in terms of business cost and business benefit, 
and are much more enthusiastic for what we are doing. So when I have 
contact with the business areas, I do not fee/ that I have to sell what we am 
trying to do, because they have already bought into the idea in a big way. It's 
more a case of educating them in how we are going to do it.. methods and 
timing. Getting developers who have been doing things one way to change 
the habits of a lifetime is much harder. " (Project Manager) 
"There are people in /T who like technical toys... but just because people like 
new technology does not mean that they want to change the way they work... 
so they might want to use the new toys in the same way that they played with 
the old toys. " (General Manager) 
The degree of resistance demonstrated by IT staff within Bank A to the project was 
an interesting issue to emerge from the interviews. Although such problems may 
have been anticipated in traditional areas of the bank accustomed to a rule based 
and hierarchical culture, it might have been expected that people employed in a 
systems development role would be accustomed to change and the need for 
flexibility, by the very nature of IT work. In practice, the business users across the 
bank could foresee the tangible benefits of systems integration as proposed by the 
project and were keen to progress, while it was perceived by the IT staff as a threat 
to established skill sets and power positions. This meant that significant difficulties 
were encountered from a managerial perspective in terms of group morale, as many 
individuals found their skills to be obsolete and their hitherto secure jobs under threat 
from new entrants. These staff had been used to a stable and undemanding 
environment, looking after an established and well known computer system on behalf 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 148 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox: the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
of user departments. They now had to acquire new skills as new technologies were 
introduced and deal with unforeseen problems in interfacing the new systems w1th 
the old mainframe, whilst coping with increasing demands and tight deadlines from 
user departments. In effect, the old working environment and culture was overturned 
in a short space of time, and uncertainty about the future encouraged rumour, 
speculation and confusion. One interviewee described the situation as follows: 
"It was the senior staff who were in a position to be most obstructive... they 
saw all these new systems as a threat, and constantly put obstacles in the 
way to prevent them going live. There were complaints about incomplete 
documentation 
... or lack of training - anything to cause a delay. The people 
that were keen to increase their range of skills by learning new technologies 
tended to be the younger ones, but they did not have the authotity to enforce 
their interests. These were key people with up to date project and system 
knowledge, but they soon became disenchanted and left the bank. " (General 
Manager) 
"So many people Jeft that we had to hang on to the hard core - because any 
knowledge was better than no knowledge. These were the people whose 
skills had become degraded over time, they had been in this fur-lined rut' 
since leaving school and felt the company owed them a living... they were 
vefy set in their ways. So we are stuck with the die hards, while those that 
want to change things leave. " (Project Manager) 
The interviewees from Bank A believed that the resistance put up by the IT staff to 
the changing nature of their roles within the organisation was a major contdbutory 
factor to the failure of the project. In contrast, the business departments were keen to 
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reap the benefits of system integration and were prepared to accept the necessary 
changes in their working practices. A similar situation occurred in Bank C where the 
IT area tried to retain its usual working practices and resisted the changes that 
project implementation would bring. In this case, although the business areas would 
benefit from the new technology, there were many different branches involved world- 
wide with differing interests and priorities. They failed to agree project priorities 
amongst themselves and the individual in charge of the project lacked the authority to 
enforce consensus on either the system developers or the multifarious business 
users. 
In Bank B, which was trying to develop links between itself and a number of partner 
banks for the purposes of creating a European wide payment system, it was the 
business area that was not committed to the project and resisted progress at each 
stage. The aims of the project directly threatened the existing skill sets and career 
paths of the individuals chosen to drive the project. The creation of a new payment 
system would prohibit achievement of departmental performance targets, which were 
based on commission taken from the volumes of traditional payments made, and 
upon which annual bonus payments were dependent. The number of standard 
payments handled by the bank would certainly fall significantly if a cheaper 
alternative service was to become available. Internal incenfives to develop innovative 
international payment systems were therefore non-existent. 
In Chapter 6 it was described how Bank D had successfully forged links between its 
systems and business areas within the London office, and how this co-operation had 
contributed to project success. In this case, the office had just completed a 
downsizing exercise and had made 45% of its staff redundant. One interviewee 
described how the individuals that had left tended to be the older ones who qualified 
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for sizeable redundancy packages, and were not comfortable with the changing 
nature and demands of their role within the organisation. The employees that 
remained tended to be younger, were more tolerant of change and prepared to learn 
new skills in order to remain valued team members in a very different environment. 
One interviewee with no IT background described how he came to work in Systems 
Development, by taking advantage of available training courses and actively seeking 
involvement in projects which involved IT: 
"I knew my position within the bank was vulnerable unless I made an effort to 
retrain, and showed some initiative. Technology was becoming more and 
more integral to our business and many people could not cope with this. The 
bank was looking for people to interface between IT and the business... in a 
sort of analyst role really, so I decided to make myself indispensable. It 
comes down to learning the jargon, and not being afraid to tackle something 
new. " (Business Analyst) 
In the case of both Mondex and First Direct, the problem of employee adherence to 
historical working practices was obviated by the total separation of the new ventures 
from the traditional activities of their founders. This strategy encompassed the 
recruitment of staff from outside the organisation - or indeed the entire financial 
services industry in some cases - and was ratified by the advantages of investment in 
customised new computer systems. Similar practices have been followed in other 
industries, notably by General Motors which set up a totally separate car plant in the 
US to build the new Satum range, using Japanese production methods and quality 
standards, (Simonian 1996). The firm did this because it did not believe that existing 
factories would be able to change their working practices to the necessary degree, 
but only limited success has been experienced with the project. Rehder (1994) 
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showed that customer reaction has been positive, market share of the product has 
improved and productivity improvements have been made. Furthermore, the cost 
reductions achieved at the new site have subsequently inspired renewed efforts to 
introduce innovative management practices in existing factories across the US, a 
process referred to as 'satumisation'. The company still lags behind its Japanese 
competitors in terms of productivity because salary levels are high and the firm 
remains overstaffed. 
It would be tempting for one to conclude from this section that the obvious way to 
alleviate internal resistance to new projects is to develop each new initiative in 
isolation from the main organisation, with its own unique staffing and technological 
support arrangements. As discussed in Chapter 6, this strategy is rarely practical 
unless the project in question represents an entirely new venture for the company. 
Many of the new technology projects under consideration by the banks concern 
improvements or upgrades which need to be integrated with existing services that 
are already operating on a daily basis. In these circumstances it would be impossible 
to isolate the project in the manner successfully adopted by Mondex or First Direct. A 
more realistic strategy would appear to centre upon improving the communication 
and relationships between business and IT areas, to the extent of developing a more 
flexible and IT literate workforce, with a skills base that is relevant to the current 
needs of the industry. The next section of this chapter considers what steps have 
been taken by the case study banks in pursuit of this goal, and evaluates their 
effectiveness in terms of the relative success or failure of the projects in question. 
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RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND GRADING POLICIES 
The traditional career path followed within the UK banks was for staff to join from 
school - or more recently university - at the bottom of the ladder and work their way 
up through a rigid grading structure over a pedod of many years. Length of service 
was therefore the primary criterion of promotion prospects, and the 'job for life' 
culture firmly entrenched. This policy meant that staff were effectively rewarded for 
getting older! As recently as 1990, it was considered unthinkable when a manager of 
Bank B resigned to join the direct competitor Bank A: 
"When news of my resignation leaked out, people passed me in the conidors 
without speaking. After a series of high level crisis meetings I was asked for 
my car keys and escorted from the premises. " (Project Manager) 
Bank A operated a single grading structure for both commercial and IT staff, although 
in practice, IT staff tended to occupy the lower grades, and rarely moved across to a 
business area. Within these grades, salaries could vary widely depending upon 
market demand for particular skills: 
"it is probably true to say that a technical specialist may be well rewarded if 
he is perceived to be 'indispensable' - but he may find it hard to move to a 
more general role... or attain staff responsibility which still remains the 
traditional route to seniority within this organisation ... and 
in many 
comparable companies as well, I would suggest. In general terms, the more 
technical the role, the lower your grade within the bank. " (Project Manager) 
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One individual within the IT department of Bank A was only tolerated because he 
was the one person with the necessary skills to perform the particular tasks required. 
He consistently failed to meet deadlines but was aware of his pivotal role within the 
project and exploited the fact. An interviewee noted how project progress depended 
too much upon a few individuals like this who had been involved from the start, as 
little attempt was made to disperse their skills more widely: 
"There is no cross-fertilisation of knowledge to reduce this 
dependency.... some people are so much in demand that they cannot get 
anything done, or they are able to trade on their importance by demanding 
more money. " (Project Manager) 
The interviewee went on to describe how skills shortages were temporarily alleviated, 
(at significant expense) by employing external consultants or contract staff, but when 
these individuals moved on their accumulated knowledge moved with them. Bank A 
tried to write instructions into the contracts of temporary contract staff which obliged 
them to transfer their skills to permanent employees during the time period of their 
contract. The logic behind this 'skill-scraping' policy was for the experienced 
temporary staff to train new recruits, who would then replace their mentors at a much 
lower salary. In practice, the contractors were naturally reluctant to pass on their 
knowledge and then lose their jobs. A number of people employed by technology 
supplier organisations were also seconded to the project. These individuals knew the 
full capabilities of their hardware, but they were put under so much pressure to 
resolve a series of minor crises that few opportunities remained for them to pass on 
their knowledge. Training courses were available in managing the changes 
associated with new IT systems. It was intended that relationships could be built up 
between the business and IT departments if representatives from both areas 
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attended these courses together, but the contacts built up were only transient 
because of the high staff turnover within IT. The interviewee suggested that these 
examples of poor knowledge management throughout the project compromised the 
opportunity to implement technological change successfully and hence generate 
competitive advantage for the bank. 
As the recession hit the UK banks in the early 1990s the predictable career structure 
began to break down. After rapid expansion duriing the 1980s recruitment practically 
ceased at Bank B overnight. Consequently the elaborate sequences of promotions 
from grade to grade were compromised, as no newcomers came in to take the junior 
jobs and free the present incumbents to move up the hierarchy. In addition, people 
who retired were not replaced, and their jobs were amalgamated with others or 
downgraded. People who had expected to progress from job to job now had to be 
content with their existing roles for an indefinite period - or face redundancy in some 
cases. Others wanted to retain their current roles, but still expected promotion due to 
their length of service. Morale suffered as a result and the more ambitious individuals 
began to leave. In a climate of cost control which had manifested in automation and 
branch closures, Bank B was keen to cut staff levels even further, so active 
recruitment did not resume as economic conditions improved. One interviewee 
described how some new employees were taken on for specific roles at junior levels, 
and there was a deliberate policy to target people without career expectations who 
were unlikely to become disappointed at the limited prospects on offer. As a 
manager who had benefited from a rapid rise up through the grades in the past, the 
interviewee was pragmatic about his own future prospects: 
"People are more realistic now and do not expect the regimented progression 
from within that used to happen. Structures are flatter now, and there are less 
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opportunities, you have to be more proactive in spotting appropriate openings 
and making sure you are ideally placed for them, and this probably means 
taking a sideways move to be in an area where a promotion may be available 
in the future. " (Marketing Manager) 
An interviewee from Bank D described how the bank was trying to move away from 
the elaborate grading structure that had evolved over many years: 
"We are now concentrating upon broadening people's experience rather than 
promoting them, and trying to wean people off the idea that you always need 
to get grade promotions. We try to pay them more for knowing more, and 
move them sideways within their grade to learn new skills. Giving grade 
increases tended to raise peoples expectations above the ability of the 
person... and sometimes those promotions reflected an individual manager's 
personal preferences rather than ability. So we try to pay people better for 
experience and knowledge. Promotion is still available if people want to move 
to a different team or country. The career path cannot be vertical any more 
because we only have four levels. " (Business Analyst) 
The problems of losing good IT staff from Bank A and Bank B were discussed in a 
previous section. One of the Bank A managers who resigned described how his 
replacement was selected: 
"They advertised my job and I was asked to help interview for the 
replacement The money they offered was only attracting new graduates or 
people with limited experience. They needed to offer another 40% to get 
people with the ability to step right in to the job, but were not prepared to do 
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that In the end, a guy that used to work for me and left, has now come back 
to do my job on contract terms. He is eaming a lot more than they were 
offering to a new permanent employee. " (Project Manager) 
The above examples from the case study banks suggest that despite recent 
initiatives to break down dysfunctional grading structures and encourage the 
development of new knowledge bases, there is still ample scope for improvement in 
the management of expertise. On a more positive note, recent research by Morris 
and Westbrook (1996) focused upon the successful implementation of a new 
technology project at Midland Bank. They found that success was facilitated by the 
replacement of Midland executives at senior levels with expedenced and 
knowledgeable managers from outside of the bank, which was an unprecedented 
step at that time. These individuals brought in a fresh approach and new ideas that 
proved invaluable. The project teams contained individuals who were experienced in 
all relevant skills and the centralised processing areas created were managed by 
people with the specific skills necessary for that type of work, rather than the 
'generalists' produced by traditional management training methods. The 'Taylorist, 
management principles followed were particularly suited to the routine nature of 
processing work - and already familiar to staff and management -a factor which 
enabled continuity of working conditions to be maintained, and eased acceptance 
and implementation of the project. In other words, the project succeeded because 
there was no need to redesign jobs or introduce innovative working practices that 
may have met with resistance. This raises questions about the viability and 
successful implementation of future projects that may necessitate more radical 
changes within the organisation. 
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O'Sullivan, (1996) reported how General Motors sought expertise from outside the 
automobile industry when restructuring its European Business Team in response to 
increasing competition. People with brand management experience in a diverse 
range of industries were recruited to bring in a fresh approach that was not 
conditioned and limited by preconceptions of how cars should be sold. 
Representatives of Bank A and Bank B also noted an increasing tendency in recent 
months for people to be recruited at managerial levels from outside the organisation. 
The Bank A example was described in the previous chapter where an additional 
management layer was created within IT. In this specific case the strategy was cited 
as contributing to the failure of the project, but within Bank B the general concept of 
external recruitment was gaining in popularity: 
"Yes, more and more. We are recruiting /T people, personnel people, press 
people, marketing people, It's still unusual within the branch network, but 
quite common in strategic and specialist roles. It's very beneficial... you get 
professionals rather than the GP. " (General Manager) 
Bank D recruits staff externally at all organisational levels, and it is considered 
acceptable to leave the bank and return to another role later on. One interviewee 
commented that this was common practice and often constituted a viable career 
move. He noted that the standard personnel forms completed by all staff include the 
categodes 'hire date'and 're-hire date'. 
At First Direct staff were selected on the basis of their communication skills rather 
than past banking experience, which was actually perceived as a disadvantage. 
Interviewees claimed this was because the policy of adopting a totally new approach 
to retail banking required no preconceptions of what the roles of the staff should 
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entail. Many work part time as the provision of a 24 hour service allows flexibility of 
working conditions. The team based working structure at First Direct is organised 
around shift times so any customer could deal with any member of any team, 
depending upon the time of day when they call. The emphasis upon quality service 
means that training is given high priority within the bank. Each new telephone 
operator receives 7 weeks of full time training before answering calls and training is 
topped up every 6 months depending on individual needs. The courses available 
include communication skills as well as specific product training. Calls are often 
monitored to check staff response in real situations and 'mystery shoppercalls are 
also common. 
Similarly, all Mondex employees were recruited from outside NatWest. Many had 
backgrounds in industries other than financial services. No arrangements are in place 
between Mondex and NatWest, or indeed Midland and First Direct, to exchange or 
rotate their respective staff and management. An interviewee from Mondex described 
the attraction of working for an industry newcomer in the following terms: 
"The challenge of building up electronic cash is a strong motivator on people 
to perform. It comes from outside, and is far stronger than any internal 
attempts to get the best out of people. It's a self selecting group... if you did 
not think it would be a winner you would not join the company, and this is a 
very different group of people from your average bank employee. If you asked 
someone from Natwest about Mondex people they would say, They are a bit 
different from us' and they might appear envious-and not altogether 
supportive. It's unlikely anyone would say... What a great bunch of guys. ' 
(Marketing Manager) 
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Yet again the above examples indicate the advantage to First Direct and Mondex of 
starting with a clean sheet of paper and being able to select appropriate staff with no 
historical preconceptions of the nature of their roles within the organisation. In 
contrast, this section has also highlighted the problems faced by the other case study 
banks in attracting new staff and changing the skills and expectations of a workforce 
used to a far more stable environment and conditions of employment. The problem 
for organisations of losing their best people has recently been labelled by the press 
as 'bright-sizing'. As illustrated in the case of Bank D, individuals who have the 
capacity and enthusiasm to learn new skills would appear to be the very people the 
banks need to retain as new technology systems are introduced. It is interesting to 
speculate whether the home banking project at Bank D would have been as 
successful if the office had not recently lost 170 of its more senior and traditional staff 
through a generous redundancy programme. The final section of this chapter reviews 
how the banks have attempted to broaden the skills of their workforce to varying 
degrees by a process of 'hybridisation', and considers how this strategy impacted 
upon the specific projects studied. 
HYBRID MANAGERS 
In the study by Fincham et al (1994) referred to earlier, an increasing tendency was 
noted for power to move away from hierarchical management towards the 
possessors of technical knowledge, as IT projects became increasingly strategic and 
central to key business activities. At the same time, users became more demanding 
as they acquired a level of technical knowledge and ceased to accept solutions that 
could previously have been imposed by system developers. The authors suggested 
that the development of 'hybrid expertise' was necessary to reconcile these 
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dynamics, ensuring technology was integrated with business requirements. They 
quoted Ead (1989) who defined the hybrid role as follows: 
". 
-hybrids are people with technical skills able to work in user areas doing a 
line or functional job, but adept at developing and supplementing /T 
application ideas. " (p. 205) 
There was little evidence of deliberate hybridisation in the cases studied by Fincham 
et al, but the policy was successful on the occasions when such roles evolved during 
project implementation. For example, they describe how in Bank of Scotland systems 
development was the joint responsibility of a systems analysis and programming 
area, and also a business analysis team. Crucially, these two groups were placed 
together both geographically and structurally within the organisation, which facilitated 
communication. The business analysts were hybrids whose role was to make a 
business case for new projects and interface between developers and users. They 
regarded themselves as bankers rather than systems staff, although most had a 
computing background. As such, they spoke 'the language of both sides'and were 
able to mediate effectively in disputes. The developers resented the incursions into 
their traditional knowledge base by the hybrids and were keen to show up any lack of 
computing competence that they displayed. Despite this, the contdbution of the 
hybrids was instrumental in the success of the projects studied. 
Other writers have advocated the deliberate cultivation of hybrid skills in order to 
facilitate technological innovation. A study of expertise management by Howells 
(1997) of the failed interbank EFTPOS project, noted the difficulties experienced by 
the banks involved in assimilating the necessary expertise to develop an innovative 
project within a traditional organisational structure and culture. The major problems 
in 
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this case concerned rigid separation of commercial and technical functions within the 
banks, and the existence of many hierarchical layers of management separating 
those individuals with the power to take strategic decisions from those who had 
assimilated 'hybrid' knowledge. The author concluded that the success of future 
network innovations could be facilitated by active, strategic management of expertise 
within the organisation so that hybrid knowledge was available to aid project 
implementation from the outset. This would be an improvement upon earlier 
examples where expertise was accumulated by trial and error during the project 
itself, and therefore acquired too late to be of significant value at the time. 
Willcocks and Mason (1987) descdbed how Citibank in the USA had encouraged the 
development of hybrid skills by removing the intermediary systems analysis function 
altogether. This strategy forced business users to develop their own skills in systems 
analysis. Support was provided by training courses in managing technology and the 
backing of contract technical staff was available to the users if required. Outside of 
the banking world, Scarbrough and Corbett (1992) noted that other industries had 
also experienced considerable success in developing hybrid managers. In particular, 
Esso UK claimed that 90% of IT projects were now delivered on time and within 
budget after involving hybrid managers, compared with 60% beforehand. 
The development of hybrid managers would seem to be a practical solution to the 
misunderstandings between IT and commercial employees raised in this chapter 
that have tended to compromise the success of new technology projects. There has, 
however, been criticism of the hybrid manager notion in the literature. Critics focus 
upon the perception that such individuals lack credibility in either the IT or the 
business areas, because the necessary broad approach of the hybrid would mean 
that detailed knowledge of either speciality was hard to sustain (Simpson 1991. ) In 
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addition, it has been claimed that the speed of change in the industry is such that the 
technical skills of the hybrid manager soon become outdated and redundant, (Currie 
and Glover 1996). The authors based this conclusion upon the findings of their 
empirical research in which 'hybrids' were criticised within their organisations for 
spreading themselves too thinly, and as a result lacked the necessary depth of 
knowledge of either business or technical issues. 
Within the case study banks, very different attitudes towards hybrid managers were 
displayed. According to an interviewee from Bank B: 
"If you put a banker into an /T role you can add value from a naivety point of 
view, you ask strange questions ... 
bring in fresh ideas, different experiences. " 
(General Manager) 
This individual was referring to his own experience as he had spent two years as 
Deputy to the Head of IT at Bank B. He had a general banking background, and no 
prior knowledge of IT. Although he believed that his commercial background was of 
value to the IT area, the decision to promote him to this role could not be regarded as 
an attempt on the part of Bank B to cultivate hybrid skills. The move was regarded as 
unique within the bank and he was subsequently promoted again to a banking role 
with no further IT involvement. 
In Bank A, occasional attempts were made to create 'hybrid managers' with 
knowledge of both technical and business issues to bddge the gap between users 
and system developers. These individuals tended to lack credibility in either camp 
and their knowledge was perceived as superficial or out of date. Possibilities within 
IT were limited if a technical manager wished to make a career move within the 
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organisation, whereas commercial roles carried more money and status. In these 
circumstances it was rare for commercial managers to seek a career move into IT. 
Occasionally IT management were rewarded for technical excellence by promotion 
out of their area of expertise and into 'people management, a task for which some 
were ill equipped. In addition, the organisation no longer benefited from their 
technical skills. It was described earlier that Bank C maintained rigid demarcations 
between systems and business staff, and it did not encourage cross over between 
the areas. This separation meant that there was no capacity for either the IT division 
to impose the system on the businesses, or for the business divisions to enforce their 
particular requirements from the new system. One interviewee also noted that users 
were reluctant to admit to their lack of technical knowledge when checking that 
system specification matched their business requirements, which led to 
misunderstanding and errors. The person in charge of the branch integration project 
was actually seconded from a business area to run the project and he had no prior IT 
expenence. After implementation of the scaled-down version he was returned to a 
business area, and the project management experience that he had accumulated 
was therefore lost. These cases appear to exemplify the typical British notion that 
access to senior management levels should be via a general management route 
rather than a technical one. This situation is investigated in more detail in the next 
chapter which analyses leadership issues within the case study banks. 
In contrast, interviewees from Bank D were enthusiastic about the value of hybrid 
skills 
"We encourage the development of a team of 'superusers'who have bought 
in to the project and been involved from the start You pick the best users and 
use them to train the others. However, the best users are always going to be 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox: the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
required elsewhere, and that is where senior management come in ... 
if they 
are prepared to spend whatever on the project then they should ensure that 
the best people are employed on it The superusers have credibility in the 
eyes of their peers, and they can sell the project for you. " (General Manager) 
The interviewee defined the'superuser' as an employee of a business area who was 
able to use development tools aftd tailor them to meet particular needs - without 
needing to ask a programmer for help. Another described how business analyst roles 
had developed from the'superus& concept: 
"They are not programmers but they are able to fill the gap between business 
and IT.. have an empathy with both areas and talk the /T language. They are 
hybrid people really. It's a matter of leaming the jargon. " (Marketing 
Manager) 
In addition, each of the industry consultants interviewed had noticed an increasing 
trend towards hybridisation and results were usually positive. One commented that 
some banks were taking the idea of knowledge management even further and 
developing their own internal consultancies. This role could be described as a 
research and development function to anticipate and monitor changing technological 
trends in the industry. An example of such activity within Bank B was described in 
Chapter 6. In addition, Mondex has a growing reputation as centre of excellence in 
research and development. This capability is reflected by its role in the development 
of new smart card applications, enhanced chip technologies and spin-off products 
and services. The skills acquired help the company in its certification of Mondex 
equipment and compatible products, to ensure that all suppliers meet the company's 
exacting technical and service quality requirements. 
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CONCLUSION 
Another prominent theme to emerge from grounded theoretical analysis of the data 
concerned the difficulties inherent in managing shifting knowledge requirements 
throughout the technological change process. Conceptualising the many different 
forms of knowledge discussed in the literature helps to expose the limitations of the 
banks' traditional reliance upon formal means of knowledge acquisition and transfer. 
The literature review has also highlighted how the problems of managing knowledge 
become more acute when new technology projects are developed which may have to 
be integrated with more traditional business activities. At this point, it is interesting to 
note the recent findings of Stewart (1998); while 70% of the top 1000 companies 
have introduced expensive knowledge management projects, his reserach suggested 
that the most effective technique may still be the coffee pot! 
This chapter has described how the empirical data resonates with the findings of the 
literature reviewed, and also makes an interesting contribution to our understanding 
of this subject. As expected, the case study banks met a significant degree of 
resistance to the changes in working practices and conditions that arose during the 
development and implementation of the new technology projects. The main source of 
resistance vaded from bank to bank, but was exhibited to a considerable degree by 
members of the IT departments themselves. This problem adversely impacted upon 
the projects studied in Banks A, B and C, despite the attempts of the banks to build 
new knowledge structures and integrate business and IT functions where possible. 
The process has involved experimentation with external recruitment, breakdown of 
traditional grading structures and the hybridisation of expertise; to varying 
degrees 
and with varying amounts of success in the case study banks. To summarise, an 
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industry consultant defined the necessary criteria for project success in one 
sentence: 
"It comes down to the support of the senior management team, and having 
the right people on the team, with the right attitudes and skills - technical and 
business - and the right mix of internal and external staff " 
Unfortunately, as the stories told by the interviewees reveal, these ideal conditions 
did not apply to the somewhat chaotic circumstances in which the projects had to 
operate in practice. Consequently, data analysis suggests that appreciation of the 
difficulties associated with effective knowledge management may be a further 
contributory factor to our understanding of the productivity paradox. 
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CHAPTER 8- THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION PROCESS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews literature on the nature of leadership, and considers whether a 
relationship existed between the different leadership styles adopted in the case study 
projects and the extent to which each project could be said to be 'successful'. The 
findings of earlier research in the banking industry are also integrated where relevant. 
Grounded theoretical analysis of this data provides insights into the motivations of 
visionary leaders, and also improves our understanding of ways in which the 
implementation of new technology projects can be facilitated by effective 
management. For example, the projects inspired and run by effective leaders and 
managers appeared to be the most successful, but this rather obvious statement 
raises further questions about the extent to which leadership skills can be isolated 
from the degree of organisational support - or indeed constraints - with which these 
individuals had to work. 
In the specific empirical cases under consideration, the subject of leadership was 
raised in two distinct, although related, contexts. The first concerned the nature and 
influence of the driving force behind innovation and change at the organisational 
level, and the second related to the actual role of specific project managers in 
running new technology projects. This chapter considers each of these issues in turn. 
It concludes by comparing the knowledge backgrounds of each of the individuals 
involved with their respective management skills and the degree of project success 
that was achieved in practice. 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 168 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox. the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP 
Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) noted that considerable research interest in 
leadership issues was stimulated in the 1940s by the famous Hawthorne studies, 
from which it was concluded that the performance of employees could be influenced 
by effective leadership. Since that time, many writers have emphasised the 
relationship between organisational performance and quality of leadership, although 
the distinction between 'management' and 'leadership' is often ambiguous. Katz and 
Khan (1978) defined leadership as 'an influential increment over and above 
compliance with the routine objectives of the organisation'. This implies that a 
distinction can be made between 'managers' who work within given organisational 
parameters, and 'leaders' who take initiatives to accomplish innovative goals which 
extend beyond a narrow functional remit. The concept of leaders as 'visionary' is also 
implied in an altemative definition by Bryman (1986) who categorised leadership as 
'the creation of a vision about a desired future state which seeks to enmesh all 
members of the organisation in its net' In contrast, he saw management as 'a 
preoccupation with the here-and-now of goal attainment'. Further confirmation of the 
validity of this contrast is provided by Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) who classified 
managers as 'operators, technicians, fixers and problern-solvers, and a leader as 
Visionafy, prophet, catalYst and mover-shaker. In these terms, both managers and 
leaders are considered in this chapter; the former is represented by people in charge 
of new technology projects in the case study banks, and the latter by individuals who 
have developed their own innovative ideas through to implementation. It must be 
borne in mind, however, as Buchanan and Huczynski noted, that confusion can 
easily arise because in practice the two roles can be performed by the same person. 
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So what qualities do successful leaders possess? A review of the literature provides 
a variety of answers to this question. Adair (1990) identified three primary 
charactedstics of effective leaders. He called the first 'direction', meaning the ability 
to communicate a vision of the future and unite people in their pursuit of this goal. 
The second feature was 'team-building', whereby a leader would put together an 
effective team, which itself formed part of a wider network of formal and informal 
contacts that could be drawn upon if required. The third characteristic identified was 
creativity, which allowed innovative behaviour to flourish at all levels of the 
organisation. 'Softer' leadership traits are becoming increasingly fashionable, as a 
recent report (Sunday Times 26th July 1998) - which was appropriately titled 'cuddly 
bosses come top in the business jungle' - clearly shows. The article reported that a 
study of top management in 500 companies world-wide had identified 'emotional 
intelligence' as the major criterion for effective leadership. The report defined the key 
attributes of emotional intelligence as being 'empathy, communication skills, 
motivation and confidence. In contrast, Chakravarthy and Gargiulo (1998) described 
how the CEO of General Electric was regarded as 'ruthless' and 'authoritarianin the 
way he went about transforming the performance of the company. 
De Vries (1997) noted that many studies have emphasised the importance of 
'charisma' as a characteristic of successful leadership. This attribute of leadership 
was shown to be influential in developing trust and changing the values and 
behaviour of subordinates, thereby enhancing organisational effectiveness. A famous 
example of organisational transformation under this type of leadership at the 
Brazilian company Semco has been described by Wilson (1996). The newly 
appointed chief executive, Richard Semler, began by cutting the levels of 
management from 12 to 3, and abandoned formal hierarchy altogether. Instead, 
workers were encouraged to set and manage their own production targets, 
decide 
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how many hours to work each day, formulate marketing plans, hire new colleagues, 
and appraise their own management. In addition, 23% of company profits are 
distributed equally amongst the workforce each year. The level of trust placed by 
Semler in the workforce has inspired such respect for his leadership that 
organisational productivity has increased sevenfold, and the waiting list to join the 
company now extends to thousands. Similar, if less spectacular, findings were 
reported by Bryant and Keams (1982) in their study of the use of Japanese 'quality 
circles' in Western settings. Again, the value attributed by the leader to the workers' 
contribution to the quality circles was instrumental in building trust and improving 
productivity, this time in an American naval dockyard. 
THE ROLE OF THE VISIONARY LEADER 
Morris and Westbrook (1996) studied the successful introduction of a major new 
technology project at Midland Bank, and identified the inspirational leadership of the 
new CEO, Gene Lockhart, as a major contributory factor to project success. Midland 
had appointed an outsider in a radical attempt to arrest decline in the late 1980s. This 
individual had a technical background as an IT consultant, and at the time of his 
appointment it was unprecedented for senior executives to be recruited from outside 
of the bank. He initially ran the IT Division, but was soon promoted to head the entire 
Midland Operations, and then became CEO. His strengths were considered to lie in 
his persuasiveness in committing other senior management - both psychologically 
and financially - to a shared vision of success, and also in the value of the new 
ideas 
and perspective which his technical and management training in the US brought to 
the organisation. 
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Similar results were noted by Scarbrough and Lannon (1988), who described how 
the fortunes of Bank of Scotland were transformed by the appointment of a young, 
dynamic General Manager. The new leader supported champions of innovation 
within the bank, and instigated a major restructuring exercise which aimed to 
integrate technology policy into mainstream activities. This process stimulated 
awareness of the long-term implications of new technology on banking operations, 
and HOBS (Home and Office Banking System) was launched in 1985, many years 
ahead of the competition. The bank is now regarded as a market leader in its 
utilisation of technological innovations, in stark contrast to the position in the 1970s 
when Bank of Scotland failed to recognise the potential of ATM technology and lost 
significant market share to its rivals. 
An interviewee whose role was a banking industry consultant described his 
experience of visionary leaders as an advisor to Direct Line. The Chief Executive, 
Peter Wood, started the company in 1985 with 3 colleagues, all with IT backgrounds. 
His innovative idea was to offer a service whereby insurance policies were 
underwritten by the firm itself and sold directly to the public over the telephone. 
Wood's idea of combining the underwriting and selling functions was distilled from his 
knowledge of the insurance industry, business practice, and the availability of 
appropriate IT solutions. Royal Bank of Scotland was the only major market player to 
provide financial support for the venture, and Direct Line went on to achieve 
considerable market success as a result of challenging the industry norms. In 
contrast to accepted industry practice, Wood recruited his management team 
externally, and his staff from the dole queues. When taking on new employees, 
previous experience within the insurance industry was regarded as a disadvantage, 
in order to avoid introducing traditional values and practices. The primary skill 
required of employees was a good telephone manner. Wood appears to 
fit the 
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criteda of the ideal 'hybdd manager' whose value as facilitators of new project 
implementation was descdbed in Chapter 7. 
Although these examples emphasise the merits of visionary leadership, Schein 
(1992) claimed that such cases tended to form the exception rather than the rule, 
because little is known about the actual role of the leader in the innovation process 
beyond the usual generalisation that senior level commitment is necessary for project 
success. He found that most studies concentrated upon the conflict between differing 
technical and managerial perspectives, rather than analysis of the actual impact of 
the leader upon the success of the project. Schein did not deny the value of 
inspirational leaders, but concluded from the results of a survey he undertook in the 
USA that heroic change agents were numerically unrepresentative in comparison 
with their more conservative counterparts. In the organisations he studied, the 
leaders tended to adopt a cautious and pragmatic attitude towards new technology, 
focusing upon incremental improvements in service quality or cost savings, rather 
than on radical business transformation. Schein claimed that the importance of risky 
but glamorous ideas espoused by the leaders of organisations such as First Direct or 
Mondex has been overstated, because less radical approaches are not considered to 
be so interesting or newsworthy in comparison. He concluded that 'thinking outside 
the envelope'was now assumed to be an essential pre-requisite of business success 
only because of the disproportionate publicity that such cases attract. 
Certainly both of these projects have received considerable attention as examples of 
radical innovations inspired by visionary leaders. The Mondex concept was derived 
by two senior managers from National Westminster Bank; Tim Jones and Graham 
Higgins. As members of an internal 'think tankthey were charged with looking for the 
next significant change in the payment card business. Considerable research 
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resources were devoted to the task, and both individuals have retained a leading role 
throughout the Mondex project development and implementation. 
"We are driving Mondex to become the worid's leading electronic money 
product, not just 'a technology'. Mondex is a piece of the infrastructure of the 
2 Ist Century " (Tim Jones in the Financial Times, 1 Oth January 1997) 
All the interviewees from Mondex were proud of the success that the company has 
so far achieved, and extolled the virtues of belonging to a dynamic and innovative 
organisation that was inspired by the vision of its founders. They were less keen to 
admit that the Mondex brand has been developed largely on the strength of its links 
with established market players, particularly MasterCard: 
"If I'm really honest about it, we relied heavily upon the reputation of our 
backers, particulady in the eady stages. Without that support we would not 
have passed the 'great idea'stage. " (Marketing Manager) 
The same caveat can be applied to First Direct. The leadership style within the bank 
is very open and the management structure flat. Teams of 8 -12 people are co- 
ordinated by a team leader into a pattern of shift work that ensures 24 hour cover. 
One manager looks after several teams, and the only other management layer is 
director level. All employees, including the Chief Executive Peter Simpson, work in 
an open area without pdvate offices and are on first name terms. The bank has 
devised its own grading structure that is entirely separate from the Midland system. 
Career progression is based upon performance rather than length of service. The flat 
management structure means that decision-making is delegated to the staff 
answering calls, and this improves service quality as many customer requests can be 
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handled immediately, without the need to follow a lengthy authorisation process. The 
value of this leadership style was described by the interviewees as follows: 
"Morale is high here, and we all take pride in seeing the rapid growth of the 
business. There is nobody looking over your shoulder to check up on your 
work, so management are regarded more as facilitators ... 
helping us to do our 
jobs... rather than policemen who need to maintain control. In this 
atmosphere, people are able to use their initiative and do not fear failure. It's 
quite a dynamic place to work really. " (Telephone Operator) 
"The First Direct brand is its people, there is no physical infrastructure that 
customers can interface with. / think the reason the service quality is so high 
is because of the commitment of the staff.. and the reason staff are so 
committed is because of the way this operation is run ... 
it's certainly not your 
standard and boring bank branch. " (Telephone Operator) 
"Why do I like it here? It's because of my manager really, who lets us get on 
with things, and take our own decisions in response to customer requests. 
For the first time, I have a job which is not made difficult by the management 
team. " (Telephone Operator) 
"We've got the technology, which makes the work easy, but it's the people 
really, who make the difference. You never hear derogatory remarks about 
the management, we are all part of the team and it is not always possible to 
tell who is in charge. " (Telephone Operator) 
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Some of these comments could have come straight from the bank's promotional 
literature. Although often somewhat 'sugary' in tone, these judgements were 
delivered with apparently genuine enthusiasm in a number of separate conversations 
with different teams. Individual managers interviewed were also positive about the 
prevailing management style: 
"I believe that the quality of our people are a unique asset to First Direct. New 
customers are not used to dealing with bank staff who can address their 
complaints or requests on the spot, and with such good cheer We believe 
strongly in training, and empowerment of staff, and are prepared to commit to 
this. Consequently morale is so high that the place practically runs itself. " 
(Marketing Manager) 
The value of isolating the Mondex and First Direct projects from the rest of the 
organisation was emphasised by the interviewees and echoed in an empirical study 
by Dougherty and Hardy, (1996). The authors also noted that innovators' best 
chance of success came when their project was "walled off' from the rest of the 
organisation into a separate product unit: 
"These units created bubbles of innovation meaning that approached the 
ideal type, where innovation had legitimacy and value in the eyes of the 
participants. These bubbles were self-contained micro-configurations in which 
resources, processes, and meaning were aligned with innovation. " (p. 1145) 
However, whilst this policy may have paid dividends for the particular project under 
consideration, the authors claimed that it did nothing to enhance the innovative 
capacity of the organisation as a whole, unless specific systems were developed 
to 
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integrate the project with existing operations. By formalising innovation in this way, 
they believed individual project managers would have a greater chance of 
overcoming organisational resistance to their efforts. In the cases of Mondex and 
First Direct, the success of both innovative projects has yet to impact on Nat West 
and Midland in terms of the way in which each parent company is structured and 
managed. In fact, it is no longer immediately obvious who the originators of the 
projects actually are. 
The leadership record in the other case study banks was more mixed. Bank B is one 
of the more conservative of the UK banks and is not renowned for innovative 
leadership. Recent advertising promotions have emphasised the importance of 
historical continuity, and the stated intention of the bank is to concentrate upon its 
traditional strengths. One exception, as described in Chapter 6, concerns the 
sponsorship by the Chief Executive of a small 'think-tank'. This area is ring fenced 
from operational activities and charged with identifying industry trends and 
appropriate technological solutions. It provides another example of innovation in 
isolation from standard organisational practice. Although some ideas originating from 
this area have been commercially developed and are now offered as services by the 
retail bank, in common with the eadier examples this strategy has not impacted on 
the way in which the operating areas themselves are structured and managed. 
The branch integration project studied at Bank C lacked senior level commitment 
during the extended life of the project, and still attracted little interest from top 
management after its failure. There was no accountability or analysis undertaken of 
what had gone wrong. The interviewees noted that the same problems which had 
compromised this project were repeated in subsequent ones, because no efforts 
were made to address the contributory organisational factors to project failure. Bank 
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C appears to be large enough to absorb the project costs, (estimated at E300 million 
over a six year period) without too many questions being asked, but a post-project 
review which would have analysed the reasons for failure was considered to be too 
expensive at a cost of El million: 
"The review might well have pinpointed the finger at certain senior individuals 
who did not want to advertise their role in the failure of the project.. so it was 
quietly swept under the carpet, and no organisational changes were made. " 
(Project Manager) 
"You could understand it if it was a minor project, but this was a major 
company-wide investment, probably the biggest project ever It is a weakness 
from top management Coherent decision-making at a strategic level was 
totally absent For example, just months after they introduced the system to 
Italy, it was decided that this part of the business would be franchised out in 
Italy. The buyer who bought the franchise rights did not want to use the 
system because of its limited capacity, so they took it out again. " (Project 
Manager) 
When pressed on the issue of how senior management could get away with wasting 
shareholders' money to this extent, one interviewee summarised the reasoning 
behind the project, and the lack of accountability for failure as follows: 
"/ think the top management were in a dream worid - they had this vision of 
the future that would restore past glories, and this alone was considered 
sufficient to justify the expense and risk taken. Anyway it's different for /T 
projects, the people authorising the expenditure do not understand the 
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technicalities or what is considered a 'reasonable' price for equipment, they 
just accept what they are told. Rather than admit they do not understand, they 
will just say 'go ahead'. And this project has run for years - who now 
remembers who signed off on it? The bank is big enough to absorb failures 
like this. " (Project Manager) 
In contrast, the London office of Bank D underwent significant change under the 
direction of an inspirational leader. Although his achievements were recognised and 
held up world-wide as a model for the bank to follow, attempts to copy his 
management style in other parts of the bank have not yet succeeded. In a sense, the 
London off ice can be regarded as geographically ring fenced in the mode of First 
Direct or Mondex. The leaders role was descdbed by one interviewee as follows: 
'7 think in any organisation undergoing this type of activity you are going to 
find one person driving change. He's made speeches, written books, made 
videos. He's well respected in the bank for what he's done. But although 
they've tried to repeat the experiment in other parts of the bank, it has not yet 
happened.. so it is not that easy. " (Marketing Manager) 
"Our MD was previously our IT director, and he is very focused on using 
relevant new technology. He has built the area up to a position of strength so 
that all the other countries look to us for development. It is his leadership that 
has put us in such a strong position in the marketplace. " (Business Analyst) 
This section has compared and contrasted the findings of earlier research into the 
role of visionary leaders at the organisational level with the analysis of the empirical 
data. The issue of the prevalence of visionary leaders within the industry can only be 
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addressed by analysis of a much larger sample size, which is not within the scope of 
this thesis. The examples from the literature indicate that the effectiveness of such 
leaders in terms of the successful projects in which they were involved is 
considerable. The case study examples of Mondex and First Direct support these 
findings and have been well publicised success stories, but in addition the analysis of 
the empirical data has shown that the success cannot be wholly attributed to quality 
of leadership because the degree of institutional backing has played a crucial role. As 
Buchanan and Boddy (1992) pointed out, 
"The key role of 'exceptional people' has to be balanced with an 
understanding of the 'extraordinary circumstances' in which they find 
themselves acting. " (p. 65) 
Furthermore, it is clear that the successful innovative projects studied have yet to 
inspire significant change in the broader organisational context, despite the 
considerable influence of their leaders. 
THE ROLE OF PROJECT MANAGERS 
At the beginning of this chapter the distinction was made between 'leadership' and 
'management' in terms of the breadth of the role and degree of influence within the 
organisation. This section focuses upon the more pragmatic skills usually associated 
with day to day project management rather than innovative leadership. 
In Chapter 2 the subject of 'change agents' (Buchanan and Boddy 
1992) was 
introduced during discussion of the management of the technological change 
process. The authors sought to identify the nature of the expertise necessary 
for a 
180 
Lisa Harris. Brunel University page 
Technological Change and the Productivity paradox: the management of new technologies in UK retail banks 
change agent in seeking to shape the outcome of a particular change project. They 
noted that the change management agenda varied depending on whether the 
project concerned was central or peripheral to the activities of the organisation, and 
whether the change programme itself was perceived to be radical or incremental. 
Specifically, the more radical and central the change programme, the more essential 
to the change agent were skills in resolving political tensions and conflicts rather than 
technical or project management issues. In particular, they described these essential 
skills as follows: 
"... the politicking, the wheeler-dealing, the fixing and negotiating, the coalition- 
building and the trade-offs - which typically cannot be discussed in the 
organisation without damaging individual credibility or the legitimacy of the 
change attempt. " (p. 29) 
Bank C provides a good empirical example of a project manager who lacked many of 
the political skills necessary to progress his project in circumstances such as those 
noted by Buchanan and Boddy above. 
Maidique (1980) classified several roles that he observed in studies of successful 
innovations. The most famous of these is the 'champion' who he defined as an 
individual who adopts an innovative idea and takes appropriate action to ensure it is 
successfully implemented in the organisation. Clearly, the existence of an individual 
prepared to go to considerable lengths to ensure a project is successful would 
appear to be a valuable asset to an organisation, particularly in situations where a 
number of projects are competing for limited resources. In contrast, however, 
Dougherty and Hardy (1996) downplayed the popular tendency to place emphasis 
upon individual champions of innovation, as a result of their comprehensive study of 
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innovative projects within a number of mature industdes. They found that although 
specific project success was largely dependent on the efforts of certain inspirational 
people who were able to make use of their power and influence, such success rarely 
engendered long-term organisational commitment to innovation because of the 
limited scope of any one individual within the company as a whole: 
"But rather than celebrate lone champions and other individual heroes, we 
suggest that pfimary reliance on such personal power is inherently ineffective 
for sustained innovation. Such power is limited by the reach of individual 
networks, knowledge, and experience and is easily uprooted by downsizing, 
restructuring, and changes in senior managerial focus. " (p. 1146) 
Despite the large sample size and range of industries studied, the authors found few 
examples of organisation-wide, support for innovation as an essential business 
activity: 
"Sometimes individuals were able to resolve project-to-organisation 
connection problems successfully by accessing resources, establishing 
collaborative processes, and creating strategic meaning for their innovation. 
But connections made in this way were fragile and vulnerable, because they 
depended on the initiatives of the incumbents of specific positions and their 
particular networks rather than on organisation-wide systems. " (p. 1133) 
These findings indicate that innovative projects tended to succeed despite adverse 
organisational conditions, rather than as a result of supportive organisational factors. 
Common problems faced by project managers included lack of access to necessary 
resources, and the receipt of only temporary support from senior management who 
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did not rate innovation consistently on their list Of Priorities. In fact, Dougherty and 
Hardy went so far as to claim that prevailing organisational systems actually 
encouraged conformity and stability: 
"Innovation was not simply suppressed, it was unseen; it was ignored and 
invisible in a wider organisational community that could not understand its 
role. " (p. 1134) 
In these terms, the heroic efforts of individual 'champions' could therefore result in a 
successful project on a one-off basis without engendering any lasting commitment to 
innovation within the company. Subsequent projects would therefore come up 
against exactly the same problems. This scenario is similar to the case of Bank C, 
where the lack of leaming from project to project was emphasised by a policy 
whereby project leaders with accumulated experience were moved on, and replaced 
by newcomers who faced the same difficulties in running a new project. To 
summanse, Dougherty and Hardy believed that the usual remedies put forward for 
solving innovation problems, such as the creation of product champions, or 
separation of the project from the standard routines of the firm, can only have short 
term value while the principles upon which the organisation is based remain as 
before 
"The longevity of such a solution is limited so long as innovation remains a 
foreign body in a system that values the routine. " (p. 1147) 
The case study banks provide many other examples of ineffective project 
management. In Chapter 7 it was mentioned that the leader of the European 
Payment System project in Bank B had been chosen' to direct the project. He was 
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also head of the department responsible for the bank's existing intemational payment 
operations. This meant that there was a direct conflict within his department between 
the need to meet performance targets - and hence qualify for bonus payments - 
which were based upon volumes of traditional payment business, and the task of 
developing and implementing a new service which would ultimately replace the 
existing methods. The large margins that the bank currently earns on international 
payment traffic would also disappear. This absurd situation came about because at 
Director level of the bank it was believed that the personal contacts members of the 
department had with management of other European banks would be useful in 
forging the necessary strategic alliances for a successful new payment system 
project. The decision was therefore imposed upon the department without careful 
consideration and consultation with the people involved. It meant that even the 
project manager had no real incentive to make the project succeed. One interviewee 
described the situation as follows: 
"He (the project manager) was a company man through and through... with 
no desire to rock the boat His main concern was to protect the day to day 
business that paid his salary and had given him the status he so much 
enjoyed. The new project was merely a nuisance, and as long as he could 
placate his bosses by demonstrating that some progress was being made, 
then things could more or less car7y on as before. He was gambling on the 
notion that top management had no real interest in making the project 
succeed either " (Business Analyst) 
It is fair to say that this attitude was shared by the majority of managers 
in the 
department. Each had forged a successful career based upon years of experience of 
traditional business and the establishment of a network of contacts within other 
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correspondent banks. The managers could map out likely future promotions within . 
the same area which would be jeopardised if they ceased to fit the company mould. 
However able they might have been, individuals who did not fit in were distrusted and 
marginalised by their colleagues, so they tended to become frustrated and leave the 
bank: 
"My boss was a bit of a maverick ... 
he had been transferred from a subsidiary 
company and had no time for all that 'old boy stuff He was always 
complaining about all the politics, and warning of the consequences of such 
introspective behaviour-but his eady enthusiasm to generate change soon 
evaporated. He /eft to join an organisation that was less monolithic, less 
political, less wrapped up in itself. " (Marketing Manager) 
The tendency of able managers to migrate to organisations with a culture more 
sympathetic to their aspirations will be explored further in Chapter 9. 
The view of the project manager that the creation of a European-wide network for 
exchanging international payments was not highly rated at senior levels of Bank B, 
appears to have been endorsed by the passage of time. Originally billed as a solution 
for'1992', which was the magic date for creation of a single European market, Bank 
B only operates a small scale pilot scheme some six years later. The vast majority of 
international transfers are still handled in the traditional manner. The same manager 
is still in place, and the slow progress has not been questioned within 
the bank. 
Pressure has been exerted by the European Commission to sfimulate change, 
but 
there is little competitive threat within the industry as all the 
banks are continuing to 
profit from the status quo. The competition from industry newcomers 
is not yet 
considered viable enough within Bank B to disturb this rather complacent attitude. 
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In Chapter 6 it was described how a new layer of management was introduced to the 
IT department of Bank A, while at the same other areas were simplifying their 
hierarchical structures by removing management layers. Interviewees from Bank A 
directly attributed the project failure to poor leadership. They explained that the first 
thing the new IT manager did was sack all the contract staff as part of a cost cutting 
exercise, and they were told to leave overnight. These individuals were professiona 
and motivated people who had assimilated a considerable amount of project 
knowledge, and their loss was keenly felt. In addition, within the IT department, there 
was no coherent infrastructure in place to co-ordinate and control the different project 
teams. As a result, different sub-projects imposed their own procedures and 
standards. For example, within the same office some groups were working with 
Microsoft Access version 1 software, and others with version 2, which was 
fundamentally different in terms of its usage and capacity. Some sub-divisions of 
the project failed and held up the overall project because they became too insular 
and isolated from the overall goals. Teams wanted to see their'own' bit of the project 
succeed without considering the impact upon other areas. This attitude was 
exacerbated by setting individual targets to project groups which did not reflect work 
being done in other areas. 
The opinion of interviewees who worked within the IT division was that 
the new 
manager had been employed to convey bad news, to shake up 
the division and 
effectively take the blame for unpopular decisions from which 
the Finance Director 
wished to dissociate himself. To support this contention, one 
interviewee cited an 
earlier example of the Finance Director making a scapegoat of a particular 
manager 
when a project was delivered late. This individual was not 
given the necessary 
resources to run the project effectively, and other obstacles were 
put in his place, but 
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he was held to blame for the failure and left the company shortly afterwards. The new 
rnanager was unpopular with employees who were keen to progress the project and 
feit that her influence was jeopardising its success. They noted that she had favoured 
certain individuals and bought their loyalty as a shield against internal cftcism: 
"Some managers will do anything to keep in her good books. They know they 
are not doing the right thing, and they will tell you that out of the office, but it 
means they get more staff, or are considered for promotion etc. She has 
considerable influence, and has made some strange decisions, promoting 
people without the right background or experience. / think they realise that, 
and are grateful, so they work hard to keep in her good books. So it is not 
productive work that comes out of them, it's based on making her happy. " 
(Project Manager) 
"There is starting to be a dawning that nothing is coming out of IT There is a 
core of good managers in IT, but they are up -against the IT manager and her 
cronies who want to keep things ticking along, have an easy life. So there is 
an underground IT management going on at the moment, trying to work out 
how they can bypass afi this. " (Project Manager) 
In this environment, the likelihood of implementing successful IT projects was 
considered to be remote. 
Interviewees from Bank C again attributed failure to ineffective project management. 
They described how the person in overall control of the project had contributed to 
its 
failure. He was a Senior Vice President who reported to the head of IT world-wide, 
who in turn reported to the Chief Executive. Consequently he was not very high up 
in 
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the extensive bank hierarchy, and at the same horizontal level as the heads of the 
branches in which the project was to be implemented, so he had very little power. 
The manager was not a 'systems person' and had been transferred from a business 
area to head up this major IT project. There were several hundred people working 
on the project, which was of bank-wide importance. In this case the will to make the 
project succeed was there, but the manager lacked the authority to impose decisions 
on all the bickering branches of the bank that were involved. Geographically, the 
project was spread over many countries which made it hard to control, and 
psychologically many of the participants lacked interest in it: 
"What became obvious during my time on the project was that managers did 
not always tell the project leader the truth, and so he did not know the exact 
situation. They could just sit there and tell him that everything was fine, or 
they were over optimistic... saying it will be fixed by noon or whatever, just to 
protect their own position. Most timescales set were so optimistic that they 
were rarely met and this created much negative publicity for the project. The 
markets were told they could come and test it in March, and it then it was 
June, and this went on and on. The head of the project then had to face all 
these market heads who were confused about what was going on and why 
the project could not deliver on time. There was a lot of time wasted on 
politics, managers playing one off against the other to enhance their own 
position within the organisation. " (project Manager) 
The interviewee described how the project manager was taken in by his 
subordinates' reports of project progress because in his previous role within a 
business area of the bank, playing such games was unknown. In this case, 
the 
project was internal, developed by IT for the benefit of the business areas, and there 
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was no external customer involvement. This meant it was considered fair game for 
participants to test out organisational politics in an attempt to further their careers. 
Had the manager been an IT insider, he would have been aware of this tendency and 
far more sceptical about reports of project progress: 
"It should not have mattered that he was not a specialist in IT He had all 
these VPs reporting to him and they were mainly /T specialists. He was there 
to manage a project, and in his previous role he had turned around a large 
market to make it profitable and did a good job. The problem was that people 
lied, and he was not used to that type of working environment. " (Project 
Manager) 
In common with the earlier section that examined visionary leadership at the 
organisational level, this section of data analysis has illustrated how the influence of 
the personality and commitment of the project managers to specific project success 
cannot be examined in isolation of the operational constraints within which they 
operated. It is therefore difficult to assess whether more dynamic personalities could 
have overcome these problems. Even in the successful cases, no individual manager 
was abie to instigate widespread organisational change that might prevent the same 
problems recuning in future projects. 
THE KNOWLEDGE BACKGROUND OF PROJECT LEADERS 
Currie (1995) conducted a survey of financial institutions which emphasised how 
information technology has developed into a strategic issue for the banks because It 
is used to increase efficiency, link remote locations, streamline processes and 
Improve customer service. Despite the large sums of money invested by 
banks in IT, 
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her research indicated that technology departments are still regarded merely as 
support functions. For example, even senior executives in charge of large projects 
tended to have no technical background, as IT staff were rarely promoted to top 
management roles, and links with the business users were poor. Currie's survey 
showed that only 11 % of the responding organisations regularly promoted IT staff to 
senior management roles, and 37% claimed that such moves occurred 'very 
occasionally'. In the remaining 52% there were no technical people at all in senior 
positions within the organisation. 
These conclusions are borne out within the case study banks. The leaders of the new 
technology projects in Banks A, B and C had no IT background, although the leaders 
of Banks A and C came to their projects with reputations as effective managers. 
These were the two projects that turned out to be the most spectacular failures. In 
Bank C the knowledge gap was perpetuated because managers who had 
accumulated experience when put in charge of IT projects were transferred back to 
business areas upon completion of their projects. Consequently they were not able to 
make use of the knowledge acquired by running future projects. Conversely, the MID 
of the London office of Bank D had previously been the IT Director, and he retained 
enthusiasm and commitment to technological innovation which he encouraged 
amongst his employees, many of whom were new to IT. The leaders of First Direct 
and Mondex did not themselves have IT backgrounds, but the problems of managing 
IT within these organisations were less acute than in the traditional banks. There 
were no legacy systems to contend with and each operation was well resourced with 
dedicated teams of technical staff responsible for system development. 
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CONCLUSION 
As only a small number of cases have been studied, this project does not attempt to 
contribute to statistical analysis of the prevalence of visionary leaders within the 
industry, or to the value of different backgrounds and experience in the context of the 
management of new technology projects. As it is impossible to isolate the individual 
leaders from the environments within which they operated, the extent of their 
influence is difficult to assess without tracking the record of a leader over an 
extended time period, encompassing a number of projects managed (ideally) for 
different organisations. 
The case studies do illustrate that while there was a definite link between innovative 
leadership and project success, it was not the sole criterýion. Analysis of the data has 
provided insight into possible ways in which the implementation of new technology 
projects can be facilitated by effective project management (Bank D). These findings 
therefore build upon the literature discussed in Chapter 2 that regarded technological 
change as a process able to be shaped and controlled by management action over 
an extended period of time. Few examples were found either in the cases studied or 
the literature reviewed whereby inspirational leadership resulted in definitive change 
at the organisational level - the influence of individuals was limited to specific 
projects. These empidcal findings support the theory put forward by Dougherty and 
Hardy (1996) that organisations cannot sustain innovation over time because of the 
limited impact of any one individual in a situation where the overwhelming tendency 
is to maintain organisational continuity. The cases show that this attitude appears to 
be still prevalent in the banking industry, and the analysis adds a further dimension to 
our understanding of the productivity paradox. This issue is developed further in the 
next chapter that deals with the cultural issues impacting upon new technology 
implementation in the banks studied. 
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CHAPTER 9- THE ROLE OF CULTURE 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the role of culture in the technological change process is examined at 
both the industry and organisational level within the banks. Grounded theoretical 
analysis of the literature and empirical data from the case study banks shows that 
adherence to a culture based upon historical processes and values acts as an 
inhibitor to change, thereby constraining the potential of new technologies. This 
analysis process also enabled insights into the IT productivity paradox to be gleaned 
by drawing upon a body of literature not normally associated with the subjects of new 
technology and technological change. 
The chapter begins by defining what is meant by the word 'culture' in an 
organisational context. The culture that has developed over time in the retail UK 
banking industry has been described in Chapter 3, so only a brief summary is 
provided here. This review illustrates how the culture has grown around an ethos of 
stability and continuity, so that technological change tends to be feared and avoided 
where possible. Analysis of previous research in the banking industry and the 
empirical case study data demonstrates the diverse range of impacts made by 
inappropriate organisational cultures upon the implementation of new technology 
projects. In turn, other cases also illustrate how a supportive culture can facilitate the 
change process. This analysis thereby builds upon existing theoýes of technological 
change that were introduced in Chapter 2. The literature provides conflicting 
accounts of whether culture can be changed - this chapter contftutes to 
the debate 
by descfting how one of the case study banks was actually able to create and 
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sustain a climate in which new ideas could be generated and turned into viable 
commercial products, through a process that involved a significant cultural change. 
WHAT IS CULTURE? 
This section provides a brief review of the literature on the nature of culture. It is not 
intended to be a comprehensive analysis of what is an enormous subject, but to 
form a conceptual basis for analysis of the impact of a 'banking culture, upon the 
implementation of new technology projects. 
In general terms, Watson (1994) defined 'culture' as follows: 
"the system of meanings which are shared by members of a human grouping 
and which define what is good and bad, right and wrong and what are the 
appropriate ways for members of that group to think and behave. " (p. 111- 
112) 
The word 'culture' has been described in a business sense by Pascale and Athos 
(1982) as 'the philosophy that guides an organisation's Policy towards employees or 
customers'. Schein (1994) claimed that culture was the 'overarching determinant of 
how organisations work'because it provided meaning for individuals seeking stability 
and predictability. He went on to define culture as: 
ýJhe pattem of leamed basic assumptions that has worked we// enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to the problems of survival 
and in teg ra tion. " (p. 8) 
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As early as 1961, a study of engineering firms by Bums and Stalker found that the 
typical response to environmental change was protection of existing business 
practices, to the extent of separating new ventures geographically and structurally 
from the established business of the firm. The changing circumstances threatened 
established power positions and status structures, prompting defensive action to 
protect this culture. The concept of a corporate culture was more widely popularised 
by Peters and Waterman (1982) in their world-wide bestseller, In Search of 
Excellence, in which they suggested that particular company values could have a 
direct impact upon organisational performance. Deal and Kennedy (1982) suggested 
that companies could 'manage' their cultures to increase business effectiveness. The 
inherent attractiveness of this idea precipitated one of the most popular management 
'fads' of the 1980s, and analysis of organisational culture together with debates over 
whether culture can in fact be changed have since come to dominate modem studies 
of management. 
The Japanese industrial organisation provides the most famous example of 
successful management of the often conflicting goals of flexibility and efficiency, 
within a distinctive and unique culture. Dore (1986) suggested that the Japanese 
success is based upon 'flexible rigidity', with emphasis upon vertical disintegration 
and highly organised, very effective inter-industry networks. This permits massive 
cost efficiencies, particularly in areas such as marketing. The Japanese culture 
encompasses what Ouchi (1980) categorised as 'clan management, or a reliance 
upon social controls and relationships of trust, rather than on self interest and 
economic necessities as in the bureaucratic model of management. (For a detailed 
analysis of the dimensions of differences between different national cultures see 
Hofstede 1984. )
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Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) distinguished two distinct perspectives from the 
literature on the nature of culture in organisations. Firstly, they claimed that culture 
can be regarded as a 'variable' that is capable of changing as a result of 
management action, as described in the early research described above. In these 
terms, culture provides a sense of identity, commitment and solidarity for employees 
which reinforces the values of the organisation while allowing management to shape 
and control employee behaviour. Secondly, the authors identified a contrasting and 
deeper view of culture that regards it as indistinguishable from the organisation itself. 
By this they meant that culture both determines and is determined by social 
interaction within the organisation. The perspective recognises that a number of 
cultures may compete within one company, for example between management and 
staff or different functional groups, and that manipulation of culture to control 
behaviour may well be ineffective in such circumstances. The definition of culture 
provided by Morgan (1986) reflects its complexity according to this viewpoint: 
"... the slogans, evocative language, symbols, stories, myths, ceremonies, 
rituals and patterns of tribal behaviour that decorate the surface of 
organisational life, merely give clues to the existence of a much deeper and 
all-pervasive system of meaning. " (p. 133) 
It is clear from the above review that little consensus exists as to the nature of 
organisational culture. The next two sections of this chapter contribute to this 
debate 
by discussing the traditional banking culture, whether culture can be changed and 
how the analysis of the empidcal data can add to our understanding of 
this 
contentious area. 
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THE TRADITIONAL BANKING CULTURE 
Chapter 3 described how the traditional banking culture has become deeply 
entrenched in our society. Briefly, banking in the UK has evolved over the past 200 
years into a highly specialist community. The industry has played a significant role in 
the changing fortunes of the UK economy because of its importance to the 
government as an instrument of monetary policy. Considerable emphasis has been 
placed on the development of a culture based upon tradition and stability. This image 
has been deliberately cultivated by the banks as it was seen to befit custodians of 
other peoples' money. The banks have grown dch on a historical money transmission 
monopoly, and have invested heavily in both electronic and paper based clearing 
mechanisms. Despite environmental changes in the form of increased competition, 
market deregulation and technological developments, the traditional structure, 
functions and priorities within the industry remain internally consistent and largely 
unaltered (Fincham et al 1994). 
Similar findings were made by Child and Smith (1987) in their study of Cadbury Ltd 
which operated in a very different sector to the banks: 
"Senior managers hold very similar constructs of the firm's operational 
dynamics which effectively furnish the rules of the game for the sector. " (p - 
569) 
This scenario can be explained by the work of Abernathy (1978), who noted how the 
characteristics of a specific industry sector were influential in shaping the 
development of a firm, to the extent that maturing sectors constrained the activities of 
the firms within them along increasingly similar lines. At the more micro level within 
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the component firms, Van Maanen and Schein (1979) emphasised the importance of 
lorganisational socialisation' which ensures that newcomers absorb the appropriate 
company and industry values that are deemed normal and acceptable. They showed 
how the provision of a shared frame of reference across the sector results in the type 
of increasingly stanclardised behaviour described above. 
Handy (1985) defined four distinct varieties of organisational culture that he 
described as'power' 'role' 'task' and 'person' respectively. His notion of a role culture 
appears to fit well with the traditional banking culture, as it is dependent on rules, 
procedures, security and hierarchy of control. In common with the notion of the 
'mechanistic! organisation identified by Bums and Stalker (1961), Handy noted the 
problems faced by role cultures in times of changing environmental conditions: 
'Role cultures are slow to perceive the need for change and slow to change 
even if the need is seen. If the market, the product needs or the competitive 
environment changes, the role culture is likely to continue to forge straight 
ahead confident in its ability to shape the future in its own image. (p. 191) 
This was certainly the case in Bank B, where attention was firmly focused on 
preservation of traditional business in the domestic market, created during an era of 
monopoly power which is no longer extant. Attempts to provide a payment service 
which crosses national boundaries still rely upon historical links with local banks in 
the countries concemed. Delays and double charging are endemic to this service, 
despite efforts by the European Commission and consumer groups to introduce 
quality standards. It was clear in Bank B that defensive strategies were fuelled by the 
Prospect of losing commission income as new competitors undercut funds transfer 
Prices and Monetary Union threatened to remove the need for currency exchange 
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within Europe. Radical change, however, would pose a threat to established career 
paths and power positions. There was little evidence in Bank B that technological 
developments were being utilised to pursue innovative methods of money 
transmission that could encompass a single European-wide payment system. While 
the technological capacity existed to devise more radical solutions, the project 
focused instead upon improvements in the quality and cost efficiency of existing 
services, One interviewee from Bank B described the situation as follows: 
"The problem is much more of culture, than of technology. The problem is 
changing the philosophy, changing the way work is done and then using the 
technology to facilitate that, to underwrite the change. If no one is prepared to 
grab the bull by the homs in this way, then we will just make the same 
inefficient processes marginally more efficient. You may have some marginal 
incremental benefit, but if you do not change the way things are done and the 
way people think - radically - and support that with technology, then you are 
just going to have the same problems. " (Marketing Manager) 
New entrants to the money transmission market are not encumbered by histodcal 
precedents and conservative organisational cultures. They have a more flexible 
approach because they are not compromised by vested interests in the maintenance 
of existing procedures and practices. An interviewee from Mondex (the company 
forms a good example of Handy's 'task! culture) summadsed their approach as 
follows: 
"We are pretty outward focused, as / guess we still have a lot to prove. This 
situation has created a sort of 'pioneel, 'mentality in the company - dogged 
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determination if you like. We have neither the time or the inclination to mess 
around with political games and status symbols. " (Marketing Manager) 
The history of technical change provides many examples of organisations that have 
failed to utilise the potential offered by new technologies, and are eventually 
replaced by new market entrants, but the banks still do not appear to be taking this 
threat too sedously. The strategy of the newcomers seeks to combine technological 
capability with consumer needs, to create new market opportunities. For example, 
Microsoft and Visa International are jointly developing software which will facilitate 
electronic payment for goods and services available on the Internet, now a rapidly 
developing commercial market. A successful product could lead to the eventual 
exclusion of banks from the field of money transmission. Gates (1995) has made no 
secret of his belief that the convergence of money, commerce and personal 
computers represents one of the great new markets of modem times. Deregulation in 
the financial services industry has removed traditional barriers to market entry, and 
this trend looks set to continue with the growth of the Internet as a commercial 
medium. Building Societies and even supermarkets can now turn themselves into 
banks and offer a full range of financial products. Evidence does exist that this 
pressure is forcing the banks to be innovative and gradually come out of their 
historical and increasingly irrelevant introspective obsessions. For example, some 
interviewees acknowledged that their banks had missed out on the rapidly growing 
telephone banking business by initially dismissing the potential of the idea, allowing 
First Direct to build up significant market share. As a result, they are now determined 
not to be so complacent with regard to future new initiatives: 
"I think they are more on the ball now. Deregulation of the market is forcing it, 
innovation by new entrants is forcing it- Computer banking is a massive 
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industry in the States, and will be over here. The banks were dismissive of 
telephone banking until recently, now they all have it. If a bank now does not 
have a telephone or internet service it will be a prime candidate for takeover. 
That attitude of We are the blue-blooded bankers and so don't need to worry 
about newcomers' is outdated and they cannot seriously sustain it any 
/onger " (industry Consultant) 
Other interviewees also supported this argument: 
"Banks which cannot cope in this more aggressive environment will either be 
forced out of business or taken over by a competitor - the level of competition 
is now too great to sustain the number of players in the market. I think there 
will be pockets of resistance at a middle manager leveL.. those who have 
spent 25 years in a particular environment for example, and there are 
massive change management projects now underway to change that culture. 
I'm not saying it will be easy, and happen ovemight, but it will have to be 
done. " (General Manager, Bank C) 
The issue of whether deeply entrenched cultures can in fact be changed is dealt with 
later in this chapter. 
THE IMPACT OF CULTURE UPON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Many examples can be provided from the literature which illustrate the negative 
impact that inappropriate cultures can have upon technological change. Research in 
the commercial banking sector by Child and Loveridge (1990) was described in 
Chapter 6 in the context of structural constraints upon technological change. They 
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also noted the adverse impact that the 'national banking habit' and the histohcal 
development of institutions within society had upon technological innovation in the 
institutions they studied. The authors claimed that banking cultures reflected a sober 
and predictable image which was intended to encourage customer confidence. At the 
same time, the desire to be seen as responsible custodians of wealth meant that the 
technological emphasis was placed upon preservation of managerial controls, at the 
expense of innovation. 
Schein (1985) suggested that greater acceptance of technological change required a 
change in organisational culture, because practices and values were built around 
existing technologies which have contributed to the successful development and self 
image of the organisation. One of the strongest elements of culture he identified was 
the status system attached to these traditions, and the possession by individuals of 
critical skills. Schein claimed that innovation was a property of culture, and the 
potential of information technology as a competitive and strategic weapon would not 
be fulfilled unless innovative cultures were present or developed, enabling the 
organisation to learn and adapt. This attitude was also noted by Piore and Sabel 
(1984) whose theory of 'flexible specialisation' emerged from their observations that 
technological progress could be self-blocking, and new products were generally 
designed to fit existing equipment and procedures. The importance of culture was 
also emphasised in a study of video disk development by Graham (1986) who found 
that prevailing cultural values and attitudes in the firm, based upon past experience, 
were inadequate when it came to dealing with an innovative product in a new market. 
Loveridge (1990) used examples from the banking industry to illustrate the problems 
inherent in the implementation of new technologies, without due attention to cultural 
factors. He found that the final form of the technology could be very different 
froM 
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what was originally intended, and the process of rendering social hierarchies 
obsolete set up areas of conflict between old and new vested interests. He 
suggested that this 'automation of bureaucracy' approach would constrain the 
potential of information technology in banking. Empirical research by Howells and 
Hine (1994) into the development of EFTPOS network technology, was described in 
Chapter 6 to illustrate the difficulties inherent in managing a new technology project 
within structural constraints. In addition, the authors found that the design of a single 
national network which would have benefited both banks and retailers was 
sabotaged by the inflexibility of the actors involved, who each exhibited different 
social, commercial, cultural and political agendas. This project provides another 
example of the issues of structure and culture overlapping to influence new 
technology implementation. Alternative bilateral arrangements were eventually 
established between individual banks and retailers, and the entire process cost the 
banks in excess of : E120 million. The authors concluded that the cultural identities 
and particular knowledge bases of the banks involved were only suitable for 
managing their existing business, and this mitigated against the radical change 
necessary to create a new industry-wide network technology. By zealously guarding 
their traditional role and attempting to exclude newcomers from the clearing system, 
the banks tended to act as technological followers rather than leaders. This again 
raises questions about the capacity of the traditional banking industry to exploit 
technological advances in a proactive, strategic manner, and can be compared with 
the attitude towards European Payment system developments demonstrated in Bank 
B. 
Zuboff (1988) argued that companies can pursue either an 'automating' or 
'informating' approach to innovation in work practices and procedures, but only the 
latter adds value by introducing flexibility and job enrichment. She focused upon the 
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'informating' capacity of IT to transform organisational structures and processes, 
thereby introducing the flexibility, job enrichment and skill enhancement necessary to 
respond to increasing competition and rapid environmental changes. In practice, she 
noted that attempts to informate work processes at a Brazilian bank were inhibited by 
a culture of hierarchical authority, control and functional rigidity, and the result was a 
mere automation of existing processes. Staff became dernotivated as the new 
technology introduced was designed to increase managerial control by replacing the 
skill and experience of individuals, rather than increase flexibility to meet the needs of 
a changing market. These findings are comparable with the UK research described 
above, where the defensive strategies of UK banks aimed to protect traditional 
business, with the technological focus upon cost savings and automation of existing 
processes. It can be argued that in this situation, the interpretative frames or cultural 
norms of the individuals shaping change in the banks give rise to particular 
interpretations in relation to the problems that the new technology was used to 
address. This means that the mode of solution preferred is influenced by the culture 
of the banks, leading to a tendency to favour 'automation' over 'information' in 
Zuboff s terms. 
Interviewees from Bank C blamed the failure of the world-wide branch integration 
project upon the culture of complacency which existed within the organisation, based 
upon past success and prominent market position. Not only was the project a 
spectacular failure, but there seemed to be little concern within the company about 
the amount of money wasted, and no impetus to find out why it had gone so wrong. A 
rather flippant remark by one interviewee has a ring of truth in these circumstances: 
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"When the company is making profits in the billions then it does not really 
matter whether projects are successful or not! Save on matches and spend 
on champagne, that has always been our way, " (Project Manager) 
The culture within the organisation was very conservative and change was resisted in 
day to day matters as well as in the implementation of large scale projects: 
"The policy is there, you know, 'we welcome innovative ideas from our 
people', but you have to push very hard to get anything done. They were not 
prepared to let people tfy out their ideas, / mean some may not have worked, 
but others would have compensated. They had to be 110% sure it was a 
winner before they approved it, no one was prepared to take any risk. " 
(Project Manager) 
"The failure of this project was very much typical of the organisation. It was 
good at responding to external customers when under pressure. But if there 
was more time in hand it was almost a rule that it would end up in political 
games. The culture of superiority goes right through the company, but the 
competitive situation is so different now, and we still cannot see it. " 
(Marketing Manager) 
The situation was very similar in the case of Bank A. As described in Chapter 7, the 
interviewees attributed project failure to a lack of communication between business 
and IT areas, and a reluctance to appreciate and respond to changing market 
demands: 
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"One of the biggest things was the reluctance of the /T services department 
who actually run the systems to take on anything new. New systems were 
developed and ready for implementation but obstacles were put in their way 
to prevent them going live. For example, they complained about incomplete 
documentation, or lack of training etc. The staff are very old fashioned in their 
computing ideas, and they are after the job security of keeping what they 
know, so they see a// these new systems as a threat. " (Project Manager) 
"The people in /T have been really obstructive. They no longer have a 
specialist knowledge base on which to justify their existence, as the users 
themselves are becoming increasingly expert and demanding. The culture in 
the bank is changing, and some people just cannot handle it. " (Marketing 
Manager) 
First Direct provides a more positive example as it demonstrates how innovation and 
change can be encouraged within a supportive culture. It would be easy to read too 
much into this success because First Direct has been isolated from the 
organisational environment of Midland Bank. In this case, a particular 'type' of 
culture has been deliberately engineered from a clean sheet of paper. It appears to 
have been successful, and there is now no obvious connection between the two 
organisations. As discussed in the previous chapter, despite the success of this 
Project there has so far been little influence upon the traditional culture which still 
pertains within Midland Bank as a whole. 
A change programme at Midland which was described in Chapter 7 and analysed 
by 
Morris and Westbrook (1996) was found to be successful precisely because 
it did not 
Clisrupt the prevailing management style and ways in which the staff had to work. 
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They were used to obeying instructions and changes were able to be incorporated 
into existing routines with little disruption. This study raises the question of whether a 
rnore radical change programme which challenged the accepted norms would have 
been so easily accomplished. Given the level of introspective behaviour in the 
industry, and the common need to cut costs, it is interesting that no attempt was 
made by the other banks to copy Midland's successful innovation. The authors 
explained this reticence by referring to the potential decline in importance of cheque 
clearing over time as the process is superseded by more modern payment methods, 
and also to the relatively lowly place occupied by Midland in the banking hierarchy, 
which rendered its innovations uninteresting in the eyes of its more successful 
competitors. Centralised cheque processing also represented a rather maverick 
move away from the accepted industry norms of collective management of routine 
transactions, and this added to the perceived unacceptability of such a project. 
Consequently, Midland has enjoyed a significant competitive advantage in terms of 
the cost savings and improvements to customer service introduced by their new 
system, without the usual rush by competitors to conform. The attitude of the other 
banks towards this successful project also illustrates the reluctance of the industry as 
a whole to cast aside traditional assumptions and accepted norms to embrace radical 
change. 
This section has shown how the most successful banking innovations were either 
separated from the mainstream activities of the organisation, or were so incremental 
in nature that they did not disrupt existing business activities. More radical projects 
were compromised by restrictive cultural norms and values. The next section of this 
chapter considers whether it is possible for culture to be changed in these 
circumstances. 
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CAN CULTURE BE CHANGED? 
A vast literature now exists on the subject of how to change culture. Mintzberg (1979) 
advocated the development of a culture of 'adhocracy', which is organic and 
decentralised in structure, thereby avoiding the pitfalls that are usually associated 
with bureaucracy. He claimed that such organisations minimise planning, control and 
the division of labour, in search of innovation. Harvey (1989) recommended vertical 
disintegration as a means of increasing flexibility, which shifted the emphasis from 
direct control within the organisation, to the creation and active management of 
networks of contractual relationships between firms. This approach allows the firm to 
specialise, with flexibility maintained at the industry level. Quinn (1992) argued that 
flexibility can be enhanced by a shift in emphasis from the management of business 
assets to the co-ordination of knowledge and intellect within the firm. Peters and 
Waterman (1982) advocated 'simultaneous loose-tight controls' that permit flexibility 
by avoiding bureaucratic constraints, but maintain control by means of shared 
cultural values throughout the organisation. Clark, Hayes and Lorenz (1985) 
recommended the reorganisation of management styles, philosophies and personnel 
with long term strategies in mind rather than immediate productivity gains. 
In practice however, while examples do exist of individual companies, such as Bdtish 
Airways, that have 'created' a new corporate culture, (Brown 1995) these success 
stories appear to be few and far between. March and Simon (1994) in their revised 
edition of a seminal text which introduced the concept of 'bounded rationality' 
(referring to the limited cognition of organisational members), maintained that their 
theory still holds true today - despite the vastly increased resources available 
to the 
modem Organisation, the authors believed that potential for change would always be 
constrained by the conflicting agendas of employees. As eady as 1952, Lewin 
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identified three phases of culture change, namely 'unfreezing,, 'change' and 
, refreezing'. 'Unfreezing' results from questioning of norms which have led to a 
specific failure, thereby sensitising employees to the need for change, which is then 
consolidated into new procedures or behaviours; during the 'refreezing' phase. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this theory appears overly simplistic and linear in its 
classification of the technological change process, which appears invariably to be a 
more dynamic and turbulent series of events in practice. 
Cressey (1992) argued that traditional banking culture actually helped incremental 
changes to be introduced, but the more fundamental change necessary to retain 
competitiveness in the future would be inhibited by these same characteristics. He 
found that when changes were introduced gradually in a piecemeal fashion, 
implementation was facilitated because employees were used to obeying instructions 
in a rule-based and paternalistic environment, and therefore put up little resistance to 
change. The author also noted the power of 'cultural baggage' within UK banks to 
inhibit the business transformation made possible by technological developments, 
and deemed necessary to compete with industry newcomers. Despite the 
commercial incentive to change banking culture, the practical difficulties involved 
should not be underestimated. 
Not all writers have treated the increasing popularity of using culture as a 
management ool with the same enthusiasm as its originators. Kotter and Heskett 
(1992) studied the relationship between organisational culture and the financial 
performance of large firms in a variety of industries, and found no direct correlation 
between business performance and a strong corporate culture. In addition, many of 
the organisations identified by Peters and Waterman as excellent in 1982 now no 
longer exist. Legge (1995) noted that strong cultures could be dysfunctional if they 
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prevented employees from looking beyond a rather narrow, inflexible view of the 
world and the role of the organisation within it. She found that the longer culture has 
been allowed to become entrenched within an organisation, the more widely shared 
and persistent the associated values and beliefs are likely to be. In contrast, a weak 
culture may be more adaptable to changing environmental conditions. Green (1994) 
also questioned the ability of organisations; to manage culture in a Prescriptive way: 
7f culture could be levered into shape then, by now, someone would have 
discovered the method. The metaphors of fine-tuning and fit which abound in 
much of the literature on culture and strategy are altogether inappropriate for 
something as complex as human social systems. " (p. 427) 
He noted that while corporate cultures appear to be stable and static when studied at 
a particular point in time, applying a longitudinal perspective reveals that they are in 
fact too multi-dimensional and dynamic to be susceptible to manipulation by 
management. 
The industry consultants interviewed were sceptical about both the capacity and 
commitment of the UK retail banks to instigate effective culture change because of 
the strength of their current market position: 
"The ones that are going to be successful are the new entrants, or the ones 
that start from scratch, like First Direct- The reason that the big banks 
like 
Barclays will survive is because of their sheer size. I guess cultures can 
be 
changed eventually, but there could be a high social cost which might 
become unacceptable. These banks are just too big, and too protected, 
and 
can afford to lose a lot of money on IT projects. This situation may 
be 
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changing with shareholder pressure, but most of those with any clout are 
themselves large institutions. Barclays for example, has one of the best 
returns on capital in the worid, so there is little pressure from its shareholders 
to innovate. Even when they make massive provisions for bad debt, they can 
still pay dividends out of reserves, and the share price tends to be on a one 
way ticket upwards. " (Industry Consultant) 
Bank D has also been accused of complacency because its size and market position 
has led to good results, and hence there has been little pressure for innovation at the 
organisational level. The area of the bank which was studied has just gone through a 
downsizing exercise, and is now considered to be much further ahead in terms of 
new business practices than the rest of the bank. It provides an example of 
successful culture change, but can be compared to First Direct and Mondex in that 
the area benefited from its geographical and structural separation from the rest of the 
organisation. Consequently, the culture could be changed in the London office 
without impacting upon the company as a whole: 
"We are now concentrating upon broadening people's experience rather than 
promoting them, and trying to wean people off the idea that you always need 
to get grade promotions. We try to pay them more for knowing more, and 
Moving sideways within their grade to leam new skills. Giving grade 
increases tended to raise peoples expectations above the ability of the 
person. Sometimes those promotions reflected an individual managees 
personal preferences rather than ability. So we try to pay people better 
for 
experience and knowledge. " (Business Analyst) 
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,, Our new policies have been accepted, because the people we are left with after the 
downsizing are more tolerant of change than some of their counterparts who have 
left. Those that wanted to stay for ever on one particular job, but expected promotion 
due to length of service... these are products of the old culture, and many of them 
have now gone. " (General Manager) 
"For me the main reason the culture could be changed was due to the way the 
process was managed, and the personality of the man at the top, If you have respect 
for somebody then you go along with their ideas, and get caught up in a wave of 
enthusiasm. This tends to mushroom if success is seen to be achieved. Admittedly, 
he was allowed a free rein to introduce changes, and was able to get rid of a lot of 
dead wood, which is not always possible. Certainly the bank as a whole is as 
ponderous as ever, but we seem to have hit a jackpot here. " (Marketing Manager) 
In summary, the data analysis supports the theory that culture can in fact be changed 
- at least within specific parts of the organisation - provided that the necessary 
commitment and authority is available. The management strategies employed at 
Bank D enabled the full potential of an innovative project to be realised, and the case 
provides practical guidance on the appropriate way for future initiatives to be 
managed. The other examples described in this Chapter illustrate how rarely such 
conditions appear to be met, as specific aspects of a 'traditional banking culture' 
appeared to engender an attitude of complacency based upon past success that still 
appears to prevail in the industry. This can be manifested to sabotage organisational 
change and hence inhibit the potential of new technologies, as illustrated in the cases 
of Bank A, B and C. Such reticence therefore offers significant opportunity for new 
market entrants to challenge the traditional banking structure in the UK 
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CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the case studies resonates with Buchanan and Huczynski's claim (1997) 
that culture can be expressed at different levels, and whilst susceptible to change by 
management at one level, there are deeper aspects to culture which may be too 
firmly embedded to be manipulated in this way. For example, the observed 
preference to 'automate' rather than 'informate' when planning new technologies may 
well be a result of entrenched cultural norms defining and limitating the range of 
alternative solutions under consideration. 
As newcomers to the banking market, First Direct and Mondex had a lot to prove and 
there was no scope for complacency. As both organisations; were set up and run as 
separate entities from their founders, the task of deliberately creating a dynamic 
culture was greatly facilitated. It can be concluded therefore that the case studies 
contribute to understanding of the relationship between organisational culture and 
technological change in two ways. Firstly it has been shown how restrictive 
inappropriate cultures can be upon the implementation of new technology projects, 
and secondly that it is possible to change a prevailing culture in order to facilitate the 
change process. A longitudinal study is necessary in order to assess whether the 
changes instigated are sustainable over time and able to encompass other areas of 
the organisation. 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 212 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox. the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
CHAPTER 10 - DISCUSSION: THE NEED FOR ORGANISATIONAL 
LEARNING 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the data analysis process followed in this thesis. It then 
considers to what extent such analysis has contributed to academic understanding of 
technological change in general, and the information technology productivity paradox 
in particular. It goes on to summarise the findings that emerged from the data 
analysis process described in Chapters 6 to 9, and pulls the analysis together by 
discussing the major issue to emerge from the study; namely, the need for 
organisational learning. The next section seeks to relate the analysis to ideas raised 
in the organisational learning literature. The chapter concludes from this that because 
the banks studied have made limited efforts to learn from past mistakes, and that 
even the lessons from successful projects are rarely disseminated throughout the 
organisation, the potential value of technological change projects continues to be 
compromised. 
THE DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS 
Grounded theoretical analysis of the case study matedal was undertaken 
in an 
attempt to draw out the contributory factors to specific project success or 
failure 
within the banks studied. The four major issues identified by this process were: 
0 organisational structure 
0 management of knowledge 
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effective leadership 
0 organisational culture 
These issues formed the subjects that were discussed in detail in Chapters 6-9 
respectively. This chapter pulls together the findings from each of these areas and 
discusses the major theme to emerge from the study - the need for organisational 
learning if effective management of new technology projects is to occur. Figure 2 
below summarises the analysis process followed in the context of the study as a 
whole 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 214 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox. - the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
All of the case studies support the earlier work described in Chapter 2, which 
criticised the notion of technological determinism. In each example, technical 
problems with the new systems were insignificant in compadson with the 
organisational issues that compromised project progress. The findings here are in 
accordance with McLoughlin and Clark (1994), who claimed that while the actual 
'technology' has some influence upon the nature of organisational change, it is only 
one of many interacting and complex factors. They concluded that effective 
introduction of new technology required a challenge to conventional prerogatives, 
and commitment from all levels of the organisation. Even then the new systems 
studied tended to evolve over a long period of time, rather than inspire immediate 
change. 
As early as 1973, Flannery predicted the imminent demise of paper cheques and the 
circuitous bank cleadng network, in favour of an electronic system made possible by 
advances in technology. We can now see with the benefit of hindsight that this 
radical change did not occur. While there have undoubtedly been important 
developments in electronic payment systems since Flannery's work was published, 
they have evolved alongside the paper based methods rather than replacing them. 
Cheques are still widely used and settlement in the credit card industry is still 
dependent on a voucher-based authorisation system. The work by Freeman and 
Perez (1988) and Nelson and Winter (1982) descdbed in Chapter 2 also supports 
these findings by emphasising the slow and incremental nature of technological 
change. This suggests that although slow, the pace of change in the banks may still 
be sufficient to maintain their market position. 
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This evolutionary scenario contrasts with the work of Schumpeter deschbed in 
Chapter 2 who predicted 'gales of destruction' in which innovative products and 
processes would sweep aside obsolete industries and set up entirely new contexts in 
a disruptive, but ultimately beneficial fashion. It has been illustrated in this research 
that change on such a large scale has not yet been observed in the UK banking 
industry. The market is still dominated by the traditional players despite the 
considerable opportunities now offered by technological developments. Freeman and 
Perez (1988) argued of course that considerable time would be needed to allow for 
the structural and social adaptations necessary for full advantage to be taken of new 
technologies. During the transition they said there would be a period of strain, as the 
old social framework became increasingly dysfunctional. The authors claimed that 
the resulting system, once finally established, would differ significantly from earlier 
versions. In support of this theory, it could be argued that the limited steps the banks 
have taken to change the way they do business are evidence of a gradual transition 
that has yet to pay dividends. If this is the case, the examples from this study show 
that there is still a long way to go, and that a longitudinal study is necessary to 
investigate the issue. 
Another scenario is that the banking market of the future could consist of entirely 
different organisations. Recent reports by financial service consultancies have 
highlighted the threat posed by Internet banking operators to the operations of the 
traditional banking oligopoly. They claim that banks are struggling to exploit the 
benefits of 'virtual banking' and stand to lose a substantial part of their business 
unless they adapt their processes and expand their product range. The developers of 
Mondex anticipate radical change of this nature and believe that precedent should 
not necessarily determine either the direction or the actual providers of new 
business 
practices. These organisations undoubtedly represent a potentially radical alternative 
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to existing banking services. Caution is clearly necessary in accepting these claims 
as parallels can be traced with the earlier excessive predictions as to the 
, revolutionary impact'of electronic banking. 
Although the potential for IT to 'transform, the banking industry has been heralded in 
the press for a number of years, this study has found no sign as yet that the UK 
banks are succumbing to the threat from new competitors. As noted by Dunne 
(1998), the banks are making record profits from their traditional business; share 
prices are at an all time high, and IT failures can be funded from reserves and are 
soon forgotten. It was also shown in Chapter 2 that while the publicity accorded to 
new banking technologies tended to generate high levels of awareness, but not 
necessarily a high degree of purchase. Even amongst the 'early-adopting' groups of 
customers, new products were bought to supplement rather than repla existing 
arrangements, (Brierley 1997). 
To conclude this section, the extent to which the results of the empirical study 
resonate with the explanations of the IT productivity paradox described in Chapter 2 
will be discussed. To do this, the six case studies were analysed against each of the 
ideas outlined in earlier chapters which have been put forward to explain the 
productivity paradox. The results can be summadsed as follows: 
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REASON FOR EXISTENCE OF ITPP BANK STUDIED 
Lack of accountability and failure to Banks A, B and C 
address past mistakes 
Focus upon automation of established Banks A, B and C 
procedures within existing organisational 
structures 
Lack of consideration of the 'human' Banks A, B and C 
issues when new technologies are 
introduced 
Tendency to 'patch' together legacy Banks A, B and C 
systems to meet changing needs 
Development of radical innovations to Bank D, First Direct, 
replace existing services Mondex 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that studies which focus largely upon the measurement of 
changes in productivity are problematic because of the difficulty of isolating the effect 
of particular changes in quantitative terms, and also because such research provides 
little information about why productivity did or did not improve. This qualitative study 
has provided plenty of evidence of a lack of accountability for failure, poor human 
resource management, and a considerable degree of mismatch between technology 
and business strategy. The examples of Bank D, First Direct and Mondex can in one 
sense be regarded as successful 'informating' (Zuboff 1988). However, the study 
has 
also shown that the projects are less innovative than they might at 
first appear 
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because of their continued reliance upon the traditional structure of their parent 
companies for reasons of functionality or credibility. Each of these possible 
explanations for the productivity paradox will now be addressed in the context of the 
data analysis. 
LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
In each of the 'failed' projects studied there was no attempt made to investigate the 
reasons for project failure with the intention of avoiding future repetition of the same 
problems. In Bank C, for example, a review was suggested, but the projected cost of 
El million was deemed too high. This figure was insignificant in comparison with the 
amount of money (some E300 million over a six year period) that had been wasted 
during implementation of the project. Interviewees from Bank C blamed the failure of 
the world-wide branch integration project on the culture of complacency which 
existed within the organisation, based on past success and prominent market 
position. Not only was the project a spectacular failure, but there seemed to be little 
concern within the company about the amount of money wasted, and no impetus to 
find out why it had gone so wrong. The same problems that had compromised the 
project were subsequently repeated because no effort was made to address the 
organisational factors that had contributed to project failure. The issue of blame 
played a significant role in the reluctance to address these factors: 
"The review might well have pinpointed the finger at certain senior individuals 
who did not want to advertise their role in the failure of the project ... so 
it was 
quietly swept under the carpet, and no organisational changes were made. 
" 
(Project Manager) 
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This scenario also applied in the case of Bank A, where a steering committee met 
once a month to check project progress. The review process was compromised by a 
fear that blame would be apportioned amongst certain individuals if too much 
ernphasis was placed upon explaining the reasons for project failure. 
In Chapter 8 it was described how the leader of Bank B's European Payment System 
project was also head of the department responsible for the bank's existing 
international payment operations. This meant that there was a direct conflict within 
his department between the need to meet performance targets - and hence qualify 
for bonus payments, which were based upon volumes of traditional payment 
business, and the task of developing and implementing a new service which would 
ultimately replace the existing methods. The large margins that the bank currently 
eams on international payment traffic would also disappear, and meant that even the 
project leader had no real incentive to make the project succeed. Some 6 years later, 
the vast majority of international transfers are still handled in the traditional manner. 
The same leader remains in place, and the slow progress has not been questioned 
within the bank. Pressure has been exerted by the European Commission to 
stimulate change, but there is little competitive threat within the industry as all the 
banks are continuing to profit from the status quo. The competition from industry 
newcomers is not yet considered viable enough within Bank B to disturb this rather 
complacent attitude. 
These examples illustrate that lack of accountability was based partly on the attitude 
of complacency which had arisen in the banks from many years of good 
financial 
results and a strong market position at the organisational level, and partly upon 
the 
desire of individuals at all levels to avoid taking personal responsibility 
for project 
failure. 
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AUTOMATION WITHIN EXISTING STRUCTURES 
There was little evidence in Bank B that technological developments were being 
utilised to pursue innovative methods of money transmission that could encompass a 
single European-wide payment system. While the technological capacity existed to 
devise more radical solutions, the project focused instead upon improvements in the 
quality and cost efficiency of existing services. In contrast, First Direct has been able 
to adopt a 'clean sheet' approach to system building and data management, as it is 
run as a separate entity from its parent bank. Interviewees identified First Direct's 
ability to customise its information technology to suit specific business needs as 
pivotal in establishing the new bank as a provider of quality service. In addition, First 
Direct offers customers the facilities of the Midland national branch network to 
withdraw cash or pay in cheques by linking the infrastructure of its proprietary 
computer system to that of its parent. As such, it provides an interesting example of 
innovation in the mode of service delivery operating in conjunction with traditional 
banking arrangements. 
It was also noted in Chapter 5 that some US banks have taken this scenario further 
and are starting to operate 'parallel banks. ' These are effectively new outlets starting 
with a clean sheet - that is, new technology and new staff - 
for the benefit of 
customers who expect 'state-of-the-art' banking facilities. The banks concerned run 
both their traditional and their new operations along side each other, rather than 
attempt to convert legacy systems and retrain existing staff to operate effectively 
in 
an entirely different culture and business environment. 
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With the exception of Bank D, the projects studied were either implemented within 
existing organisational structures, or separated entirely from day to day operations to 
avoid the difficulties associated with changing current arrangements. In Bank D the 
benefits of organisational change to support project implementation were evident, but 
the changes were not replicated in other areas. Research in the US banking industry 
by Dougherty and Hardy (1996) supported this finding. They found that remedies for 
solving innovation problems only had short-term value if the basic principles upon 
which the organisation was based remained unchanged, and that mature 
organisations were unable to sustain innovation over time because of an often 
overwhelming tendency to maintain organisational continuity. 
LACK OF INTEGRA TION BETWEEN TECHNOLOG Y AND BUSINESS STRA TEG Y 
In Bank A, the interviewees noted that there had been a more ready adoption of the 
new working practices by the business users than the IT department that developed 
the new technology. Indeed, the degree of resistance demonstrated by the IT staff 
had played a significant role in its eventual failure. Although such problems may have 
been anticipated in areas of the bank accustomed to a rule based and hierarchical 
culture, it might have been expected that people employed in a systems development 
role would be more accustomed to change. In practice, the business users across 
the bank could foresee the tangible benefits of systems integration as proposed by 
the project and were keen to progress. In contrast, the IT staff perceived a threat to 
established skill sets and power positions. Another major reason for project failure in 
Bank A was the lack of communication between business and IT areas at a strategic 
level, There was also a lack of appreciation of changing roles and pdodties in an 
increasingly competitive market. Historically, the IT department had been used 
to 
dictating terms to the business for systems design and implementation, 
but as 
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business users became more IT literate, they regarded the systems area as just 
another supplier, and became far more demanding. 
A similar situation occurred in Bank C where the IT area tried to retain its usual 
working practices and resisted the changes that project implementation would bring. 
In this case, although the business areas would benefit from the new technology, 
there were many different branches involved world-wide with differing interests and 
priorities. They failed to agree project priorities amongst themselves, and the 
individual in charge of the project lacked the authority to enforce consensus on either 
the system developers or the multifarious business users. The project leader had 
been seconded from another part of the bank and had no prior project management 
experience. This problem was compounded when he was moved on again to an 
unrelated role after completion of the project and his painfully accumulated 
experience was lost to the organisation. 
In Chapter 8 it was described how the success of the electronic home banking 
project in Bank D could be largely attributed to the Managing Director, who had 
previously been the IT Director. This individual had the vision and the power to 
instigate major structural changes, - allowing a closer working relationship between the 
business and IT areas to be built up. Divisions between business and IT areas in 
Bank D were reconciled by undertaking a 'business alignment prograrnme. ' The 
process involved analysis of the fit between the core businesses of the bank and the 
systems necessary to support this business. To get all the necessary staff working 
more closely together, people were physically removed from their roles within 
operating areas and given permanent roles as liaison officers in the IT area, while 
IT 
staff were transferred to fulfil similar roles in the relevant operating areas. 
This 
scenario contrasts sharply with the case of Bank C. The structural separation 
of 
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technical and business functions within different reporting lines ensured that there 
were no mechanisms in place to resolve conflicts between the two areas. The 
individual in charge therefore lacked the authority to instigate organisational changes 
or impose decisions upon participating areas, despite the strategic nature of the 
project. 
'PA TCHING'OF LEGACY SYSTEMS 
Short cuts and existing system 'patching' were observed in both Bank A and Bank C 
when the project aims were scaled down over time as budgets and timescales were 
exceeded. In Bank B there was a deliberate policy of adopting existing systems to 
develop new services - in fact the capabilities of current systems were used to 
determine the characteristics of new services in order to keep costs to a minimum. 
This strategy reflected the reluctance of the bank to deviate from traditional (and 
profitable) methodologies despite customer demand and increasing competition. In 
contrast, First Direct and Mondex had no reason to patch existing systems when 
developing new services. This is because they were set up from scratch and had the 
considerable advantage of having no legacy systems to contend with. It was noted in 
Chapter 5, however, that banks rarely find themselves in this fortunate position 
because of their reliance upon historical systems for day to day operations that have 
to be supported alongside new developments. A degree of patching is therefore 
inevitable except in very rare cases. Additionally, care must be taken to ensure that 
today's innovative system is not tomorrows legacy system, although current 
technological standards are converging as more attention is paid to issues of 
future 
compatibility and enhancement. 
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FOCUS UPON RADICAL INNOVATIONS 
The point was made in Chapter 2 that it may be inappropriate to focus upon 
productivity improvements as a measure Of successful new technology 
implementation, because organisations are now using IT to develop entirely products 
or services which fundamentally change the basis upon which they conduct their 
business. The examples of Bank D, First Direct, and Mondex appear at first sight to 
offer ample evidence of radical innovative activity in the UK retail banking sector. All 
the interviewees from Mondex were proud of the success that the company has so 
far achieved, and extolled the virtues of belonging to a dynamic and innovative 
organisation, which was inspired by the vision of its founders. They were less keen to 
admit that the Mondex brand has been developed largely on the strength of its links 
with established market players, particularly MasterCard. 
Closer inspection of the other seemingly innovative projects reveals that the 
electronic banking system developed by Bank D remains localised to one small area 
of the bank, and the only innovative feature of the First Direct service lies in the 
delivery mechanisms that it employs. Otherwise, the banking services offered are 
identical to those of the traditional banks, and the bank relies upon Midland for 
access to the clearing system. First Direct customers wishing to pay in cheques or 
withdraw cash are also still dependent on the Midland branch network. Resear& 
has also shown that purchasers of innovative banking products are using them to 
supplement rather than replace their existing banking arrangements (Brierley 1997), 
and a longitudinal study is therefore necessary to address this issue fully. 
In summary, therefore, the data analysis contdbutes to understanding of 
the 
technological change process and confirms the findings of earlier work 
that has 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 225 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox: the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
investigated possible reasons for the existence of the productivity paradox. It also 
supports the findings of earlier research described in this thesis which investigated 
the process of technological change management in the banking industry. For 
example, as with earlier work, it has been shown here that specific aspects of 
organisational structure, culture and management style tended to compromise the 
potential of the technological change projects studied. In consequence, the full 
potential of such new technologies was rarely realised. It was surprising that the 
same problems identified in the past were still recurring consistently in view of both 
the amount of resources the banks have invested in the projects, and the 
increasingly competitive nature of the market in which they are operating. The 
findings therefore raised questions about the apparent lack of learning from past 
mistakes, an issue that earlier work in this area has not focused upon. Discussion of 
this broader issue was incorporated into later interviews, and the results provide a 
different perspective on our understanding of how new technologies are managed 
within the banks. The next section of this chapter draws together the analysis in the 
previous chapters in terms of the perceived need for organisational learning if 
technological change projects are to be managed more effectively. 
THE NEED FOR ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING 
'RINGFENCING'LEARNING 
Chapter 6 focused upon the influential role of organisational structure within the case 
study banks. The work builds upon the Burns and Stalker theories of 'mechanistic' 
and 'Organic' structures by focusing upon the difficulties faced by the banks in 
attempting to change from one type of structure to the other. In order to 
facilitate 
Such change, new projects were 'ringfenced' from mainstream operational activities. 
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The value of separating innovative projects was evident in the cases of First Direct, 
Mondex and to some extent Bank D, but at the same time it was noted that the 
projects continued to rely upon the parent institution. For example, although it is 
fashionable to condemn bureaucratic structures for restricting innovation, the 
success of First Direct appeared to owe more to the solid reputation of its parent, and 
also to the convenience of allowing customers access to the Midland branch network, 
than to the capabilities of the new technology the bank employed on a green-field 
site. 
The internal "think tank" developed by Bank B was also ring-fenced from operational 
activities. It was charged with identifying industry trends and appropriate 
technological solutions, and provides yet another example of innovation in isolation 
from standard organisational practice. Such policies have obvious benefits for the 
individual project in terms of facilitating culture change by providing the ability to start 
with a clean sheet of paper. In each of the examples studied however, it seemed 
that the benefits of the organisational separation policy were restricted 2only to the 
particular project in question. This was because day to day activities within the banks 
were unaffected by the success of spin-off projects, as no specific systems were 
developed to encourage leaming by integrating the new projects with existing 
operations. By ring-fencing the projects, the very opposite was actually the case. The 
success of Mondex and First Direct has yet to impact on Nat West and Midland in 
terms of the way in which each parent company is structured and managed. By 
restricting the opportunities to leam from successful projects, no ongoing 
commitment to innovation can be generated in the mainstream banking areas. This 
finding supports the work of Garvin (1993) who noted how the existence of such 
intra-company boundades inhibited the flow of information, encouraged isolation and 
reinforced preconceptions. To recommend, therefore, that organisations transform 
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their structures from 'mechanistic' to 'organic' appears ovedy simplistic and 
something not easily achieved in practice. 
LEARNING ACROSS DEPARTMENTS 
The level of interaction between business and IT departments was also found to be a 
significant issue in the context of project success or failure. The literature review 
showed that this problem has been raised in numerous research projects going right 
back to the 1970s. Despite this, few of the banks studied had any systematic 
procedures in place to encourage communication and co-operation between these 
areas. Once again this indicates that little learning has taken place from earlier 
experiences. While interviewees from both Bank A and Bank C cited poor 
communication between the two areas as a major contributor to project failure, the 
successful project run by Bank D was characterised by a close relationship between 
all project participants. This situation was facilitated by the effective leadership of a 
manager with both systems and business experience. As the relationship between 
business and IT areas emerged as a major theme in all the cases studied, the issues 
surrounding business and technical expertise at the individual level were addressed 
in a separate chapter. 
INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL BARRIERS TO LEARNING 
Chapter 7 described how the case study banks met considerable resistance to the 
changes in working practices and conditions that arose dudng the development and 
implementation of the new technology projects. Again, this was a common 
finding in 
the literature, but surprisingly the main source of resistance actually arose 
from within 
the bank IT departments themselves. This issue impacted adversely upon 
the 
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projects studied in Banks A, B and C, despite the attempts of the banks to build new 
knowledge structures and integrate business and IT functions where possible. Their 
strategies to encourage learning by transferring knowledge have involved 
experimentation with extemal recruitment, the breakdown of traditional grading 
structures and the development of new forms of expertise. In some cases, the 
potential for learning was compromised by entrenched social divisions between 
managers and workers that discouraged full and frank communication in either 
direction. Whilst these policies may not seem very radical in themselves, they 
represented a major break with tradition in some of the more conservative institutions 
studied. As such, they have been introduced with caution and in a piece-meal 
fashion, so it may be some time before the full impact of these changes upon the 
implementation of new technologies in the banks can be assessed. Certainly the 
policy was successful in the case of Bank D, but the changes were restricted only to 
the London office and have yet to be introduced in other parts of the bank. 
LEADERSHIP AND LEARNING 
In Chapter 8 the findings of earlier research into the role of visionary leaders at the 
organisational level were compared and contrasted with the results of the empirical 
study. The examples from the literature indicated that the effectiveness of such 
leaders in terms of the successful projects in which they were involved was 
considerable. The case study examples of First Direct (and to some extent Monclex) 
have been well publicised success stories, but the data analysis has shown here that 
their success cannot be wholly attributed to visionary leadershIP. For example, as 
shown above, heavyweight institutional backing has played a crucial role in securing 
customer acceptance of the new technologies. Bank B is one of 
the more 
conservative of the UK banks and not renowned for innovative leadership. 
Recent 
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advertising promotions have emphasised the importance of historical continuity, and 
the stated intention of the bank is to concentrate upon its traditional strengths. This 
policy was reflected in the failure of the leaders of the payment system project to 
pursue any innovative solution. 
Analysis of the case studies indicated that innovative projects driven by visionary 
leaders tended to succeed despite adverse organisational conditions, rather than as 
a result of supportive organisational factors. Common problems faced by project 
managers included lack of access to necessary resources, and the receipt of only 
temporary support from senior management who did not rate innovation consistently 
on their list of pdodties. The pressure to work within prevailing organisational 
systems tended to encourage conformity and stability. The heroic efforts of 
individuals could therefore result in a successful project on a one-off basis without 
engendering any lasting commitment to innovation within the company. Subsequent 
projects would therefore come up against exactly the same problems. This scenario 
occurred in the case of Bank C, where the lack of learning from project to project was 
emphasised by a policy of moving on project managers with accumulated 
experience. Newcomers who replaced them therefore faced exactly the same 
difficulties in running a new project. 
From the evidence presented in Chapter 9 it can be concluded that culture plays an 
important role in the adoption and implementation of technological innovations. 
Specific aspects of a 'traditional banking culture' appeared to engender an attitude of 
cOmplacency amongst the major players based upon historical success rather 
than 
cOmmercial reality. This tended to reduce their perceived need to 
learn from past 
mistakes and hence inhibited the potential of new technologies, as illustrated 
in the 
cases of Bank A, B and C. Such reluctance offered significant opportunity 
for new 
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market entrants to challenge the traditional banking structure in the UK. As 
newcomers to the banking market, First Direct and Mondex had a lot to prove and 
there was no scope for complacency. As both organisations were set up and run as 
separate entities from their founders, the task of creating a dynamic culture was 
greatly facilitated. The example of Bank D showed that it was possible for culture to 
be changed within a traditional bank, albeit it only within a restricted area on this 
occasion. The case illustrated how the particular management strategies based upon 
teamwork and empowerment that were employed at Bank D enabled the full potential 
of the project to be realised. 
To conclude this section, the major learning issues that emerged from analysis of the 
case studies are summarised below: 
FACTORS COMPROMISING IT PROJECTS BANK 
STUDIED 
Reliance upon automation of existing procedures Bank B 
Lack of accountability for project failure Banks A, B, 
and C 
Complex and dysfunctional organisational structures Banks A, B, 
and C 
Lack of key IT and project management skills - poor Banks A, B, 
management of expertise and C 
Misalignment of technology and business strategy Banks A, B, 
and C 
A culture of complacency and resistance to change Banks A, 
B, 
and C 
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Lack of learning from the mistakes of earlier projects Banks A, and 
C 
Friction and lack of integration between IT and Banks A, and 
business areas C 
Lessons learnt from successful projects not Bank D, First 
disseminated throughout organisation 
II 
Direct, Mondex 
-- 
Despite these problems, the banks are making record profits and inroads into the 
market by industry newcomers are not yet significant. Endudng value is still attdbuted 
to the traditional banks in terms of their: 
0 reputation for integrity and safe-keeping of funds 
0 dominant market position and scale of reserves 
0 level of financial commitment to new projects 
0 customer inertia preventing large-scale defection to other service providers 
0 convenience to customers of nation-wide branch structures 
0 profitability of existing operations 
These factors have contributed to the continuing market strength of the traditional 
banks in the UK, and time has therefore been allowed for the somewhat limited 
operating changes that they have instigated to gather momentum. For example, the 
following strategies were observed during the empirical study that facilitated project 
Success: 
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FACTORS FACILITATING IT PROJECTS BANK STUDIED 
Using new technology to 'informate' rather than- First Direct, Monde-x 
'automate' Bank D 
'Ringfencing' new projects from the rest of the First Direct, Mondex, 
organisation Banks B and D 
Building links between business and IT areas D 
Willingness of staff to accept change and learn new Bank D 
skills 
External recruitment policies to acquire new skills Banks B and D, First 
Direct and Mondex 
Cultivation of 'Power Users' and Internal Banks B and D, First 
Consultancies to generate knowledge and facilitate Direct and Mondex 
learning 
Ability to rely upon existing business structures and First Direct and 
processes for new project success Mondex 
Inspirational leadership Bank D and First 
Direct 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, these activities have resulted in specific project 
successes without generating commitment to technological innovation at the 
organisational level. For example, even the rapid growth and success of First Direct 
has not impacted upon mainstream banking within Midland Bank. Furthermore, First 
Direct, s telephone banking service itself appears less innovative when its continued 
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reliance upon the branch infrastructure of Midland is considered. These issues tap 
into a broader set of ideas and concerns about organisational leaming, and are 
discussed in the next section that examines the literature in this area. Such a 
synthesis of ideas may shed light on the lack of leaming that was observed in the 
empidcal cases. 
THEORIES OF ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING 
Senge (1990) descdbed leaming organisations as: 
ff places where people continually expand their capacity to create the results 
they truly desire, where new and expansive pattems of thinking are nurtured, 
where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually 
leaming how to leam together " (p. 1) 
This definition appears over-idealistic and gives no guidance on the practicalities of 
encouraging organisational leaming. Garvin (1993) also acknowledged the growing 
commercial imperative for learning, but noted that few companies explicitly 
encouraged learning in pursuit of competitive advantage. He defined the learning 
Process as follows: 
"A learning organisation is an organisation skilled at creating, acquiring, and 
transferying knowledge, and at modifying its behaviour to reflect new 
knowledge and insights. " (p. 80) 
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Many other writers have noted the increasing need for organisational earning if 
cornpanies are to compete effectively in rapidly changing markets, (see for example 
Whipp and Clark 1986, Jackson and McLoughlin 1997). 
Theories of organisational learning help to show the relationship between learning 
processes and the form that learning takes. It is thus important to recognise that not 
all of what is learnt in organisations is done in an explicit and codified way. Huber 
(1996b), for instance distinguished three components; firstly, knowledge acquisition 
(which may be by means of expedence, experimentation or acquisition); secondly 
information distribution (which can be facilitated by technologies such as databases 
or groupware) and thirdly organisational memo (which may be in the heads of 
employees or as wriften down rules and procedures). 
One issue here is that the 'tacit rather than the 'formal' elements of knowledge (see 
Chapter 7) are more difficult to transfer and retain. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
claimed that the conversion of tacit to explicit knowledge represented the most 
important element of organisational leaming, and could be achieved by the promotion 
of 'knowledge networks' active at each of the acquisition, transfer and storiing stages 
of leaming deschbed above. Argyýs (1977) identified 'single-loop' leaming as a 
scenario where decisions were based on prior experýience without questioning the 
undedying norms upon which the orýiginal action had been taken. He claimed that this 
type of leaming was inadequate for innovation, which instead relied upon 'double' or 
'triple' loop leaming where decisions were taken only after analysing the reasons why 
a particular strategy had been followed in the past. Jackson and McLoughlin 
(1997) 
suggested that conventional bureaucratic organisations such as 
banks rarely 
progressed beyond single loop learning, and Morgan (1986) suggested 
this was 
because different departments and hierarchical levels operated 
in a fragmented 
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fashion according to their own interests and goals. This finding is closely related to 
the concept of 'bounded rationaliV (March and Simon 1994) and this study has 
highlighted the attempts within the banks to overcome this constraint; by means of 
external recruitment and hybhd managers for example. 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that insufficient time may not yet have been allowed for 
organisations to maximise the potential of new technologies. Historical examples 
were provided (Simon 1987 and David 1990) from other inclustries that illustrated the 
length of time necessary for new technologies to be fully accepted and integrated in 
preference to traditional and established methods. Both writers emphasised the need 
for an extended leaming curve whenever radical changes to existing practices were 
proposed. Tidd et al (1997) showed how an organisation's existing knowledge base 
could constrain its capacity to exploit the opportunities presented by technological 
advances, because the learning process required would be 'path-dependent'. This 
meant that the new knowledge acquired would be strongly based on existing 
knowledge in order to reduce the perceived risk associated with the change. The 
more commifted an organisation became to a chosen leaming curve, the more 
difficult it would be to switch the leaming process to a radically different area. This 
finding was observed in the case study banks and also builds upon the theoretical 
discussion of 'technological lock-in' in Chapter 2. 
It can be argued that organisations need first to make mistakes in order to learn from 
them, and the banks studied in this thesis should therefore not be condemned too 
strongly for some of the errors they have made. However, the absence of 
learning 
frOm past mistakes was one of the more surprising issues to arise from this study. 
It 
meant that subsequent projects within a bank tended to come up against exactly 
the 
same Problems as had been experienced earlier. The considerable resources 
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devoted to IT projects did not extend to measurement of the effectiveness of new 
systems, or analysis of why mistakes had occurred. This scenario was particularly 
applicable to Bank C, where the lack of learning from project to project was 
emphasised by a policy of moving on project leaders with accumulated experience. 
Newcomers who replaced them faced the same difficulties in running a new project. 
Bank D successfully implemented a new technology project, but the organisational 
changes that were introduced to facilitate the operation have yet to be replicated in 
other areas of the bank. In Chapter 8 it was shown that no individual project leader 
among the case study banks was able to instigate widespread organisational change 
that might prevent the same problems recurring in future projects. The policy of 
'ringfencing' new IT projects has limited impact because the remainder of the 
organisation is unaffected by the change, and consequently has no opportunity to 
build upon project successes at the organisational level. Research in the US banking 
industry by Dougherty and Hardy (1996) supported this finding; they found that 
standard remedies put forward for solving innovation problems only had short term 
value if the basic principles upon which the organisation was based remained 
unchanged. In other words, they believed that such organisations could not sustain 
innovation over time because of often overwhelming tendencies to maintain 
Organisational continuity. 
Gulliver (1984) descdbed the benefits that had accrued to British Petroleum as a 
result of implementing a 'Post-Project Appraisal Unit' (PPA) which was respons, ble 
for analysing completed projects within BP. The results of this review were 
disseminated throughout the organisation so that particular successes could 
be 
repeated elsewhere, and lessons learned from past mistakes: 
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"The PPA philosophy is that the companys investment performance will only 
improve as more BP people learn what went wrong and what went right in the 
past" (p. 454) 
The author noted that despite the obvious value of such a strategy, he had found few 
examples of companies that made even a cursory attempt to evaluate project 
performance after completion. Maidique and Zirger (1985) studied a large number of 
both failed and successful new products in the electronics industry and concluded 
that knowledge obtained by analysis of failure was often instrumental in achieving 
subsequent success. They described failure as 'the ultimate teachee. In one of the 
few examples of post-project appraisal found, Garvin (1993) described how Boeing 
introduced new policies to learn from mistakes after experiencing difficulties with the 
introduction of both the 737 and 747 aeroplanes. A high-level project team was 
appointed to compare the new product launches with earlier, more successful efforts 
to analyse where mistakes had been made. The group was charged with developing 
a set of 'lessons leamed'for the benefit of people involved in future product launches. 
Individuals who had worked on this appraisal team were then seconded to the 757 
and 767 start-up teams to transfer the lessons learned to these new projects, both of 
which went on to be successfully launched. The scarcity of such success stories 
indicates that it is not only the banking industry that is failing to maximise the benefits 
of new technology, and a comparative study of IT project management in a variety of 
industries may provide valuable insights into this problem. This particular study 
has 
concentrated upon UK banks; future research that builds upon these findings and 
focuses upon comparing bank strategies for IT in a number of different countries may 
be of considerable value. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the individual projects studied provide some Support for 
each of the theoriies put forward in Chapter 2 for the existence of the IT productivity 
paradox. The cases also contribute to the debate by considering the role played by 
organisational structure, knowledge management, leadership, culture and 
organisational learning in the management of new technology projects. Such detailed 
information would not have been obtained if the traditional quantitative method of 
studying the productivity paradox had been followed. The findings support the work 
of Wilson described in Chapter 2 who found little evidence of productivity 
improvements when new technologies were introduced in a number of industry 
sectors. 
To summarise, the limited steps that the banks studied have taken to facilitate 
technological change have had some success at the individual project level, but have 
not yet instigated a more long term commitment to innovation and change throughout 
the organisation. According to many interviewees, this lack of learning from past 
experience is not regarded as a problem within the industry because the market 
position of the banks remains as strong as ever. Whether this position is sustainable 
over time is a question that can only be addressed by a longitudinal study. It can 
therefore be concluded from the analysis that this issue is contributing to the 
continued observance of the information technology productivity paradox. 
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CHAPTER 11 -CONCLUSIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This short concluding chapter begins by surnmarising the reasons why new 
technology management in the banking industry was chosen as the subject of this 
thesis. It then assesses the findings in order to consider whether the study has 
addressed the specific research questions raised. Areas where further research 'is 
thought to be necessary are suggested, and also the extent to which the results of 
this study can be generalised to other industries. Finally, the implications of the 
findings are considered in the context of future success prospects for both the 
traditional banks and industry newcomers. 
SUMMARY 
The banking industry was considered to be an important example of technological 
change to study because of its position as the world's heaviest investor in new 
technology. The extent of the industry's domination of the market for new technology 
projects means that findings from an industry study also have a wider relevance in 
the context of technological change in the economy as a whole. 
This thesis has studied the management of new technology projects within the 
banks 
in an attempt to find out why so many projects do not reach their 
full potential, 
despite the high levels of investment made and the acknowledged commercial 
imperative. It is becoming increasingly common to read in the press of 
how 
technology has the potential to 'transform' banking practice, 
but in reality the 
progress appears to be slow and incremental. New services 
have tended to be 
added to a banWs existing services rather than replace them, and 
they only become 
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integrated into mainstream banking practice over a period of many years. As 
indicated by the limited take up of the Mondex product to date, the use of cash as a 
payment mechanism has proved to be extremely durable despite the increasing 
variety of alternatives now available. 
It was noted at the beginning of this thesis that conservative approaches to 
technological change offered significant opportunity for new market entrants to 
challenge the traditional banking structure in the UK. The degree of success 
experienced by newcomers such as First Direct and the supermarkets in a 
comparatively short period of time indicates that the banks are starting to lose market 
share to organisations that are able to offer new forms of banking service by utilising 
information technology more effectively. In such operating conditions, the business 
incentive to improve productivity within the traditional banks is considerable. 
However, there appeared to be little evidence of this in practice. The paradox 
between technological opportunity and business reality in the UK retail banks 
warranted further investigation and this issue formed the focus of the study. 
ASSESSMENT OF FINDINGS 
The thesis put forward in Chapter 2 was that the difficulty of translating technological 
opportunity into increased productivity centres upon the way in which new technology 
implementation is conceptualised and managed within adopting organisations, rather 
than upon technical failings. By contrasting the ways in which the retail 
banks and 
their new competitors approached the implementation of new technology projects, 
it 
was possible to identify a number of factors which were critical 
to the success or 
failure of each project studied. The findings from a number of projects recently 
implemented in a vadety of traditional UK banking organisations and 
industry 
Lisa Harris, Brunel University page 
241 
Technological Change and the Productivity Paradox.. the management of new 
technologies in UK retail banks 
newcomers were brought together in order to analyse the management issues in 
rnore detail. Six projects were studied in depth, with the background to the cases 
described in Chapter 5. 
The analysis of the findings set out in Chapters 6- 10 has shown that the way in 
which new technology projects in the case study banks were managed was indeed 
pivotal in shaping the implementation process and the eventual outcome achieved. 
This finding does not mean that all the projects studied were badly managed. On the 
contrary, many instances were noted where effective management facilitated and 
enhanced project success. Chapter 10 drew these findings together and concluded 
that the banks studied were unable to translate the learning taking place within 
individual Proeects into a systematic process that could be utilised at an 
orqanisational level for the benefit of the bank as a whole. Consequently, despite the 
amount of resources the banks have dedicated to information technology, the 
improvements made remain fragmented and transitory in nature. 
This study has confirmed the findings of earlier work that has variously Identified 
organisational structure, knowledge management, leadership and culture as critical 
issues in the management of new technology projects. It has also built upon these 
findings because previous research has focused upon the measurement of 
PrOductivity changes rather than detailed qualitative analysis of a range of 
management processes, and hence has not paid the same attention to the vital 
issue 
of generating and disseminating organisational learning. it can therefore 
be 
contended that the study has contributed to the theoretical debate about the nature of 
technological change and the reasons for the continued existence of the productivitY 
paradox, as well as provide practical guidance for managers on 
the successful 
implementation of future new technology projects. 
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CAN THE RESULTS BE GENERALISED TO OTHER INDUSTRIES? 
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is dangerous to assume that the findings of an analysis 
of six case studies have a wider application in other situations. Even if a larger 
number of cases had been studied, the method does not allow 'proof' to be 
established in a statistically significant sense. However, the position of the financial 
services industry as the UK's leading investor in new technologies made it a 
particularly suitable arena in which to study technological change and the information 
technology productivity paradox. This means that the lessons learned may have 
relevance in a wider context than is usually provided by concentration upon one 
specific industry. It has also been argued in Chapter 2 that a qualitative study of 
contemporary cases can provide the rich detail necessary to illuminate the social and 
cultural influences upon technological change that are beyond the reach of a 
quantitative approach. 
Care has been taken throughout the analysis process to compare the findings with 
those of previous research and to build upon existing theories where possible. 
Additional value can be obtained by drawing upon areas of literature (in this case 
technological change and organisational learning) that are usually studied in 
isolation. Theodes of the nature of learning, of course, have a very broad currency. It 
is contended, therefore, that the study of technological change management in the 
banks can add to current knowledge of more genedc issues of innovation theory and 
the management of innovation in practice. 
Certainly, there are a number of precedents in other industdes of the market situation 
currently experienced by the banks. Many historical studies of technological 
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competition discussed in Chapter 2 have shown that established market players tend 
not to come up with innovative ideas. Such research demonstrates that the usual 
response by industry incumbents to a threat from industry pioneers is further 
investment in existing technology - or, if new technology is employed, traditional 
business processes are imposed upon its use. Industry incumbents are then able to 
avoid the risks associated with early market and technical uncertainties by delaying 
major investment in the new technology until a later stage. The drawback of this 
strategy is that they tend to get left behind and consequently struggle to establish a 
viable market position in comparison with the more innovative pioneers who have 
hence been given time to build up the necessary skills. The parallels are such that 
future studies of technological change in the banking industry may well provide 
another example to add to this list which currently includes sailing ships, electro- 
mechanical calculators, typewriters and many others. 
SUGGESTED AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
This particular study has concentrated upon UK banks; future research that builds 
upon these findings, and focuses upon compahng bank strategies for IT in a number 
of different countrlies may be of considerable value. In Chapter 10 it was noted that 
research in other inclustrlies has also commonly reported on failures to maximise the 
benefits of new technology. The scarcity of success sWes in this area indicates that 
a comparative study of IT project management in a varýiety of industries may provide 
valuable insights into the problem. 
It has also been shown in this study that the limited steps the banks 
have taken to 
facilitate technological change have had some success at the individual project 
level, 
but have not yet instigated a longer term commitment to innovation and 
change 
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throughout the organisation. This lack of learning from past experience is not 
regarded as a problem within the industry because the market Position of the banks 
remains strong. Whether this position is sustainable over time is a question that 
would make an interesting longitudinal study. 
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
To conclude the study, this final section reflects on what the results can tell us about 
the future make-up of the banking industry. At this stage it is still difficult to predict 
the likely extent of change in the industry structure. It is clear that the benefits to the 
consumer in terms of increased choice and efficiency are likely to be considerable. 
The historical review of the financial services industry in Chapter 3 showed how new 
services tended to evolve and integrate with existing ones over a period of many 
years. It is important to bear in mind the cautionary note described in Chapter 1 
against the frequent tendency to exaggerate the potential of new technologies. 
Claims that technological advances will prove the demise of traditional banks may 
well be premature. 
It was argued in earlier chapters that an 'anti-innovation' culture still prevails in the 
banks which encompasses the dealings that they have with both clients and their 
own staff. As a result, attempts to introduce radical changes in working practices 
based upon new communication technologies have so far been both belated and 
half-hearted. Bank customers also tend to mistrust radical change, as trials of 
Mondex and reaction to EMU have shown. Evidence has been put forward in earlier 
chapters which shows that the market position of the banks remains strong, 
but that 
the pressure from industry newcomers is forcing them to become more Innovative. 
Steps have been taken by the banks to address some of the organisational 
issues 
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described in earlier chapters that have compromised IT projects in the past. It is clear 
from the empirical study that these changes have had a limited impact to date 
because innovation in a wider organisational context is not yet evident. Earlier 
research has also shown that technological change tends to be incremental in 
nature, is initially based upon existing routines, and the social changes associated 
with new technology implementation take a considerable amount of time to filter 
through the system. 
In contrast to the traditional banks, organisations such as Mondex and First Direct 
tend to be free of the costs of maintaining extensive branch networks and complex 
legacy computer systems and they are not constrained by vested interests in 
maintaining existing technologies. Furthermore, despite current scepticism, the 
acceptance of telephone banking or electronic cash requires a leap of faith by the 
consumer which is not unprecedented. Many financial transactions today are only 
represented by numbers on bank statements, and over a lengthy period of time it 
became acceptable to receive coins in exchange for goods, then paper cheques 
instead of coins, and even automatic bank transfers instead of cheques. It has also 
been noted in this study that supposedly innovative ideas are often supported by 
mainstream industry incumbents; certainly the innovative projects studied here relied 
upon their links with established market players for customer acceptance. On this 
basis, it would appear that the prospects for acceptance of new banking technologies 
over the longer term are good, but they will operate under the remit of the existing 
market leaders who will continue to dominate the industry for the foreseeable future. 
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